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Southland Times, Issue 19772, 21 February 1923, Page 5

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THE RUHR SITUATION INTERVENTION NOT FAVOURED SPEECH BY MR LLOYD GEORGE (By Telegraph—Press Assn.—Copyright.) (Australian and N.Z. Cable Association'. LONDON, February 19. (Received February 20, 8.5 p.m.) In the Address-in-Reply debate in the House of Commons Mr H. A. L. Fisher moved the amendment agreed upon by both wings of the Liberals relating to the European situation. He said the Council of the League of Nations should be invited immediately to appoint an expert commission to report on Germany's capacity to pay reparations and the best method of effecting the payments. Mr Fisher said he believed the overwhelming opinion of the country was against the Government being associated with the French in the occupation of the Ruhr. “It was lamentable,” he said, “that the great comradeship in arms should be broken up on a little rock of debt collecting expedition. What a sordid ending to a splendid tale.” Mr Fisher said he did not agree that France’s object was militaristic. What concerned British public opinion was the possibility that the Germans would be asked to pay a sum which was quite out of their reach. This might be made a pretext for an indefinite occupation.

Mr Pringle said the French occupation was the greatest event since the armistice for it revised the war conditions. Britain ought not to be the satellite of France, nr the patron of Germany. They should have regard both for French and German views. It was difficult to establish the case of legality for the French action. Lord Robert Cecil said that the suggestion that there was not a solution of the question, unless we called a world conference and rewrote the treaty, seemed to him a perfectly impossible policy. He was not quite sure that Labour members fully recognised the importance of friendship with France. As to reparations, the French disappointment was not unreasonable, but very understandable. He profoundly believed that the guarantee of a general security, under the League of Nations, not a paper guarantee, but one that would satisfy technical and military opinion, was the most desirable thing. Mr Lloyd George disagreed. The resolution should be regarded as a want of confidence. He pointed out that several members of the Government in 1922 favoured referring reparations to the League of Nations. He agreed it was extremely desirable that the French and English democracy should march together, as far as they could, but friendship did not mean that we should approve of every French act, or every French Minister that might place the world’s peace in jeopardy. On the contrary, he thought there was a most sincere form of friendship for France, that dominated those now entreating the Government to take some action to save France from disaster, a disaster inevitable, sooner or later, and the later the greater. Mr Lloyd George said he believed the French Government was committed to a policy of irretrievable disaster. There was nothing in the reparations questions demanding such a violent step as this. M. Poincare’s refusal of a proposal by the Bankers’ Committee was the first fatal step leading to the grave blunder in the Ruhr, which aggravated the whole situation and made it clear that reparations was not the object in view. He believed in the justice of the reparations, but if the present step failed, reparations would be gone. If it succeeded, the cost would be so great that the reparations would be irrecoverable. The advisers had chosen between cash and smash. France was trying both. She could not decide between the two. He did not believe a single French military adviser had ever advocated the seizure of the Ruhr. It was a dangerous position in which to place an army. It was ill-conceived and ill-thought out. The invading Germans in 1914, thought terrorism was all that was needed, but fear was never the last word in human action, but the sense of justice. The outbreak against wrong was always deeper and stronger than fear. Germany’s national spirit was humbled by the war, but for the first time after the armistice the German national spirit had re-awakened. With both French and German pride engaged, none knew what the outcome might be. Germany might break up, which meant that reparations would be gone and disarmament would be gone similarly. A revolution in Germany would be a greater danger to France, Britain, and Europe than a militarist Germany. He had proposed to re- ; fer the question to the League last August, | but M. Poincare refused it on the amazing ground that nothing in the Versailles Treaty could be referred to the League. It was essential that America should come into the Ireague. America had the world’s gold locked in her chest. She was suffering indigestion from the surfeit of it. Mr Lloyd George said that America had moral responsibility. They must have .American help, with or without the League. If America was sounded he did not believe that France would refuse an offer from the two greatest Powers which saved her from destruction.

Mr Arthur Henderson said that while supporting the amendment, he regretted Mr Lloyd George’s speech, which he believed would do much harm to France and encourage Germany’s defiance. He appealed to the Government to allow a free vote, as the amendment should not be regarded as a vote of censure.

Sir John Simon stated that the initial misfortune of the Versailles Treaty was that it failed to fix firmly the reparations figure, thus a premium was put upon invasion of part of Germany.

Mr Bonar Law replying said that though the Government differed from the French, they did not think that either the British or the world would be interested or helped by taking up an attitude antagonistic to Prance. Personally he did not pretend the Government liked the situation which had arisen. Un the contrary the Government disliked it. The Germans had taken up their attitude because they realised that the sanctions were being imposed for the sake of demands which they could not meet. “We knew France would regard intervention as an act of hostility, so this could not be the right time to act upon the amendment, but I am sure a better opportunity would come. It is better to wait than do harm by hasty intervention.” The result of the voting was received with loud ministerial cheers. WIRELESS COMMUNICATION. LONDON, February 19. (Received February 20, 8.5 p.m.) Mr Bonar Law, replying to a question, said the matter of wireless communication had been exhaustively considered by a sub committee of the Imperial Defence Committee and would now come before Cabinet. He hoped to be able shortly to announce the Government’s decision.