The Southland Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. Luceo Non Uro. FRIDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1926. THE CHINESE SITUATION

Southland Times, Issue 20043, 3 December 1926, Page 6

The Southland Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. Luceo Non Uro. FRIDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1926. THE CHINESE SITUATION

Events are moving more rapidly in China, where the situation is probably more serious than Sir Austen Chamberlain’s statement to the House of Commons suggests. One London message mentions that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs mentioned that British troops would be despatched to China, but the summary of Sir Austen Chamberlain’s speech does not make his declaration so definite, restricting him to an assurance that additional foroes would be sent if a landing were necessary. At present the idea is to rely on the naval forces, which the Admiralty considers sufficient for the needs of the situation. This means that there is no thought of intervention. Hankow, the centre of the immediate danger, is watched by the warships of Britain, France and Japan who have concessions on the banks of the river beside the city, the British concession being closest to Hankow. Riots and strikes aimed at foreign interests and at wealthy Chinese disclose the work of the Communist agitators emboldened by the succe&s of the Cantonese forces, but though the situation is threatening the show of naval power has been enough to keep the Chinese from any violation of the concession areas. It is difficult to say how long this forbearance will last because as the river falls the withdrawal of the heavier vessels will become necessary, and at any moment a Cantonese advance further down the Yangtse may encourage the Chinese to challenge the power of the three foreign powers. So far the American Government has remained aloof, preferring to allow the Customs revenues to go to the rebels or elsewhere, since very little of the money actually flows through the proper channels. The American attitude, however, may be changed overnight. If American lives or American property become involved the public demand for action will become insistent. It has already been suggested that the commercial rivalry of the powers affects them in their treatment of the situation in China. They know that the boycott in China is a remarkably effective weapon and no power is anxious to provoke its use if the other powers are not involved. Britain has felt its force in Hong-Kong and her trade has suffered in the Yangtse area where she commands the greater part of the business. At Shanghai, unlike Hankow, there is a common interest since all the powers are involved in the duty of safeguarding the foreign concession and an attack there can be dealt with far more easily than any offensive act by the Chinese in the upper reaches of the river. Not only in the Yangtse, however, is danger threatening. Wu Pei-fu, one of the best of the Chinese leaders, has never recovered from the defeat he sustained when Feng betrayed him, and he must not be regarded as a serious obstacle to the Cantonese, because his lieutenants are not reliable and his troops are not so well armed as they were when he was in control of the Central Government. Chang Tso-lin’s decision to send no more troops to the Yangtse is dictated by his fear of the Kuominchun forces under Feng, who may strike at the capital from Mongolia at any moment. When the Kuominchun withdrew from Pekin they were not defeated. Wu’s subordinates pursued Feng’s army beyond Kalgan, but took care to refrain from a definite challenge, and the Kuominchun army is practically intact. If it moves it will have Russian backing, and its success will open.the way to Russian dominance of China extending from Canton to Manchuria. The position to-day can be understood only if it is accepted as being bi-focal. On the one hand there is the threat against foreign lives by the Chinese, and on the other there is the challenge to the powers by the Russians. This latter is the major problem and it will be the most difficult to meet since it may involve action outside of the Chinese frontiers.