The Southland Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING “LUCEO NON URO” THURSDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1937. Important Changes In The British Army

Southland Times, Issue 23378, 9 December 1937, Page 4

The Southland Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING “LUCEO NON URO” THURSDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1937. Important Changes In The British Army

Six months after the appointment of Mr Leslie Hore-Belisha as Secretary for War, changes which have been described as “revolutionary” have been announced for the British Army. Cable messages printed on Saturday reported that Major-General Viscount Gort was replacing Field Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell as Chief of the Imperial General Staff. This follows rather quickly after Viscount Gort’s appointment as Military Secretary _ to the Secretary for War, which took place in September and which, in the words of a writer in The Times, “has set some of the dovecots aflutter.” The same writer suggested that there was no reason to assume that this earlier appointment indicated that “the Secretary of State for War has in view a definite scheme for speeding up promotion in the commissioned ranks.” Mr Hore-Belisha, he added, was “not likely to do anything that might savour of jumping a claim or rushing in advance of his departmental or extra-departmental helpers.” But Mr Hore-Belisha is not a man who allows the punctilio of office to stand in the way of needed reform. His immense activity and considerable achievements as Minister of Transport encouraged hopes—which have been fulfilled —that he would prove equal to the formidable difficulties of his new post. The British Army is the most conservative of the three Services, and in the years following the War it was allowed to come close to, stagnation. Partial disarmament put it out of step with military developments in Europe; its strategy, and much of its equipment, had not advanced beyond the requirements of 1918; and when the need for rearmament could no longer be ignored it was plain that only a man of unusual organizing ability could remedy the situation. • It is only fair to admit that Mr Hore-Belisha has been able to make use of much useful data provided by experts. There has been no lack of military theorizing; in one sense, perhaps, there has been too much of it, and not enough work of a more practical kind. As far back as 1924 the Haldane Committee made recommendations which are only just being carried into effect. Included in the committee’s report was one statement which seems to have been rediscovered by the present Secretary for War. “It has been represented to us by the many authorities that we have consulted that if it is desired to make the Army attractive as a profession to men of good intellectual attainments, certain conditions are essential: (1) Work must be provided of sufficient intellectual interest. (2) There must be real opportunities for advancement by merit. (3) The remuneration must be adequate.” The importance of these suggestions can be stressed by reference to a recent book, “Europe In Arms”, by Liddell Hart, military correspondent of The Times. Discussing the sources from which the ranks of the British Army are filled, he explained that in the past the officers have been drawn from the upper middle classes, and that “it was a family principle that the Army was the vocation of those sons who were not likely to shine in other professions. If there has been some change in this basis, it persists sufficiently to be a handicap in days when the trend of warfare places an increasing premium on intelligence.” That there is to be a more drastic change in the future was emphasized in a British Official Wireless message, printed yesterday, which quoted a statement by Mr Hore-Belisha in the House of Commons. “Merit, character and ability as well as suitability for any particular office would be the guiding considerations,” he said, “regardless of youth, age, or mere seniority in the event of any further appointments.” He added also that “all appointments would be made on the assumption that their holders would be able to hold their posts under conditions of active service.” This is important. There is already enough data to suggest that future warfare will depart widely from the tactics of 1914-18, and if it follows the trend of military theory it will require special physical and mental qualities in Army leaders. It is not merely that elderly men, no matter how far they have been toughened in years of service, are unequal to the strain of a campaign which will introduce all the shocks and terrors of machinemade war. Older men who have grown up in an obsolete school of tactics can scarcely be expected to adapt themselves to the mobility of present-day armies and their intricacy of control. The volume and accuracy of modern gun-fire makes it almost certain that new methods of attack will have to replace the defensive nature of the last great struggle, which led to stalemate and a war | of attrition. Mechanized forces

and the element of surprise implicit in the swiftness of air attack make it essential that there should be a bold departure from tactics which are no longer practicable. “Four years ago,” wrote Liddell Hart in the book from which we have already quoted, “a committee composed of the younger generals was appointed to investigate the lessons of the war, and to see whether they were adequately applied in our training .... It is common knowledge that this re-examination of wai’ experience led to the conclusion that surprise was of paramount importance, both in attack and in defence, and that the greatest lesson of the last war was that no attack on an enemy in action was likely to succeed unless his resistance was already paralysed by surprise in some form.” Although European strategists—notably in Germany, Italy and Russia—still seem to believe in the value of mass formations, French and British officers of the younger school are increasingly in favour of a strategy which can make the best use of technical efficiency. This may mean, among other things, that the command of an army will be mor* widely shared. The day seems to be past when a group of officers will sit over their maps and keep control of masses of troops. Mechanized warfare is hard to link up to a central authority once an attack has been launched: its mobility changes the shape of battle too quickly for a literal adherence to staff plans. This means a greater responsibility for junior officers, and emphasizes the need for mental quality in the personnel of the new army. In placing the accent on merit and sweeping away the false outlook of tradition, Mr HoreBelisha has taken a step without which all other advances in military science would seem to be valueless.