The Southland Times. SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1939. National Security And “Hysteria”

Southland Times, Issue 23740, 11 February 1939, Page 6

The Southland Times. SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1939. National Security And “Hysteria”

We print this morning a letter from a reader who disagrees with our editorial comment on the defence of New Zealand. His insinuation that we are “somewhat hysterical” need not be taken seriously: it is a charge made almost inevitably when somebody begins to talk plainly about national security, and if it were true in this case we could still claim to be in excellent company. Every other part of the British Empire is making defence the major issue in politics and national endeavour. Only in New Zealand are the preparations grudging and feeble. For the current financial year approximately £2,000,000 was set aside for defence (together with another £1,000,000 for aerodromes and hangars) out of a total Government expenditure of more than £60,000,000. We insist that in view of the world situation today this amount was hopelessly inadequate. We believe also that the official outlook shows a complete lack of imagination and an inability to understand that the new technique of aggression takes no account of orthodoxy. “Captain” relies on theoretic viewpoints to deny the feasibility of naval attack. . You do not

give your readers (he writes) the conclusion recently reached by the Navy Departments of Japan, Britain and America ... that to operate successfully at a greater distance than 1500 miles from their bases, the world’s greatest navies will need to be three times their present size.” It should scarcely be necessary to explain that when a naval expert talks of one of the world’s greatest navies operating successfully he is assuming that the operations would be against forces of comparable strength. At the present time four or five heavily armoured cruisers could destroy the naval units on the New Zealand station without needing to come within range of their guns. It is merely silly to talk of the “colossal difficulty” of transporting large numbers of men through “hostile seas” unless there is proof that the seas—in this case the South Pacific—are commanded by a British fleet. Informed opinion in Britain is now almost unanimous that a battle fleet capable of holding the command of the sea could not be sent to the Pacific. “Does this mean that we should be unable to come to the support of Australia and New Zealand if they were attacked?” asks Commander Russell Grenfell in his recent book, “Sea Power In The Next War.” “Not necessarily; but it does mean that we could not aid them to the extent that they may have been led to expect. And that means that they would have to rely on their own resources to a much greater degree than hitherto.” This fact has long been recognized in Australia. New Zealand,. however, continues to slumber.

When our correspondent deals with home defence he seems to be on his own ground; yet it is here that his positions are weakest. Referring to “mechanized and up-to-date equipment” he says that “thousands of pounds worth of this sort of fighting gear has been on order for years and cannot be supplied for obvious reasons.” This is a damaging admission, for it implies that the shortage has been known “for years” (years of increasing danger) and that the authorities have been content to wait until their orders can be fulfilled without attempting to find alternative sources of supply. Admittedly, it is preferable to use equipment of British manufacture; but if the need is urgent (and anybody who was not altogether in a comatose state during the September crisis should know that it is urgent) it should not be impossible to look elsewhere. Australia has not hesitated to order aeroplanes from the United States. Apparently there are sufficient rifles in New Zealand “to equip every able-bodied man”; but if up-to-date equipment is still on order it would be interesting to know how many of the available weapons are obsolete. And even if the rifles are the latest models are they likely to be of any real use in an emergency if they are thrust into the hands of thousands of men who do not know how to use them? It should not be necessary to inform “Captain” that effective troops cannot be trained in a few hours or days. Finally our correspondent brings out “the one great fundamental reality”, which is simply—in his opinion—that “if a large, wellorganized and skilfully led force makes a landing in New Zealand (and can keep its lines of communications open) it will beat us to our knees whether we are armed to the teeth or not.’’ This is defeatism. We are indeed a “tiny” people; but we inhabit a country admirably fitted by geographic position for defence by comparatively small, but adequately trained and equipped, forces —naval, air and military. Our contention is that we are failing to make the best use of our natural advantages. “Captain” invites ridicule when he implies that an unbeatable morale must depend for its strength on a blind confidence in the Govern-

ment and in our pitifully inadequate forces. He has demonstrated, better than he knows, the outlook of fatal self-confidence or equally fatal apathy that we believe to be the greatest threat to this country’s security—an outlook, let it be added, that we shall continue to attack until there is evidence that the public needs no further warnings.