THE CROWN HOTEL

Southland Times, Issue 19519, 19 May 1922, Page 5

THE CROWN HOTEL

LICENSEE AND COMMITTEE SUPREME COURT’S JUDGMENT THE APPLICATION DISMISSED (Special to the Timm). * DUNEDIN, May 1«. In the Supreme Court thia morning, Wr Justice Sim gave judgment in the cane in which a publican nought writs compelling the Wailace Licensing Committee to grant hia licence which it had refnaed on legal ground*. Michael O’Brien, licensee of the Crown Hotel, Otautau, had moved for a writ of certiorari and a writ of mandamus against, the Wallace Licensing Committee consisting of Messrs George Cruickshank, S.M., of Invercargill; John Horrell, of To Wae Wae, farmer ; Leonard Wright Petchell, of Riverton, BJTOuntant and commission agent ; Arthur Bulman, of Fairfax, farmer ; William Templeton, of Riverton, flaxmillsr; and Edward John Stevens, of Hekeia, fanner. The Crown Hotel at Otautau was destroyed by fire in May, 1919. In the same month the chairman and two members of the Licensing Committee gave plaintiff a certificate authorising him to cany on business in premises at the roar of the destroyed building for a period of six months. In December, 1919, the Committee granted plaintiff an extension till the March, 1920, meeting. At that meeting the committee adjourned the matter for a month to enable plaintiff to report what provision he proposed to make for boarders and travellers. The Committee laid down certain requirements as to accommodation, and in June, 1920, a publican's license was issued to plaintiff. When plaintiff applied for a renewal of his license in June, 1921, Inspector S. J. Dew objected on the ground that the premises were not maintained at the required standard. Objections were also lodged on behalf of the Wallace No-Lieenso League and the Otautau branch of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union. A memorial from electors asking that the license be not granted was supported by legal argument at the September meeting of the Committee. The committee subsequently decided that the legal objection raised waa sound, and adopted a resolution regretting that as the legal objection raised wae sound the application must be refused. Plaintiff asked (a) That a writ of certiorari l>e issued for the purpose of quashing or setting aside the refusal ; (b) that a writ of mandamus bo issued to defendants ordering them to hear and determine the plaintiff’s applies- , tion ; and (c) that the Court order payment of costs to plaintiff.

In giving judgment His Honour said that the first question to be determined was whether the renewal granted in June, 1919, of the publican’s license in respect of the Crown Hotel was valid or not A publican’s license could only be granted in respect of an existing building. At the date when the renewal was granted the Crown Hotel was represented only by an office in which, under the authority of the Committee, the. plaintiff was carrying on his business as a 1 publican. This office might be treated as having been part of the licensed premise® according to the definition of “premises* contained in section 4 of the Act, but it certainly did not comply with th® requirements of section 76 of the Act, and there was no jurisdiction therefore to grant a publican’s license in respect of it. The proper course for the Committee to have followed would have been to adjourn the hearing of the application for a renewal (and also the annuaJ meeting) from quarterly meeting to quarterly meeting until plaintiff had erected in place of the destroyed building a new one which complied with the requirements of section 76. When that had been done there would have been jurisdiction to renew the license to plaintiff, and in the meantime the original license by virtue of section 116 of the Act would have been extended until the application for a renewal was finally disposed of. That must be treated a® having been granted in respect of the office. The Committee therefore treated the office as the house in respect of which the license was granted, and then proceeded to treat the same office a® a neighbouring house for the purpose of section 138.

“Mr Callan, for plaintiff, has relied strongly on section 171 of the Licensing Act, 1908, in support of his case,” continued His Honour. “That section made a licensee liable to forfeiture in certain circumstances. One of these was when the licensee allowed his licensed premises to become ruinous or dilapidated, subject to the proviso that if the premises had become ruinous or dilapidated by reason of fire, tempest, or other cause beyond the control of the licensee the license should not be forfeited until reasonable time had elapsed for the reinstatement of such premises, but that section did not apply in terms to a case such as the present., where the licensed house had been completely destroyed by fire. Such a hous was neither ruinous nor dilapidated. It had ceased to exist as a house and could not be reinstated. If in such a case a licensee wished to carry on his business he must get an order under section 138.” His Honour proceeded to consider the position of the license granted by the Committee in June, 1920. That was, hs said, the license which plaintiff applied to have renewed in June, 1921. It was not, he thought, In any better position than the license granted in June, 1919. It was granted in respect of three separate houses. Of these the office appeared to have been part of th® original licensed premises, but it wm not suggested that the ball or the cottage had ever been part of these premises. What the act contemplated was that a publican’s license should be granted in respect of one house and of one house only. That was made clear, he thought, by the provisions of section 76 of the Act and by the form given in the schedule to the Act of the application for a publican’® license, and of a publican’s license. The position then was that in a borough or town district a publican’* license could only be validly granted in respect of one house, and that must be a house which complied with the requirements of section 76 of the Art. Th® granted in June, 1920, wbr bad therefore, because it was granted in respect of three separate and distinct house®, and because not one of these houses complied with the requiremente of section 76. It was bad also because it was granted as a renewal of the previous license, which had been granted in June, 1919, in respect of the office only. In substance it was not a renewal at all but a grant, of a new license in respect of two new houses. If application had been made to the Supreme Court a writ of certiorari would have been issued for the purpose of quashing the certificate. It was clear, therefore, that the Committee, if it had desired to do so, could not have made any valid grant to plaintiff in separation, 1921. in respect of his then pending application. It would be idle to qussh ths refusal of the Committee and to send case back for further consideration when it was clear that the Committee had no jurisdiction to grant to plaintiff what he. applied for, namely, a renewal of the invalid license granted in June, 1920, or to make any valid grant in respect of plaintiff’s application. He thought, therefore, that plaintiff had not made out any case for the interference of the Court, and the motion was dismissed Mr Buhnan was left to pay his own costa, and plaintiff wae ordered to pay the other defendants the following costa : £lO 10/for filing statement of defence, and £l2 12/- for their costa oi the argument, with disbursements to be fixed by the Registnax.