The Southland Times. THURSDAY, JANUARY 22, 1942. Enemy Objectives in Burma

Southland Times, Issue 24649, 22 January 1942, Page 4

The Southland Times. THURSDAY, JANUARY 22, 1942. Enemy Objectives in Burma

fpHE JAPANESE occupation of 1 Tavoy, reported yesterday in a message from Rangoon, means that the enemy is half-way up the narrow Burmese province of Tenasserim, on the shores of the Indian Ocean: No indication has been given of the strength of the forces engaged in this area, although it seems probable that the British troops were not numerous enough to offer any serious resistance. Apparently Tenasserim was not given an important place in the defence plans for Burma, in spite of the fact that its comparative closeness to the South Thailand railway makes it an obvious base- for offensive action. If sufficient forces were available it should not be difficult to cut the Japanese lines on the narrow Kra Isthmus. Unfortunately Burma has been thrown upon her own resources, and these are not large enough to support anything more than a strictly defensive strategy. As in so many other British countries, small military forces with only meagre equipment are called upon to defend a large territory against a numerically superior enemy. To a certain extent their task has been simplified by a terrain which provides immense natural fortifications. Events on other fronts have made it necessary to speak cautiously of physical obstacles. But unless the Japanese have an overwhelming air superiority they are not likely to consider an advance from any direction except the south. The northeastern frontier region of Burma in the upper Shan States is protected by mountain ranges that are extensions of the great natural vertebrae of western China. In the lower Shan States, where the frontier opens into the Japanese-occupied territories of French Indo-China and Thailand, the Salween River — bridgeless and turbulent —is regarded as an impassable barrier. Moreover, the road on its eastern bank, which runs north to south through the Shan Plateau, is extremely narrow and dangerous. Frequent landslides occur, and only a few demolitions would be needed to make it useless. At the mouth of the Salween is Moulmein, the terminus of the railway from Rangoon, and it is probably here that the British land forces would offer their main resistance to an invader. The country between Moulmein and Tavoy has few good roads. There are several rivers, short and fast-flowing; and although coastal operations could be supported from the sea the Japanese would probably have to organize them on a larger scale than seems possible at present. Burma is a monsoon country, and there are still nearly four months of good campaigning weather before the rains begin in the middle of May. It has always been assumed that the Japanese would make the Burma road their first objective. But this famous road, which begins at Lashio, 150 miles north-east of Mandalay, is probably safe from anything except air attack; and in recent weeks the expansion of the International Air Force seems to have given it a more complete security. The value of the road, however, depends on the continued use of Rangoon as a supply base. If the Japanese make a serious attack on Burma they are almost certain to use the southern route through Tenasserim. They are already at Tavoy, which gives them a landing field about 250 miles from Rangoon. And since Rangoon, in addition to being the entrepot which feeds the Burma road, is also the port of disembarkation for reinforcements from India, it will be subjected to increasingly heavy air attacks. But the land expedition should not be on a dangerously large scale while fighting continues in Malaya.