The Southland Times WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1939. The Failure of Nazi Policy

Southland Times, Issue 23945, 11 October 1939, Page 6

The Southland Times WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1939. The Failure of Nazi Policy

THERE has been nothing unexpected in the British and French reactions to the “peace proposals.” As soon as Hitler had spoken it became clear that no basis had been provided for a just and honourable settlement. But it is interesting to notice that this opinion is held almost as firmly by the neutrals as by the Allied Powers. There are even signs of divided opinion in places where the Nazis could have looked most confidently for support. In Italy the official comment has been guarded, and there is a noticeable lack of enthusiasm in the writings of Dr Gayda, whose articles are usually believed to reflect the mind of Signor Mussolini. The obvious assumption is that Germany’s diplomatic errors have been recognized throughout Europe: in the chancelleries of the smaller countries there is probably jubilation at the thought that Hitler and von Ribbentrop > are now enmeshed in the net they had prepared for others. A correspondent of The New York Times, whose summary of the position was printed yesterday, rightly, pointed to “the one tremendous fact” which outweighs all hypotheses—“the Russo-German. Pact has not only weakened Italian support and strengthened the neutral States’ determination to fight if necessary, but has lost to Germany far more in Eastern Europe than her armies have won.” The volte face in Nazi policy could be justified to the German people only by a quick and spectacular success. But although Hitler has been able to claim the subjugation of Poland in one of the shortest campaigns in modern history the military achievements have been dwarfed by. the greater and comparatively bloodless success of the Soviet Government. Without the existence of a state of war in Poland the Red Army could not have advanced so far and so quickly. It is equally true that the Nazis needed no / help from-, the Russians: if they had been given a free hand the campaign would have lasted longer, but it would probably have ended with a complete German occupation of Polish territory. Russia’s co-operation had to be purchased with a share of the spoils, and it is now clear that the price was too heavy.

Moral Weakness

The weakness of Nazi diplomacy can be found in its reliance on a cynical and fallacious psychology. Hitler probably believed that when he had finished with Poland there would be no great need to justify his actions, for he counted on the bargaining power that would have come with a lightning victory and with the increased strength of the Reich. As always, he expected the naked fact of power to overshadow moral considerations that might influence the attitude of his neighbours. But the access of power has been comparatively small, and is qualified by the limitations implicit in the Russian alliance. Hitler is no longer a lonely figure, dominating Europe: he stands before the world as the partner of Stalin. The way to the east is closed; even in the Baltic the Soviet leaders have gained a dominant position; and in the southeast there can be no admittance to the coveted oil fields of Rumania. Meanwhile the Allies are standing firm in the west. Unless Hitler is willing to make new and specific proposals that would come close to an acknowledgement of defeat he must now face a major struggle for which Germany has neither the resources nor the spirit. At such a moment the assistance of friendly States would be invaluable. But where can Hitler find friends? By authorizing the agreement with Russia he weakened the Rome-Berlin Axis, possibly beyond repair, and showed in the plainest way that his regard for his allies was about as sincere as his respect for the pledged word. Signor Mussolini supported Hitler through all the Axis manoeuvres, and in return received nothing except cordial greetings. Now he finds that his partner has allowed the AntiComintern Pact to. become a mockery, and in doing so has raised dangers for Italy in the Balkans. Spain has already withdrawn from the anti-Comintern group: her defection, and the strict neutrality of Italy are cutting Germany off from the Mediterranean zone where (especially in Spain) the Nazis could have found valuable strategic opportunities. In the Far East the Japanese have passed from dismay and disapproval to an open hostility. The smaller neutral States feel no impulse to aid the schemes of the man whose threats and insidious tactics have kept them in the fear of aggression ever since the reoccupation of the Rhineland. Seldom in history has there been so clear a demonstration that truth and integrity are good allies, and that the leader who believes in baseness cannot afford to make mistakes.