The Southland Times THURSDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1939. Soviet Aggression in the Baltic

Southland Times, Issue 23946, 12 October 1939, Page 4

The Southland Times THURSDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1939. Soviet Aggression in the Baltic

ALTHOUGH no responsible observer has attempted to condone the tactics of aggression used by the Soviet Union in the past few weeks there has been a temptation to stress the pragmatic value of Russian intervention as a check on Nazi expansion to the east and in the Baltic. It would be mere folly, however, to pretend that there is any fundamental difference between the methods now being used by Russia and those which have forced the Allies to take military action against Germany. One by one the representatives of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been summoned to Moscow, and while the talks proceeded at the Kremlin there was word of troop concentrations on the frontiers. Demands for territorial concessions, backed up by a display of force, were the methods of aggrandizement used by Hitler in his attack on Austria and later on Czechoslovakia. It is partly to prevent the recurrence of such action and to restore a world order in which the small nations can be freed from the perpetual fear of aggression, that Britain and France are now committed to a European war. The friends of Russia seem to believe that when such methods are adopted in Moscow they are miraculously endowed With the virtue of necessity. If there is to be any exemption from legality among the Great Powers the moral basis of the Allied war policy will be increasingly exposed to danger.

Naval Weakness

There is no justification for the diplomatic offensive in the Baltic. The Soviet leaders are busily engaged in securing naval bases although actually their naval forces are not likely to be more than potentially dangerous for manyl years to come. Much of their | new strength in capital ships is | still on paper, and the three battleships now in commission are 30 years old. Almost the same position exists in relation to cruisers. As far as can be judged from the scanty information available the Russians have relied most heavily on submarines: it is believed they have 134 under-water craft. But the Soviet Fleet is divided among the three naval zones of the Far East, the Black Sea and the Baltic. (At least 70 submarines are said to be based at Vladivostock.) It seems unlikely, then, that the Russians have any serious. pretensions to sea power, and to this extent it could be argued that they are visualizing a defensive naval strategy in the Baltic. But there is nothing defensive in their military tactics. Armies that probably outnumber those of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are being quartered on the three Baltic States that have already succumbed to pressure, and it has been reported that 700,000 Soviet troops are now massed “within easy striking distance of the Finnish frontier.” Admittedly, the Russians would think twice about entering on imperialist adventures if the world were at peace. But the tendency to extend frontiers which already enclose a sixth part of the earth’s surface (not in scattered units, but in a single vast land mass) while the Allies are fighting Germany must not be misinterpreted as “defensive” action. It is plain aggression, backed up by a cynical use of methods which, only a few short months ago, the Soviet leaders were condemning in others with a fine flow of invective.

Finland’s Danger

Although it may be true that the Allies have gained indirectly from the Soviet advance in Eastern Europe the advantages are very different from those which would have come from Russia’s entry into the Peace Front. Already the danger of an opportunist strategy is being emphasized in Scandinavia, where the northern States are anxiously watching the difficulties of Finland. The Finns are obviously unwilling to follow the example of the three small Baltic States, but they must realize now that if they resist Soviet invasion they may have to face the same fate as Poland’s. They are a hardy and determined people who have fought for their independence and justified their victory by the success of their political and social administration. If they show fight at this critical moment it will be difficult for Norway and Sweden to remain passive while violence rolls nearer their own frontiers. Perhaps the secret of Russia’s share in the “peace offensive” can be found in the sinister movement of events in the Baltic. For the growing list of Soviet gains and the evidence within them of a Soviet imperialism may eventually force the Allies to reconsider the question of Russian “neutrality” and confront them with military and naval problems far greater than those now engaging their attention in a restricted war zone. The enemies of peace are to be found in Moscow no less than in Berlin.