THE CRISIS IN EUROPE

Southland Times, Issue 22917, 16 June 1936, Page 7

THE CRISIS IN EUROPE

IS THERE A WAY OUT? IMMENSE TASK FACING BRITAIN In this, the fourth and last article of a series published in The News Chronicle, London, Professor C. K. Webster, of the London School of Economics, succinctly summarizes the fundamental necessities of British foreign policy if catastrophe is to be avoided in Europe. Three earnest articles written on the crisis have revealed something of its magnitude and complexity. They could not tell all the truth. Each naturally insisted on one or two outstanding arguments. Those on France and Germany were a defence of their attitude; that on Britain was an attack on ours. For the Germans there was stressed their fear of invasion from superior encircling forces, the wrongs that they . had suffered in 'he Treaty for Peace, their desire for equality and their obvious wish for British friendship. But no mention was made of their refusal to treat Russia as an equal, their use of force without any attempt to negotiate, the fact that Locarno had been freely accepted by all their statesmen, including Herr Hitler, and the brutality and threats which have necessarily alarmed all their neighbours. For France it was claimed that, though safe herself, she had to protect , the smaller States of Central Europe from the German menace because of her obligations under the Covenant: that if Germany obtains possession of Austria she will make Czechoslovakia her vassal, threaten Italy and menace the independence of other States; that the refortification of the Rhineland would prevent Fiance coming to their assistance. Only a British guarantee of German promises to respect the established order would satisfy her. No attempt was made in this article to explain France's own breaches of the treaties—her refusal for so long to negotiate a disarmament treaty or her invasion of the Ruhr—while her palpable manoeuvres to prevent the application to Italy of the same system which she wishes to apply to Germany were defended on the ground that she had done all Britain had asked her to do and that anyway she cannot bother much about non-European countries. This last is not a very convincing argument to set before the British people, who have obligations all over the world. Lucid And Compelling. Sir Norman Angell’s lucid and compelling article was the simplest of all. The British people made war probable, he said, by refusing to think out their problems. At one moment they absolutely rejected solutions which a few years later they gladly accepted. By attempting to limit their responsibilities to other States and leaving Europe uncertain of their attitude, they tempted the aggressor to the very course of action which would force them in the long run into war. This was a brilliant attack, but it left out such considerations as that British policy depends on the attitude of others, that she has done far more than any other Power to try to make the Covenant work in defence of Abyssinia, to reduce armaments, and to meet Germany’s claims, and that she has tried to reassure France by reaffirming her obligations under Locarno, while at the same time she has tried to make possible a comprehensive settlement in Europe once the tension on the Rhine is reduced. At any rate, all three writers seem to insist on the importance of the share which Britain must take a way to a more peaceful Europe is to be found. And it is obvious that, though less powerfully armed on land and in the air than some other States, Britain has an immense part to play by reason of her Fleet, her economic power and, above all, by her historic position and moral weight. New Air Fleet. To these will soon be added an aerial fleet second to none. What can she do to preserve the peace of Europe? It would be absurd to venture into details. A negotiation is in progress of a peculiarly delicate kind. Only a part of the facts can be known. Statesmen must be trusted by democracies to work cut the methods by which great results can be achieved. But the main principles of any settlement depend on what the British people will accept, as the Hoare-Laval incident clearly proved. These principles can be found in the Covenant itself, and indeed the present disastrous state of affairs has occurred simply because its provisions have not been carried out. It is significant also that despite all their betrayals of it the peoples of Europe turn back to the League again and again. Russia, which at one time heaped ridicule and abuse upon it, is now its most stalwart supporter; Germany, even when tearing up the Locarno Treaties, made the League the kernel of its appeal to Europe; even Italy, which has inflicted on it the most disastrous blow of all, still looks to it to assist her European interests. And British interests are as much bound up with the League as those of any other State. Her salvation. lies in making effective the “League system”— a far better principle than “collective security,” for it implies much more. Something more is necessary than a mere resolve to defend the existing order. The world is rapidly changing and the existing order of things must be adapted to new forces. Four Objectives. Britain has, therefore, at least four objectives to aim at. (1) To organize sanctions, or the assistance of one member to another, in such a manner that every State in Europe which accepts the obligations of the Covenant can be assured that it will not be deserted in the hour of need as Abyssinia has been. (2) To initiate such changes in the treaties as will show that justice can be obtained without the use of force by States that have real grievances. (3) To make use of the new power which ner rearmament will give to her to negotiate a comprehensive reduction and limitation, even if complete abolition cannot be secured, of air armaments. Without this it is idle to think that a peaceful Europe can be obtained. (4) To employ her immense economic strength to bring back some measure of economic sanity to the European nations without which they cannot regain their prosperity. This is a terrific programme, and no

wonder some people shrink frorn it. But if Britain is nut prepared to undertake it, is preoccupied with petty interests, refuses to make the necessary effort of the imagination or accept the sacrifices involved, then she will eventually lose all her greatness in the catastrophe which will ensue at no remote No statesmen could have tried harder than those who governed Britain between 1878 and 1898 to keep clear of European entanglements. But her world position inevitably drove her to take sides. And then her moat defended her. Now she is as open to the only attack that really matters as any other European Power. In the past she has gloriously responded to great challenges, if always a little slowly. If she tries to evade the issue now it will be because she is not fitted for the role of a Great Power in the harder world of to-day.