The Southland Times. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1938. Germany Confronts Russia

Southland Times, Issue 23648, 25 October 1938, Page 4

The Southland Times. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1938. Germany Confronts Russia

At the present time the balance of power in Europe has been disturbed so abruptly that old political landmarks are vanishing, maps are changing overnight, treaties and pledges are like torn pieces of paper carried off by a great wind, and the student of foreign affairs is forced to pick his way through a tangle of possibilities, any one of which might receive confirmation or denial in the next cable message from London. Amid the doubts and perplexities that are this year’s heaviest crop in Central Europe the relationship between Germany and Russia remains one of the ultimate problems. The last of Czechoslovakia might be ceded to Hungary or snatched as an afterthought by Greater Germany; Rumania might move temporarily towards Britain, hoping even now that Whitehall could be tempted to intervene ,if a new act of aggression seemed imminent; and the Balkan States, agitatedly playing the old game of diplomacy, might seek to escape the gravitational pull of German expansion. But if the Nazis passed on to new gains, nibbling here, bluffing there, and extending their sphere of economic influence deeper to the east, there would still have to come a time when the long frontier of the Soviet Union imposed a final barrier. And always the question returns: is the crusade against communism a convenient myth or in sober fact a driving force in Nazi policy? Reference to Russia’s possible policy in the future is made by Mr Walter Duranty, the Moscow correspondent of The New York Times, in a rhessage printed this morning; and it will be noticed that he makes no rash prophecies, but is satisfied to state the alternatives without emphasis. “Russia has now no potential allies,” writes Mr Duranty, “and faces a strong attack from Germany after Hitler has been reinforced by acquiring Rumanian oil and grain.” But there remains the possibility of a Russian and German rapprochement. “There is no obstacle to the Russo-German friendship which Bismarck so strongly advocated except Hitler’s fanatical fury against'Jewish Bolshevism.” If this “fanatical fury” is the emotional excess of one man, or of an inner clique directly under his influence, the hatred of communism may not survive or affect the larger issues, especially if it is remembered that National Socialism and communism are merely variants of the totalitarian theme and that time may give them a greater similarity. Germany and Russia have moved more than once towards rapprochement. The great chancellor, Bismarck, worked for it constantly. As recently as 1922 the two nations signed the Treaty of Rapallo, v which guaranteed normal relations at a time when both Germany and Russia were regarded as the outcasts of Eufope. In those years Germany was anxious to regain her old markets in Russia. She believed, moreover, that an alliance with the Soviet, even of an informal kind,, was a possible protection against the encircling movements of France. On the Russian side it was hoped that German friendship would prevent the growth of a universal opposition to Bolshevism. Both countries found the arrangement useful; and after Germany had entered on her secret rearmament programme—as far back as the Bruning regime —it was in Russian, territory, far from French and British surveillance, that the General Staff built up its supply of war materials and carried out experiments in new methods of destruction.

A change in this relationship came with the intenser growth of communism in Russia, the beginning of the five-year-plan—lead-ing, among other things, to the virtual extermination of a colony of German settlers—and finally the emergence from political isolation and the appearance of Soviet representatives at Geneva. Since then the Russians have been active in their support of collective security, which means that they have been directly opposed to the Nazi theory of power politics and the Nazi plans for predominance in Central Europe. It now seems certain that Russia will abandon the League of Nations and retire into a deeper isolation, turning more and more to the east for her sphere of influence and for the development of her vast resources. If this happens there may be signs of a further change in Russo-Ger-man relations. Some observers are inclined to believe that the Red Army purge took place because for once there really was a plot behind the scenes, in this case for an underground alliance with Germany; and although the lack of information makes it necessary to rely on rumour and conjecture in Soviet affairs it is significant that Marshal Tukhachevsky and the seven generals who suffered with him had all had a German military training. The important fact, however, is that Germany and Russia have moved towards alliances in the past; and the present Euro-

pean “set-up” seems to favour a new and stronger movement of the same kind in the future. It is too early to theorize on changes that are still hypothetical; if they occur, however, their effects must be profound and far-reaching.