The Southland Times TUESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1939. The End of a Nazi Raider

Southland Times, Issue 24003, 19 December 1939, Page 4

The Southland Times TUESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1939. The End of a Nazi Raider

THERE was a hint of anti-climax in the last chapter of the Admiral Graf Spee’s story, for earlier messages gave the impression that the battleship’s commander was planning to make a run for safety. By keeping within the three-mile limit and waiting for favourable weather the vessel seemed to have a sporting chance of eluding the British cordon, and it is surprising that the scuttling was not deferred until the attempt was seen to be hopeless. It is possible, however, that the battleship’s damage was more serious than the Nazis admitted, or at least that it was bad enough to remove any hope of escaping the fast British squadron. The spectators assembled on the coast of Ecuador, and the larger audience waiting at radio sets across the world for the latest details of a naval drama, may have been disappointed when the Admiral Graf Spee refused to go down fighting. But if the battleship’s big guns were out of action it could have survived only briefly against the superior numbers and fire power of the waiting warships. The Nazis had already been through a severe ordeal: they cannot be blamed for avoiding suicide. British naval officers outside Montevideo were probably relieved when the Admiral Graf Spee was scuttled. Their duty was to destroy the ship as soon as it emerged from territorial waters; but they were not likely to have welcomed the work. The episode has already conferred glory on the Royal Navy: there was nothing more to be gained from administering the death blow. As for the Germans, they appear to' have preferred sinking their own ship to surrendering it to enemy or neutral hands, and to this extent they have served their own conception of national prestige. The important fact from the British point of view is that a dangerous raider has been beaten in battle and forced from the high seas. Although the Admiral Graf Spee’s record of merchant sinkings was not comparable with that of the Emden in the last war, the vessel had already sent a number of fine ships to the bottom: her own destruction .therefore means a considerable saving in the tonnage that would have been lost if she had remained on the trade routes.

Questions For Experts

The loss is a serious one for Germany, whose fleet includes only two other vessels of equal size and armament. It also raises some interesting questions about the effectiveness of the pocket battleships, which were generally regarded as remarkable achievements in compact fighting power. Naval experts have assumed that only two or three of the biggest British capital ships were able to face them on even terms. Although this may be true on a basis of mathematical comparison the River Plate battle seems to have proved once again that theory is not always a safe guide to performance. Strictly speaking the absolute value of the pocket battleship could not be proved beyond argument until it encountered a single vessel of equal gun power. But naval warfare seldom provides a simple test of this kind. The strategist’s art is to make skilful use of all the factors in a given situation. Singly the British cruisers may have been no match for the Admiral Graf Spee: together they combined with great skill and audacity and were able to overcome the handicaps of lighter guns and armour plating. The battle will be remembered with pride as one more demonstration of the qualities of gunnery, seamanship and deliberate courage that have enriched the traditions of the Royal Navy.