The Southland Times PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING “LUCEO NON URO” FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1938. The Background Of Teruel

Southland Times, Issue 23443, 25 February 1938, Page 6

The Southland Times PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING “LUCEO NON URO” FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1938. The Background Of Teruel

After two months of fighting in bitter weather the battle of Teruel now seems to be over, and observers are left with the task of discovering the purpose and value of what was undoubtedly the major conflict of the Spanish war. Reduced to essentials, the battle has been a series of attacks and counter-attacks, with the final decision in favour of the rebels. If there has been victory for anybody, however, it has been neither complete nor convincing. A cable message printed yesterday reported that the loyalist garrison had broken through the rebel lines, and that the retreat was orderly. “Teruel presents a scene of-fantastic desolation. It is completely uninhabitable.” What was spared by shells has been delivered to the fire; but in addition to a heap of smouldering ruins the rebels will be left in possession of the junction of important highways which gives Teruel its strategic value. To regain the town the rebels have squandered heavy reserves of man-power; and it has been reported that loyalist casualties in the two months of fighting numbered 60,000. With the two armies now taking up the positions they occupied early in December it is necessary to ask what has been gained, by either side, that could justify the destruction of property and the appalling losses in human life. In Spain, of course, life has grown cheap. Immersed in a struggle that seems to grow more bitter and fruitless every month, the leaders are thinking in terms of tactics, and the soldiers in terms of a hatred that has had an imperceptible change of direction from ideological to national considerations. The loyalists are not “greatly perturbed” at the loss of a position which has cost them so much; they will claim, no doubt, that they have achieved a moral victory by preventing the rebels from making their long-expected advance on other fronts, by taking the initiative from General Franco, by drawing reserves and munitions to an unprofitable defence, and by proving to the world that their army is organized and equipped to' take the offensive. And it must be admitted that the battle for Teruel has done a great deal to upset General Franco’s plans. To launch the counterattack at the beginning of January 500 field guns were massed on a 25-mile front, and 200 fighting planes were sent to assist the motley divisions of Spaniards, Moors and Italians. These were forces that might have broken through a different part of the line if they had been concentrated in accordance with staff arrangements. The lesson which most onlookers will find in the battle of Teruel is that modern war is by no means as sudden and decisive in operation as the experts were inclined to believe. This had already been demonstrated at Madrid, where a large population continued to exist in spite of shell-fire and air raids, and contrived to adjust itself to an atmosphere of strain and to conditions of extreme hardship. It has also shown that the Government army has been hammered into an efficient fighting machine, and that the war is therefore further than ever from a decisive ending. According to the diplomatic correspondent of The Manchester Guardian the loyalists are no longer concerned with political extremism, “so that there can be no question of any decisive Communist or Russian influence in loyalist Spain, while the influence of Germany and Italy on the rebel side is as great as ever.” There can be little doubt that the war has settled down into a struggle against foreign invaders. Viewed in relation to numbers and resources, the position does not look hopeful for the Government. The Republic is without allies, and any hope that the display of military efficiency at Teruel might impress foreign governments that hitherto have clung to a somewhat equivocal policy of nonintervention was probably destroyed in this week’s debate in the British House of Commons. Italy shows no signs of changing her tactics in the Mediterranean, and it has been reported that the Germans are strengthening their position, political and economic, in the conquered Basque territory. Capital is being invested in the industries of Bilbao, “partly with a view to counteracting British commercial influence” (according to The Manchester Guardian), and Nazi propaganda is already doing its work. It is difficult to imagine a people less susceptible to foreign teachings than the Spaniards, and German methods of “education” are not likely to be as effective as they have been in Danubian countries where a Teutonic background provides an initial advantage to those who loudly proclaim the Nazi doctrines. But if the war is to be a long one the loyalists have an important fact in their favour. Their army is homogeneous, united by a passionate faith in democratic government and na’tional freedom, and increasingly

free from foreign elements. Thej rebels have at no time been a completely Spanish group; and in recent months there have been rumours, from reliable sources, of political disunity. General Franco, for instance, has a personal following which is opposed by the Falange—a Nationalist body with fascist ideas. Furthermore, the Italians and Germans do not collaborate without dissension, and both groups are unpopular with the Spaniards. This is particularly the case with the Italians, who seem to make frequent—if somewhat premature — claims to being the “saviours of Spain. These facts encouraged observers to believe that the battle of Teruel, even in its first indeterminate phase, gave promise of ultimate victory for the loyalists. The European crisis, and the change in British policy which was directly the result of that crisis, may cause some modification in this viewpoint. If it does nothing else it will bring home to the Spanish Government the magnitude of its task, and its isolation in the new. era of Fascism.