NAZI ACTION CRITICIZED

Southland Times, Issue 23693, 16 December 1938, Page 5

NAZI ACTION CRITICIZED

REFUSAL TO GO TO DINNER AMERICAN VIEW OF “APPEASEMENT” “ONE SMALL STEP NEARER HOLOCAUST” (United Press Assn.—Telegraph Copyright) (Received December 15, 11.40 p.m.) NEW YORK, December 15. The New York Herald-Tribune, in a grimly-worded editorial, ■ “Appeasement Without Peace,” says: “The Germans seem genuinely surprised and hurt that anyone should have thought it rude of them to kick the Prime Minister in the face, and the Prime Minister, though labouring earnestly at the bellows, finds the flames of appeasement only flickering ■lower. “It seems absurd that the mere act of walking out from a banquet, however officially performed, should have power to affect the fate of Europe. But it is so typical of the difficulties which the totalitarian State presents to any kind of co-operative effort for appeasement with the democracies that it will probably serve only to bring one small step nearer that general holocaust which Mr Chamberlain still grimly maintains he has •averted.”

FRENCH PLEASED BY REASSURANCES MR CHAMBERLAIN THOUGHT TOO OPTIMISTIC (Received December 15, 7.40 p.m.) LONDON. December 14. The French Press is united in its welcome to Mr Chamberlain’s reassurances about the understanding between Britain and France, which are regarded as wiping out the unfortunate impression resulting from his statement in the House of Commons, but it is generally felt that Mr Chamberlain was too optimistic about the international outlook. “The German Press attacks on Britain have nothing to do with Germany’s wish, to live peaceably with Britain,” said a political spokesman. “Germany strongly desires others not to interfere in her domestic affairs. If the interference , continues the Press polemics will also continue. If they criticize us we shall answer with our coats off.” The spokesman added that the speeches of British statesmen at home and abroad were followed with the utmost suspicion and keen attention. “We are very sensitive to these and we have lost patience, but nevertheless we fully endorse Mr Chamberlain’s confidence that both Britons and Germans wish to live up to the Munich declaration. We desire good' relations between Britain and Germany, but sometimes we are angry with our cousin.” The present position between France and Britain is not unlike the position in 1914. On the eve of the Great War, Sir Edward Grey, then Foreign Secretary, declared in the House of Commons the arrangement with France, which had existed since November 22, 1912: “From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any furure time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen, and may never arise. I agree that if either Govern- , ment had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, »t should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common.” This understanding, contained in a letter to the French Ambassador to London, arose out of the possibility of an attack by Germany on France over Morocco. Mr Chamberlain preserves exactly the- same attitude in the dispute between France and Italy. There have, however, been recent statements or Incidents that would lead France to believe that Britain would go to France's aid in any circumstances. These include Earl Baldwin’s famous statement that England’s frontier was now on the Rhine, and Mr Neville Chamberlain’s announcement of complete agreement with France. Lady Astor has said: .“We cannot go back on France, not because we particularly love the French but because we must save ourselves.”

The opinion is expressed in many quarters that Britain is making a mistake in leaving herself indeterminate as to what she would do in the event of France being involved in a war. It is felt that this indecision will lead foreign Powers to believe that they can take the risk of threatening France to get what they want, and that France, uncertain of Britain’s help, would accede to the demands.