CORRECTING HISTORY.

Southland Times, Issue 18934, 22 September 1920, Page 4

CORRECTING HISTORY.

When Admiral Sims was writing for his fellow-countrymen the story of the United States Navy’s work in the war, he gave to his readers the impression that when he reached England in 1917 he found the naval and political leaders in a state of panic over the success of the German U-boat campaign. According to the American officer, only Mr Lloyd George was at all hopeful, and he was sustained by some religious fervour rather than conclusions drawn from the facts of the situation. Admiral Sims obviously believed that the British Navy was at the "end of its tether,” while his seniors on the peaceful side of the Atlantic took a blacker view than he did. We saw for instance, that Mr Josephus Daniels and President Wilson placed the sum of their knowledge of naval affairs at the disposal of the Admiralty, and advised that authority to show a little more courage. Mr Daniels might not have made his proposals in such blunt language, because he is a politician, but the effect of his remarks is beyond doubt. Between them, Admiral Sims and Mr Daniels gave the world the impression that in 1917 the British Navy w-as either terrorised or cowardly and at the end of its resources, that it was only the intervention of Yankee dash, organisation and inventiveness that enabled the Allies to win the war. In his book, Admiral Sims certainly gives a well-balanced estimate of the work actually done by the United States warships, but he is very positive in his declarations that the War Council and the Admiralty as he found them in 1917, were in despair. Now, Lord Jcllicoe has come along with his second book on the naval war. a sequel to hia first, which deals with the submarine crisis and corrects the American admiral’s view of the situation. Much that he says confirms Admiral Sims’s statements regarding the work of the American warships, statements that made Mr Daniels so angry, but he gives a new view of the situation that confronted the Admiralty when Admiral Sims reached London. "Wc wore certainly not in the state of panic which has been ascribed to us in certain quarters,” says Lord Jellicoe, "but we did want those who were engaged in the war on the side of the Allies to understand the situation in order that they might realise the value that early naval assistance would bring to the Allied cause.” In other words, the Admiralty had been so successful in concealing from the world the real gravity of the situation, that it was difficult to make the newly-committed American government realise how necessary naval assistance on the European side of the Atlantic had become. The tendency on the part of the American authorities and people to restrict their early participation in the naval war to the defence of the American roast had to be dealt with, and one of the means was to convince the American naval officers that something had to bo done quickly. In doing this, Lord Jellicoe admits that he had to risk conveying the impression that ho was reduced to despair, and Admiral Sims was probably justified in forming that opinion, but the British admiral was concerned only for the vital needs of the moment, and the effect of his remarks upon his reputation or that of the service to which he belonged, never crossed his mind. He has now, however, done himself the tardy justice of correcting the impression honestly formed by Admiral Sims and given to the world as part of the history of (he Great War.