The Southland Times TUESDAY, MAY 20, 1941. Syria—Key to the Middle East

Southland Times, Issue 24439, 20 May 1941, Page 4

The Southland Times TUESDAY, MAY 20, 1941. Syria—Key to the Middle East

fUHE importance of Syria in Middle J- East strategy has been emphasized by events of the past few days. So far British action has been confined to the bombing of aerodromes, but more decisive steps may have to be taken if the Germans are to be prevented from occupying the key positions. Attempts have been made to arouse the latent fighting spirit of the French garrison, believed to number 40,000 troops. General Catroux, commander of the Free French Forces in the Middle East, informed his countrymen in a broadcast that “if you should choose to take up arms to drive out the enemy I am at your gates with French armed cohorts.” When it is remembered that the North African army of France remained inactive, and possibly apathetic, during the British invasion of Libya, it is not easy to believe that the Syrian garrison will disobey the orders of Vichy. The Germans have probably made sure that a French revolt would be difficult, even if the mood for it awakened in the hearts of a determined minority. But there is always a chance, and the appeal was certainly worth making. It now remains to be seen what steps will be taken if the appeal is ignored. In Ankara, where a capacity for finding new tasks for Britain is equalled only by a conviction that Turkey should do nothing herself, several newspapers have declared that Britain “must occupy Syria urgently.” The advice comes rather coolly from a half-hearted ally; but there are sound strategic reasons for accepting it.

Limited Man-Power

If Britain could drive out the Germans, seize all the aerodromes and establish her own garrisons, the entire situation in the Middle East would be simplified. Germany would be unable to send planes to Iraq, and at the same time the invasion of Crete and Cyprus would probably have to be postponed indefinitely: stepping stones to the mainland could be of little use once the Syrian coast was guarded by British forces. The supreme advantage of a march into Syria would be the avoidance of that dispersal of forces which it is obviously Germany’s intention to arrange. It would settle, possibly in a single battle, the issues that are now being fought in Iraq as well as on the Syrian aerodromes; and it would prevent the war from spreading to various subsidiary fronts. General Dentz, High Commissioner in Syria for the Vichy Government, would probably order French resistance to an advance from Palestine, and the frontier defences are believed to have been strengthened. But the French troops would fight halfheartedly, and they could count on only a limited assistance from the Germans. Britain may yet carry out land operations in Syria. The important question, however, is whether sufficient troops and war machines are concentrated in Palestine. General Wavell is believed to have about 500,000 troops at his disposal in the Middle East. But it is doubtful if they are fully equipped, and it must be remembered that Egypt remains the real danger- zone. Germany can send troops in greaternumbers and more rapidly to Libya than she can send at present to Syria. Although the fighting in the Western Desert is spasmodic, the changing fortunes of war around Solium show that the opposing forces are fairly evenly matched. Largescale operations in Syria would create the need for reinforcements that might have to be taken from the Nile Valley, and at the first sign of a partial withdrawal the Germans would press hard against the defences- of Egypt. Political Factors

General Wavell has to decide if German infiltration of Syria is the northern arm of the pincer movement on Suez, or if it is primarily a feint intended to uncover the Western Desert. Under present conditions the situation in Iraq should not pass out of control, even with German troops in the Mosul oil region. At the worst, it is better to sacrifice the oil supply (which can be replaced from other sources) than to weaken the strategic centre of the Middle East by risky troop movements. There is always a possibility, however, that the political situation will deteriorate. The i diplomatic manoeuvres of Russia cani not have passed unnoticed. Stalin’s treaty negotiations with Rashid Ali, his reported invitation to the Afghan Foreign Minister to visit Moscow, and the appointment of a former political prisoner as Iraqi Ambassador to Russia may indicate nothing more serious than the dictator’s propensity for troublemaking. But when they are placed alongside Stalin’s other activities since his accession to the rank of Prime Minister they make it seem possible, if not probable, that the Soviet leader is collaborating with Hitler. If Russia and Germany entered into a full alliance Turkey’s position, already palpably weak, would become untenable. These considerations make it necessary for Britain to guard her strongholds and to be sparing in her efforts further afield. The defence of Egypt and the defence of Palestine are the two I fundamental needs in the difficult campaign now spreading to the coasts and deserts of Asia. This does not mean that Britain will refrain from striking hard at Syria, especially at the aerodromes, roads and railways. But it is the fact which must condition the nature and the extent of the operations that will be decided upon by General Wavell.