THE SPANISH TRAGEDY

Southland Times, Issue 23228, 17 June 1937, Page 5

THE SPANISH TRAGEDY

EVERYONE SICK OF WAR “VICTORY WILL HELP NOBODY” WAR CORRESPONDENT’S REPORT To the question, “Who will win in Spain?” the answer is “Nobody,” says H. R. Knickerbocker, famous war correspondent, in the third of a series of articles written at first hand.

“For the war, at its end, will have destroyed so many lives, so much property, and, above all, such vitally-important human values, that out of it can only come a Spain decimated, impoverished and brutalized.”

BY H. R. KNICKERBOCKER (World Copyright)

Whichever side wins, democracy and liberty are lost. Who will win the military victory? It is only possible at this stage to summarize the forces involved. Franco has his 50,000 Italians, 10,000 Germans, and 250,000 Spaniards under arms. He needs man-power. He lacks money, but has the richest agricultural districts in Spain, and can feed his people indefinitely. His artillery and machineguns may be a shade better than the Government’s, and ip aviation sides are equal. He has undisputed dictatorial control politically and militarily. He still takes the offensive. j The Government has double Franco s man-power, with 20,000 to 30,000 in its International Column, the men of which taught the Government militia how to fight. The Government has the gold of the Bank of Spain, originally £Bo,ooo,ooo—far more than Franco had. It is tom by internal dissensions, sometimes breaking out in civil war within the civil war, as in Catalonia. It is still on the defensive. Both sides are dug in so effectively that the war has become crystallized into one of position, with the attack nearly always failing at the mouths of the defending machine-guns. As the war drags on, both sides improve their fighting skill, but the advantage in this respect goes to the Government. Like the Russian army stamped out of a bloody civil war, J.he Spanish Government has built a militia that has learned how to fight. Franco’s incomparably better army at the beginning is now decimated, and lacks reserves. Franco looked a sure winner until he blundered at Madrid. He may still win if Mussolini sends him more troops, and if he takes Madrid this year before the Government completes training its army of 500,000, and before it gets unified command. He will win, too, if the Government breaks up its front through dissension. As the war is now proceeding, it becomes more and more difficult to see how Franco can win decisively within a predictable time. On the other hand, it is impossible to see how the Government can . win,, at all. It looks like a deadlock, which may continue indefinitely until one side or the other succumbs to moral, political, and finally military exhaustion. ALLIES WEARY General Franco's foreign allies are beginning to show signs of vzeariness in his support More important, however, is the impression which is growing among the friends as well as the enemies of Franco, that his victory, seemingly so certain six months ago, has become questionable. Today’s situation in Spain can only be understood by going back to the original fatal mistake of Franco when in the first week of November he failed to march straight into Madrid, as he could have done when his troops reached the city. All the world since then has been asking “Why didn’t Franco take Madrid?”

The answer is clear today. Franco had at that time not more than half the number of soldiers of the enemy. On reaching Madrid Franco was misinformed about the strength of the Red positions. As he now knows too late, Madrid was then as good as taken. It had lost the will to fight. Its morale was broken.

For the first three days after Franco reached Getafe and occupied the Casa del Campo, the capital was merely waiting for the roll of his tanks down the streets.

For a week after reaching the gates of Madrid Franco refused to permit the shelling and bombing of civilian areas, but concentrated on military positions. When Franco did decide to attack, his Moors and Legionaries went up against the iron defence which to this day, six months later, is not yet broken. Against his will Franco bowed to the ultimatum of his German military advisers that he either shell and bomb the capital ruthlessly to break its will, or they would quit.

This decision also came too late, and today Madrid is fortified in such a way that neutral experts declare it cannot be taken by direct assault but only by being cut off and starved out. But before this was done, and during the period of uninterrupted rebel victories, Germany and Italy, under the impression that Franco was going to march straight into the capital, recognized his Government, withdrew their emissaries from Madrid, sent new ones to Salamanca, and began to ship troops. IRISH VOLUNTEERS Under the same impression, the volatile Irish swarmed to the Legion, and sailed for Spain. Germans, Italians, Irish and Portuguese all wanted to be in on the winning side. The Irish were the only genuine volunteers, and probably the most disinterested of all. But six months of death, wounds, vile food, and muddy trenches, plus the growing uncertainty of final victory, have sapped the fervour of the foreigners. Whatever manoeuvres may go on in Europe between Mussolini and Hitler, the fact is that the Germans in Spain despise the Italians and detest the Spaniards. The Italians hate the Germans and loathe the Spaniards. The Spaniards abhor both the Italians and the Germans, and everybody is sick of the war.

Ever since the rival armies became approximately equal is has been demonstrated that defence has a supremacy over attack. The heaviest losses, often amounting to 50 per cent., are suffered by the attackers, who are mowed down by machine-guns, against which there ate only three methods of fighting: — First, by reckless, persistent infantry attack—wave after wave with no regard for losses, aiming to lose nine out of 10 men so that the tenth man can get through to kill the machinegunner—second, by tanks; third, by artillery. Neither side has the man power to waste by the first method. Tanks have proved a great disappointment by reason of the development of the anti-tank gun, which strewed the Spanish battlefields with

disabled tanks laden with crews pulped by anti-tank shells. I have seen Russian tanks, riddled with German antitank bullets, which pierced their halfinch armor plate as though they were paper- , Finally, neither side has sufficiently numerous or good artillery to smash the enemy’s machine-guns. (Tomorrow: German Soldiers in Spain)