BRAZIL’S VETO

Southland Times, Issue 19821, 18 March 1926, Page 6

BRAZIL’S VETO

After wrangling delegates had reached the point where agreement was in sight, the whole of the work at Geneva was killed by the decision of Brazil to veto the admission of Germany to the League of Nations. In this club one blackball is sufficient to defeat an application for membership. From the beginning the attitude of Brazil caused anxiety. She demanded a seat on the Council and said bluntly that if she did not get it her resignation would follow, but later the diplomats were able to persuade. the Brazilian delegates to adopt a tone less hectoring and there grew the belief that if the principal European powers reached an agreement the South Americans would not cause any trouble. And so the spectre of the Brazilian demands faded into the background, leaving the battles between the European nations in the centre of the stage. In those contests the Germans gained all the credit. They went to Geneva under the arrangement of the Locarno Pact and to that understanding they adhered loyally. M. Briand declared in an unguarded moment that at Locarno the Germans agreed to apply for membership and a seat on the Council without any claim, for special treatment. To that the

Germans could have replied with crushing force that the contract which precluded any special treatment was as binding on the other nations. Actually the German attitude made clear that this was their view and the French Premier at once was put at a disadvantage. He was fighting for Poland and did not disguise the fact. Ultimately, Czecho-Slovakia, France’s other ally, agrees to help him out of a ’ difficulty by retiring in favour of Poland, while Holland succeeds Sweden to give balance to the shuffling. This pretty re-arrangement could not hide the fact that it was a move to save the faces of those who had attempted to meet Germany’s entrance to the Council with a heavier body of voting against her. The Germans saw that and might have objected, but they meet the worried diplomats half-way in order to reach some decision. When the Poles would not give way a compromise of this sort was inevitable. When Poland was independent before she caused Europe a lot of trouble; now she is restored and difficulties centre about her activities. The Germans, emerging from the contest with all the honour, gave way to save the French, but now Brazil’s solemn veto has brought the whole business to the ground, and not even Sir Austen Chamberlain’s soothing declaration that the Germans are morally in the League can alter the fact that September must come befote anything decisive can be done. Brazil’s participation in the League is desirable in order to keep up the connection with America, but the price of her active interest has been rather heavy and it will revive in the minds of some Europeans the suspicion that the American interest is an inconvenient handicap without advantages to balance it. The one bright ray is that the Germans, having scored in the diplomatic contest, having seen how public opinion in the British Empire veered patently in their direction, may approach the September sitting fully prepared to make concessions so that Brazil may be given a permanent seat. The adjournment until September will give ample time for reflection, and time for the League of Nations to recover from the blows it has received from the diplomats. It would be idle to say that this flurry has not had any effect on the position in Europe. The French have suffered, and so has Sir Austen Chamberlain, but the British people have shown that they are not ready to accept anything that happens to have been arranged with the astute French leader—that much the Germans have been able to see as well as the French.