War in the Indian Ocean

Southland Times, Issue 24681, 28 February 1942, Page 4

War in the Indian Ocean

IT IS BELIEVED in London that the Axis Powers are “looking at the spring campaign as a complete world picture.” The Germans and the Japanese are expected to aim at a junction of forces somewhere in the Middle East. While the Germans push towards the Caucasus, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, the Japanese will tighten their hold on Burma, and at the same time cut the trade routes of the Indian Ocean. Most experts believe that a successful attack on Burma would be followed by a march into India. The attraction which this move must hold for Japanese strategists (apart from intrinsic gains) is the opportunity it provides for the encirclement of China. India is not strongly defended; its racial groups are divided in politics and religion; and there is a mass inertia derived from the apathy of large backward populations dominated by politicallyconscious minorities. The occupation of India would isolate China from all sources of supply except Russia, and no materials could come from this direction if the Red Army were weakened by the western campaign. It is easy to feel that a strategy which visualizes the seizure of vast territories must be insanely ambitious. But a country is only as strong as its defences, and the Japanese have already discovered that British territories in the east are not strongly garrisoned. Fortunately the situation is changing. The time-table has been disorganized by Russia’s powerful counter-offensive. Japan’s partner in aggression will have to make a surpreme military and economic effort if the expected drive to the Caucasus is to take place. And by the time Germany is ready to recovex- the initiative (if that is possible) the weight of American support should be retarding the Japanese drive in Asia.

Nevertheless tfle threat to the Indian Ocean cannot be removed until the Japanese navy suffers crippling losses. Even if no gains were made west of Burma or south of Java the Japanese would still be in a position to threaten the sea lanes between Australia, Suez and Cape Town. By capturing Singapore they have obtained a base from which they can cut the main ocean routes in the important strategic triangle, thereby interfering with the flow of troops and equipment to the Middle East. British convoys will need greater protection, which can be provided only by withdrawing naval squadrons from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. While this is being done the Germans will be able to reinforce their Libyan army more safely and substantially, and it will be harder for the United States Navy to strengthen its Pacific fleet without weakening its hold upon the Atlantic. A British naval victory in the Indian Ocean would speedily alter the balance of power. But the Japanese will probably attempt to avoid a decisive encounter. Their policy may be to carry out extensive raids, and to support their troops on the coasts of Asia. The Japanese must therefore be checked on land, and the quickest way of

doing this will be the attainment of a complete air supremacy. That is why the Allied air successes in Burma and Java are the most encouraging feature of the war against Japan.