Sweden’s Dilemma

Southland Times, Issue 24056, 21 February 1940, Page 6

Sweden’s Dilemma

THE UNUSUAL and probably unprecedented step taken by King Gustav of Sweden in issuing a statement endorsing his Government’s rejection of Finland’s appeal for military aid is evidence at once of the determination of the Scandinavian Powers to keep outside the major conflict and of the increasing difficulty of restraining their peoples from more active intervention. “With sorrowful heart,” said King Gustav, “I have decided that we must adhere to this attitude; otherwise Sweden might run the greatest risk of being drawn into war, not only against Russia but other Great Powers.” His meaning is barely concealed. There can no longer be any doubt that Germany—possibly at the instigation of Russia, possibly on her own account —has warned Norway and Sweden that their intervention in Finland will compel her to take military action against them. (It is conceivable that she has also guaranteed them against Soviet aggression in the event of Russia conquering Finland.) The Scandinavian States have thus been placed in a terrible dilemma: they must either maintain their neutrality and accept the assurances of two dictators who have been proved utterly unprincipled, or they must enter the war on the side of the Finns in the knowledge that they will be fighting Germany as well as Russia and that their countries will become a major battleground in the European war. They can hardly be blamed for choosing the former course, but history may well prove them wrong. For it should' not be overlooked that Germany’s dilemma in the present situation is probably no less than theirs.

If Norway and Sweden do send military aid to Finland and Germany is compelled to carry out her threat she will be extending the war against the Allies to two fronts, though the whole object of her costly “deal” with Russia was to avoid a two-fronted war. This is a dangerous risk for her to take; yet the alternative, an indefinite stalemate on the Finnish front, the loss of vital supplies from the Soviet, and possibly even the defeat of her ally, is an equally unpleasant prospect. It is impossible to say how strong will be the reaction in Scandinavia if the -Finns suffer’ further reverses: popular feeling may yet override two cautious Governments and put Germany’s threat to the test. But in the meantime, in spite of all the risks of their position should the Finns be defeated, Norway and Sweden have decided to cling to their neutrality, and it is to be feared that under German pressure the help they are giving Finland may become increasingly meagre.