The Southland Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. Luceo Non Uro. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 23, 1932. RUSSIA’S PLAN.

Southland Times, Issue 21660, 23 March 1932, Page 6

The Southland Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. Luceo Non Uro. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 23, 1932. RUSSIA’S PLAN.

While any fair-minded person outside of Russia must admit that it is extremely difficult to form any accurate estimate, from official or unofficial figures, of the progress of the Piatiletka or Five-Year-Plan, the tremendous effort to change Russia into an industrial country, it is possible to reach some approximation. The Soviet from time to time publishes glowing figures of the progress made under the Five-Year-Plan, and he have had Mr George Bernard Shaw to inform us that, as a result of a week’s carefully directed investigation, he considers Russia to have the finest government in the world, and to be making a huge success where other countries are failing. The fact that Mr Shaw continues to live in a sadly misgoverned country like Britain, and of whose misgovernment he is well aware, rather detracts from the value of his septuagenarian eulogy. On the other hand, observers have reported the Five-Year-Plan as a complete failure in Russia. Some observers discover that there is absolutely no unemployment; others bring back stories of the wretched thousands who have no work and who, having no work, have no food. It is fairly clear, however, that the Five-Year-Plan made such progress in the early stages that the Soviet decided to cut the period into four years, and to achieve the same results in the shorter period. In some industries it appears that the figures will be reached, perhaps exceeded, and in others failure already appears inevitable, and these failures occur in the spheres in which organization and technical skill play the biggest part. There, was some slowing in the results of 1931 compared with 1930, although the tempo of the general plan, being slightly accelerated, should have produced more. There w.as an increase in coal, but a slight diminution in pig iron, and though steel fell off Compared with the output of the previous year, copper, lead and zinc improved, and crude oil production rose by four million tons, roughly 25 per cent. The estimates for the fourth or final year in the heavy industries demand larger production figures, and though the programme calls for the investment, in the form of capital expenditure on the construction of new works, of 1,800 million roubles in 1932, there seems to be a very slight hope of the realization of the Soviet’s plans, which require, for instance, almost double the amount of steel produced in 1931, twice the amount of copper, twice the amount of pig iron, nearly three times the quantity of zine, and

an increase of over 33 1-3 per cent, in crude oil. One of the greatest difficulties experienced by the Government in this Five-Year-Plan has been and though efforts are being made to re-organize the railway system, it does not seem possible that the carrying capacity can be sufficiently enlarged to handle the proposed increase in goods. In 1913 the Russian railways were made to carry little more than 60,000,000 tons of industrial goods, but during the first half of 1931 the amount carried totalled 115,000,000 tons. It is known that for some years the rolling stock was allowed to get into very bad condition, and when all allowances are made for the feverish reorganization in the last two or three years, it is unlikely that the railways will be adequate to the task of moving the proposed 28 per cent, increase on the 1931 traffic figures. A feature of the fourth year of the Plan is a big extension in the light industries, particularly foodstuffs, and the advances aimed at are rather startling. In canned goods, for instance, the proposed increase for 1931 is 92.4 per cent. Of course, in this industry production has been enlarged enormously, but all the efforts to reduce costs have failed, and actually, with a great advance in production figures, the cost has moved forward 2 per cent, instead of showing the estimated decrease of 7.6 per cent. At the same time, it is generally admitted that these “quantity” figures have been achieved at the expense of quality, and this aspect of the Plan is causing the greatest anxiety. So far as the apparent wealth of the consuming masses is concerned, there seems to be a marked increase. The average monthly earnings in 1929 amounted to 89 roubles, and in 1931 the averare figure is 146 roubles per capita. But it is impossible to form any idea of the actual value of these earnings because Russia’s currency, managed by the State, is heavily inflated, and prices of goods outside of Government control (and goods in Government control are in short supply) cannot be quoted, although at times they reach heights which recall the extraordinary astronomical figures of Germany’s period of financial debacle. For this reason, the Plan’s capacity to achieve the proposed increase of 20-50 per cent, in potatoes, eggs and tobacco, and of 50100 per cent, in meat and butter during 1932 must be considered as one of the most important factors in determining the success of the Soviet’s effort. One thing is certain, the pressure of the 1931 drive will be exceeded in 1932, and as the Soviet has already set about a new Piatiletka, everything will depend on the capacity of the Russian people to stand up to the strain of heavy work with restricted food supplies. A significant point is that the bulk of the problems which confronted the Soviet in the first year of the Plan still remain: (a) Transport; (b) Quality as opposed to quantity; (c) Shortage of skilled technologists; (e) Import requirements; (f) The co-relation without waste of the various branches of national economy. This suggests that the FiveYear Plan has produced effort rather than real achievements, but taking the pre-war and pre-Stalin conditions into account, it cannot be denied that the results already achieved are surprising, particularly amongst Russian people.