The Southland Times MONDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1944. The Red Army in Hungary

Southland Times, Issue 25513, 6 November 1944, Page 4

The Southland Times MONDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1944. The Red Army in Hungary

TITHEN it was reported on Septi temher 11 ‘that the Russians were attempting to gain control of the Transylvanian passes it seemed probable that the battle for Hungary had. at last begun. In the weeks that followed, however, news from the south-eastern front came in fragments. If there was a battle for the mountain passes, the outside world heard little about it. There were reports that troops of the 2nd Ukranian Front were edging into Transylvania, that Marshal Malinovsky’s army group was taking the mountain road to Budapest. Then came a significant announcement: Russian troops had crossed into Yugoslavia to link up with Tito’s Partisans. And on September -28 it was reported that the Red Army had started an offensive against Hungary on a 100-mile front. It became clear, from details released later, that Marshal Malinovsky was attacking from the south-east, while General Petrov’s trans-Carpathian armies came down upon Hungary’s northern border. North-east of Nyiregyhaza the two forces made their junction, and thereafter moved towards Budapest between the Tisa and the Danube. It was pointed out some days ago that, by launching his main drive along the Tisa-Danube corridor, Marshal Malinovsky had “sacrificed width of front to secure his flanks and* had forced the Germans and Hungarians to risk complete destruction.” The Soviet risks in this battle can apparently be taken within a largei’ strategic situation which everywhere favours the Russians. It was in the mountain passes, if anywhere, that the enemy could have checked the advance. The Carpathians and the Transylvanian Alps have been described as perfect defence systems, and the Germans have shown in Italy that they can make excellent use of natural obstacles. Why, then, were they driven so easily out of the mountains? The answer seems to be the encirclement of Hungary, and especially the Soviet penetration from Yugoslavia. Hitler’s purpose is not merely to defend Hungary, but to arrange everywhere the withdrawal of his forces to the outer defences of the Reich. The Germans in Transylvania were facing a wide thrust against the eastern lowlands, and a simultaneous infiltration from the mountains in the north. At the same time the Russians and the Yugoslav guerrillas were closing in upon the German escape route from Greece and’Serbia, which runs through the Morava Gap, between Belgrade and Nish. The Germans were being squeezed out of the Balkans. It is in relation to this general and wide advance that the attack on Budapest must be given its true importance. The Russians delayed their assault on the Hungarian capital until they had completed a giant encirclement. Now that they are moving forward in a final thrust, it seems impossible for the Germans to stop them. The Axis forces were engaged on a front which extends from the north-east to the south. They have been driven back into a corridor between the two rivers which are the only possible defence lines on the Hungarian plain. The fall of Budapest cannot be long delayed. Towards Austria

Soviet announcements are seldom premature. When Moscow correspondents are allowed to release favourable reports, it can be assumed that they are accurate. The situation in Hungary can therefore be judged correctly from the sudden relaxation of the military censorship. One correspondent has been allowed to say that the Russians may be able to take Budapest by November 7, the anniversary of the October Revolution. Moscow radio h as declared that Red Army troops are already shouting “On to Germany.” If Austria is to be counted as part of the Reich, this slogan does not sound too optimistic. The Russians have broken into the great plains of central Europe, and they are attacking in force. Vienna, the capital of Austria, is not much more than 100 miles from Budapest, with flat country all the way. This is the most vulnerable part of the German front. The only possible line which could be stabilized in the east would have to extend from East Prussia through Czechoslovakia to the Styrian Alps. It will be difficult, and may be impossible, for the Germans to check an offensive up the valley of the Danube while the Red Army renews its pressure in Poland and East Prussia, and while the Allies continue to press against the western frontiers. German manpowei’ has already achieved miracles. The restoration of a strong line in the west could not have been possible if reserves were as scanty as Allied spokesmen alleged. But manpower is not the only requirement, although in the present stage of the war its strength or weakness must be a vital factor. The Germans have already lost the oilfields of Rumania. A Russian advance up the Danube will deprive them of grain and minerals and—in Austria—of industrial resources which so far have suffered lightly from air raids. Political reactions are less certain. If there is a profound war weariness in Austria, and if Nazi rule is as unpopular as some reports have suggested, it might be supposed that civilian morale would weaken as the invaders drew nearer. ■

It might also be claimed that the Soviet advance would have a unifying effect. The Austrians may not care greatly for the Nazis; but they care even less for the Russians. They have fought for Germany on remote fields, without any noticeable weakness of morale; and it must surely be expected that they will fight more strenuously when they are defending their own soil. These possibilities may soon be tested. The time should not be far distant when Russian troops will be inside the Reich. If the Germans do not collapse then, with their country invaded simultaneously from the east and the west, it will be necessary to admit that the war must go on until the Reich is helpless under a military occupation. That will mean hard fighting, and there may be no quick advance. But the Red Army’s offensive in Hungary seems to be completing an encirclement which makes the final result inevitable, and which brings it appreciably nearer.