The Southland Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. “Luceo Non Uro.” MONDAY, JULY 22, 1935. THE WILL TO WAR

Southland Times, Issue 25342, 22 July 1935, Page 6

The Southland Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. “Luceo Non Uro.” MONDAY, JULY 22, 1935. THE WILL TO WAR

Mr Lyons is right to a certain extent when he declares that war is not in the hearts of the people, but it is difficult to accept the contention that wars are caused by politicians exclusively. It has been said that every country gets the government it deserves, and that aphorism applies to dictatorships as well as to governments elected under a democratic system. Italy accepts Mussolini; Hitler is the expression of the political ideas of modern Germany; Stalin represents the will of the majority of the people of Russia. Mussolini has embarked on a policy which aims at war with Abyssinia, and the overwhelming majority of the Italians support that purpose. Italy considers that Abyssinia is necessary to her well-being, and the Italians are convinced that the price which has to be paid for the acquisition of the Ethiopian State is not too high. Subsequent events may alter their opinion, but war with Abyssinia is popular in Italy today, and the government’s plan has the support of the people. There have been some reports, most of them in the Manchester Guardian and other anti-Fascist papers of opposition to Mussolini, but the enthusiasm of the Italians cannot be denied. It is wholly wrong to suggest that Italy is not eagerly supporting her dictator in this matter. This popular support of the war is one of the most serious factors, because there is so little hope of putting a restraining hand on Mussolini through the League of Nations in the absence of any strong popular denunciation of the attack on Abyssinia. In Abyssinia, the Emperor is appealing to the patriotism of his people, and they are preparing to fight because the desire to retain their liberty is strong. Here again the popular will is in favour of war, and it is only a half-state-ment to fix the responsibility on the politicians to the exclusion of the populace. The same thing can be said of the Japanese. In Japan the army is powerful and the policy it advances finds general support among the Japanese people. The opposition to it may be growing, and in the event of a severe check this opposition may become strong enough to turn the national sympathy away from these excursions in Manchukuo and Northern China; but in the meantime the aggressive movements are endorsed by the people. One of the most remarkable discoveries made by Walter Duranty in Moscow a year or so ago was the existence of a positive desire among the Russian people to avenge the defeat by the Japanese in the Russo-Japan war of the early part of this century. In spite of the revolution and the overturn of the Tsarists, this personal feeling among the masses persists, and undoubtedly if the Soviet Government decided tomorrow to attack Japan in the Far East the Russian people would be wholeheartedly behind the move. The failure to appreciate the strength of the popular will to war is one of the obstacles in the way of effective work for peace. To-day it is wrong to assume that the will to war is confined to Mussolini and his colleagues of the government. Italy is satisfied that Abyssinia is essential to her existence as a first-class nation, and while that view persists the Italian people will support the war, no matter what may be the view of the rest of the world.