The Southland Times. MONDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1938. Britain’s Military Problem

Southland Times, Issue 23677, 28 November 1938, Page 4

The Southland Times. MONDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1938. Britain’s Military Problem

Important aspects of British military tactics were indirectly emphasized by reports of the Anglo-French talks in cable messages from London, printed on Saturday. According to the Paris correspondent of The Daily Telegraph the French Prime Minister stressed the need for creating, at the earliest moment,” an expeditionary force that would be larger than the one that went to France in 1914. “The French Cabinet is believed to be alarmed by the inadequacy of the British contingent which would have landed- in France if war had broken out in September,” said-the correspondent. “M. Daladier emphasized that the disappearance of the Czech army for all practical purposes made increased British effectives imperative.” These statements are significant for more than one reason. The reorganization of Britain’s land forces, now being carried out after years of experiment and indecision, has been based on the assumption that future tactics will depend on an increased mobility. Mechanization has become the principal factor in the new programme. But it is possibly true to say that British tacticians have learned to think of tank corps, motorized artillery and infantry chiefly in terms of defence. Although the official attitude remains inaccessible, some reflection of it—or perhaps, to be more exact, a prophetic hint of what it is likely to be—can be found in the writings of military experts, particularly in those of Liddell Hart, military correspondent of The Times, and admittedly one of the foremost tacticians in England. His book, “Europe In Arms,” was published last year, when rearmament was only just beginning to move with an accelerated pace, and the outlook in foreign affairs, although disturbing, had not been crystallized by the crises of 1938. He discussed the probable structure and function of the new army and expressed decided opinions on the wisdom or practicability of sending an expeditionary force out of Britain. “In the sphere of the land forces,” he wrote, “we are, fortunately, free of any standards imposed by the strength of the Continental armies. The only essential requirement is to maintain forces sufficient to defend, and maintain order in, our overseas territories.” He examined the difficulties that would have to be faced in sending an army to France. “When all the conditions are carefully weighed, the balance seems to be heavily against the hope that a British field force on the Continent might have a military effect commensurate with the expense and the risk. ... In the interval it would seem more reasonable to entrust the old expeditionary role to the Air Force than to dream of sending an army into the field with new means that only exist in imagination.” It should be explained that the “new means” referred to by Captain Liddell Hart are not simply new and adequate equipment, made possible by rearmament, but a proved superiority of offensive weapons over the weapons of defence. Apart from air attack which, in spite of the “laboratory” experiments in Spain and China, remains an uncertain quantity (since in neither country have there been any large-scale and effective defence measures) the concentrated fire-power of modern weapons seems to deny the advantage to an invading force once the opposing armies are in entrenched positions. But the question is no longer Confined to military theories. Political issues are deeply involved, and it seems probable that France and Britain have different opinions as to what would constitute effective aid in war-time. Deprived of possible help from Czechoslovakia, France would have to withstand immense land forces if the attack came from Germany. British theories of mobile attack are acceptable by German strategists only as part of a general plan, by no means as the pivot of an offensive. Germany still clings to the idea of totalitarian warfare in which immense numbers of troops would be involved. Whether or not this attitude is wise is not a question that will trouble the French leaders: they know that if war came huge armies would be pushed against them, and they are unlikely to feel satisfied with military aid that is confined to an air force. How far this attitude will be allowed to affect British military plans is a question that may receive increasing attention in the near future.