A MARNE SECRET

Southland Times, Issue 19278, 24 June 1924, Page 6

A MARNE SECRET

BELATED WAR REVELATION. LUDENDORFFS VISION OF DOOM. Tlie great and decisive battle of the Marne took place little more than nine and a-half years ago, but only now is the German official communique regarding it published ! (writes George Renwick in the Daily Chronicle. It will be remembered that the battle took place on September 6 to 12, 1914; but not a single word was allowed to be given out about it in Germany. So it was that during the whole duration of the war, and for long after the armistice, people in Germany knew nothing whatever about that tremendous week-long struggle which turned the tide of the war. Never has a whole country been so thoroughly deceived or kept so completely in the dark for such a long time. Not till books by prominent generals, politicians, etc., began to appear did the Germans learn anything of the battle which really decided their fate. It appears that, on September 28, 1914, —more than a fortnight after the battle—the German General Staff did decide to tell the country something about it, and to indicate cautiously that all was not well on the West front. A communique was drawn up and telephoned to the Wolff Bureau —official news agency. But before it could be sent to the newspapers the Government stepped in. The General Stan was consulted; it changed its mind, and as a consequenec the communique was not released for publication. GERMAN OFFICIAL—AT LAST. Now Vorwaerts (the Social Democratic organ of Berlin) gives the text for the first time uf this suppressed document, which has great historic interest. It is as follows : September 28, evening. “After the German Western Army had gone through Belgium, turned the northern French fortresses, and beaten the AngloFrench Army in several battles, it was necesary to stop the pursuit. As soon as it became known that the French were beginning an attack, based on the fortresses of Paris and Verdun, upon both wings of our pursuing army ...” (Here reports from other fronts are inserted, and then the communique proceeds.) ‘Ta the West, the enemy, with superior forces, succeeded at Chateau Thierry in breaking through our long front line. “For stragetic reasons, we had to withdraw that part of our right wing which was in danger on account of the break through, and which also ran the risk of being surrounded by forces from Paris. “Later, as a result of this, the victorious advance of our centre and our left wing had to be stopped, and they were withdrawn. THE ART OF MISLEADING. “Our armies retreated from the line east of Paris, Montmirail—Vitry le Francois— Chaumont, till they reached that north of Noyon, Soissons —Rheims —Verdun. “Our victorious armies in French Lorraine retreated to the German frontier. “While the French approached AlsaceLorraine with only weak forces, the French, in conjunction with the English, attacked “Out of attacks and counter-attacks a great battle developed between the Oise and the Meuse. At no point has a decision been reached.” As a description of the Battle of the Marne and the subsequent wholesale retreat of the German armies, this story—a fortnight late—must be admitted to be exceedingly cautious! Then follows a very brief description of what was known to the rest of the world as lhe battle of the Oiircq. “The enemy, by using a widespread railway net, attempted an attack with superior forces against our right wing, and then against our right flank. “Both attacks were stopped by appropriate counter measures.” Official communiques were never models of accuracy, but those few lines must go down in history as a perfect example of caution—and falsehood. FORESAW DOOM. The communique then jerks back to the East front, and finishes in characteristic style:— “ The slow progress of the great frontal battle and the continuous measures of a strategical nature which are taking place account for the fact that our news is scanty. But it will continue to be reliable,” The communique has one extraordinary feature. It is signed by ‘’General von Voight-Rhetz.” It was the first communique which that general, as “General Quartermaster,” signed. It was also the .last. He died a few days later of—so it was said —heart failure. There is a belief, however, that he cximmitted suicide after signing the communique which even he—like many other high German officers—had already recognised as denoting the loss of the war for Germany. On the same day—September 28—four years later, General Ludendorff telegraphed to the German Cabinet demanding that a request for an armistice should be sent out within forty-eight hours.