The Southland Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. Luceo Non Uro. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1926. THE CLOUD IN CHINA

Southland Times, Issue 20042, 2 December 1926, Page 6

The Southland Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. Luceo Non Uro. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1926. THE CLOUD IN CHINA

It is, of course, impossible to forecast the statement on the situation in China that Sir Austen' Chamberlain will deliver, but no utterance in Britain will arrest’ or change the course of events in China unless it reveals that the British Empire is determined to protect its nationals even if it involves the employment of force. Little is to be gained from the advice that the recent events represent the movement of Chinese nationalism and that everything should lie moved from the path of this expression of national determination. If this is nationalism, and represents the desire of the Chinese to govern themselves, they can still gain these goals without killing British subjects and destroying British assets lawfully attained. The position, however, is that the Cantonese, aided by money and advice from Russia and profiting by dissensions among their foes, have been able to gain successes which promise a military situation sufficiently threatening to involve Pekin. The Canton&e alone have never been powerful enough to challenge the northerners seriously, but recent events have shown that they have had the,

advantage of outside aid, and it is known that Feng, the Christian general, only awaits the opportunity to strike at' the capital from the west. He has but recently been to Moscow, but before he went to Russia his frank arrangement with the Bolsheviks induced Chang Tso-lin to march against him. The theory that the Russians hate Feng because he is a Christian is too restricted a view, taking no account of Russian policy, which aims at winning China wholly to Russian influence by the unification of the country under a leader sympathetic to Russia and antagonistic to the other powers. Britain has the largest trade interests in China and commercially she has the most to lose in a political upset which puts her in the role of the country’s archenemy, and as Russia’s policy is definitely anti-British the advantages to her of skilful intervention in China can be easily appreciated. In China Russia can work with more confidence, with a better chance of securing results than any of the other countries, because die is playing a lone hand, is not worried about the feelings of others, and has practically nothing to lose. She has been able to make use of the nationalistic dream, and to encourage the belief that the troubles of the Chinese have their origin in the presence of the foreigners, whereas the ills from which they suffer have been brought about by the civil wars waged by the various military leaders, ambitious for wealth and power. Negotiations with China for any purpose have been practically impossible because the so-called Government in Pekin could speak only for the portion of the country dominated by the tuchun who dominated the Cabinet. Various services to meet the obligations incurred in connection with loans have been maintained in the face of great, difficulties, but the returns have been steadily diminishing owing to the greed of the military governors who have seized everything in the shape of money they could lay hands on with safety. It now seems that the Wanhsien affair was begun by the seizure of British ships by a Chinese general who at the moment owed allegiance to no one. He certainly was not the servant of Pekin and diplomatic references to the Government there were useless. Evidently that incident had a marked effect in China, though probably it has been used by the Reds as evidence of Britain’s high-handed methods, but the failure of the powers to reach an understanding precluded any further action to demonstrate to the Chinese that there were limits beyond which they could not pass with impunity. Japan’s immediate concern is in the north and she perhaps is not willing to move, and Britain may have to [Jay a lone hand, unless the Americans are involved through the acts of the advancing troops. Meanwhile Britain is suffering the heaviest losses; but the future, if the Reds are successful, promises events which will have serious consequences for all the powers, since confiscation and repudiation may be expected to appear in company with the forcible ejection of foreigners other than, say, Russians. It is wise always to go back to that point because behind the Chinese situation is Russia’s hatred of Britain, which has been revealed too many times to be doubted. In China the Russians can act firmly, whereas Britain’s course seems to have lain between complete indifference and resolution. Either line of action strictly adhered to might be effective, but a compromise can give no better results than alternations of them, and this is what we have been trying in China. The arrival of the Cantonese in the Yangtse Valley brought the danger point near, and it must be recognised that the situation facing Britain is full of serious possibilities. It will be surprising if the cables in the course of the next week or so do not give us information of naval and military movements of a significant character. Only a few years ago a British subject engaged in any lawful pursuits could rely on his country for prompt action in the defence of his rights and his person, but since the war there has been more hesitancy shown and this in the East particularly has so weakened British prestige that we are likely to meet with circumstances more serious than any known during the past half century of our activities in China.