The Southland Times. WEDNESDAY, MAY 28, 1941. A Time-Table for the Middle East

Southland Times, Issue 24446, 28 May 1941, Page 4

The Southland Times. WEDNESDAY, MAY 28, 1941. A Time-Table for the Middle East

A great deal has been heard this year of Germany’s time-table. It is alleged that the Nazis have planned their campaigns with a remarkable attention to detail, and that they are depending for success on the swiftness of every new advance. Enough has happened in the Mediterranean zone to prove that the time-table really exists, or at least that the Germans realize the vital importance of the time factor. They are fully aware of the facts presented on Monday to the Australian people by their Prime'"Minister, newly returned from the war zone. For the next six months, said Mr Menzies, “American help could not be decisive in the Mediterranean.” During that fateful period “the British must depend on their own strength and their own resources . . .” The Germans will try desperately to drive the British forces out of Egypt and the Middle East, knowing that if they can once secure control of the Mediterranean they will have nothing to fear from economic perils, and that they will have gained a powerful strategic advantage. They must finish the campaign in six months, otherwise the tide of American war materials will be running too strongly, and the chance of an early decision will be irrevocably lost. The plan is ambitious, and will require superlative organization combined with an unbroken series of rapid victories. By this time most people are ready to acknowledge the efficiency of the German war machine, and the organizing genius which sets it in motion. All the great battles of the war have ended quickly. Poland was conquered in three weeks, Holland in seven days, France in a month, Yugoslavia and Greece in three weeks. But the indispensable condition of success is the selection of a time and place for attack in accordance with the requirements of the High Command. German strategy is carefully planned in the full knowledge of where the next blow will fall. Allied strategy is defensive, and must be made to cover a number of possible developments. The time-table had its first interruption when Yugoslavia changed her Government and forced the enemy to fight for territory that he expected to occupy peaceably. Admittedly, it was not a very serious interruption, for the Yugoslavs had no time to organize an effective resistance. Some observers believe that the Germans counted on a Greek capitulation after Yugoslavia passed under Axis control. They claim that the tenacious resistance in Greece, and the heavy losses inflicted on the enemy, slowed up his ad-

vance towards the Middle East. But it now seems more probable that the Germans were prepared for a hard battle, and that they were organizing the next phase of the campaign (the invasion of Crete) even while the panzer columns were forcing their way towards Athens. Expensive Battle

Similarly, the High Command will not wait until Crete has been captured before they give their attention to Cyprus: the plan fox’ attacking that island may have been completed months ago, and active preparations should now be in the hands of the technical staffs. But the most careful preliminary work can be thrown out of geax - by the chances and fortunes of war. There are good reasons for believing that the Germans expected to possess Crete within 48 liours. The battle has now been raging for eight days, and the issue is still uncertain. Even though the High Command admits the need for heavy losses, and claims that they are justified if the objective is gained, it can scarcely have expected to meet the type of resistance that has been put up by the British, New Zealand and Greek troops. Already it may have had to call upon parachutists and transport planes that were being held in reserve for the descent upon Cyprus. If the Germans succeed in wresting Crete from its gallant defenders (and it is by no means certain that they will do so) they will have to recast their plans in the light of their Cretan experience. Above all, they will have to replace theix - losses in machines and specialists. They may even have to decide if an attack on Cyprus, which might be even more expensive than the battle for Crete, would leave their air force in a fit state for the next clash in Syria, and afterwards in Egypt. Moreover, the time-table has been dislocated on another front. The revolt engineered by Rashid Ali was intended to place Iraq at the mercy of the Nazis. But something went wrong. Apparently the coup was premature, for the Germans were unable to send help quickly enough and adequately enough to prevent the British forces from regaining control of the military situation. All the evidence now suggests that the Arab Quislings are leaving the country and that the Nazi-sponsored regime is crumbling. Thus, if the Germans are able to invade Iraq they will have to anticipate a hard battle instead of an easy occupation. These are some of the blows that are taking the smooth precision from Hitler’s timetable. The defenders of Crete are gaining valuable time for the Allies; they are also damaging the Gerjnan war machine. And it is still possible to hope that they will succeed in holding the island. In the larger battle for the Mediterranean their great stand may well prove decisive.