The Southland Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. Luceo Non Uro. FRIDAY, AUGUST 10, 1917. RUSSIAN NOTES.

Southland Times, Issue 17733, 10 August 1917, Page 4

The Southland Times. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. Luceo Non Uro. FRIDAY, AUGUST 10, 1917. RUSSIAN NOTES.

There is obvious ground for the fear of qualified observers, as reported by cable, that the enemy’s advance across the Bukowina may result in Russian troops in Moldavia and the Carpathians being cut off. The enemy’s advance at Kimpolung turns the flank of the Russo-Roumanian force holding the Moldavian frontier in the Translyvanian Alps. Kimpolung is in the extreme south-east corner of the Bukowina, and the advance into Moldavia at this point leads the Germans to the upper Sereth and threatens the rear of the troops defending the Tolgyes, Gyime, Ojtoz, and other passes in the chain of mountains which forms the frontier between Moldavia and Hungary.' The left flank of the Russo-Roumanian line curves to the eastward along the line of the Sereth to its junction with the Danube and along the Danube to the Black Sea. In the middle of this line and at a vital spot is Fokchany. Most unfortunately for the Russo-Rou-manie.n defenders, the same rot that destroyed the line east of Lemberg appeared at Fokchany, where we are told in an official Russian communique that “owing to the voluntary retirement of two regiments the enemy took the offensive in the direction of F’okchany and pressed us across the Tyrladasus river. Clearly what is happening at the present time is this: The Russo-Roumanian line between Kimpolung and P'okchany is being curled back under severe pressure at both ends and the Germans have a tempting opportunity to put one of their favourite enveloping movements into operation. A strong advance from Kimpolung combined with vigorous progress from Fokchany would enable the Germans to meet on converging lines with the Russo-Roumanian forces between them. The outlook is not promising. There is no clear sign yet that the Russian retreat has ended. The latest retirement at Fokchany shows clearly that the untrustworthy mutinous elements in the Russian army have not been eradicated and there may be other regiments prepared to follow the lead of those which opened the breach at Fokchany. The King of Roumania, replying to a telegram of congratulation from the President of France, explains that the recent Roumanian offensive, which opened with considerable promise of success, “was stopped for reasons independent of his will.” He added that the troops were “burning with impatience to resume.” It is not difficult to read between the lines of that message. The plain meaning is that the Roumanians did not receive the necessary support from the Russian allies and had inaction inforced upon them. Unless a rapid and radical change comes over the situation a quick retreat will have to be made from the Moldavian frontier. This will mean the abandonment of the greater part, if not

the whole, of Moldavia and the establishment of new lines of defence in Russian territory. In Russia M. Kerensky is still at the head of the Government, and from the fact that he has taken the portfolios of War and the Navy in addition to the Premiership we may fairly assume that his [lowers have been enlarged, that his threat to resign has driven hostile elements from the Ministry and compelled his supporters to give him their confidence more fully. It is reported from Petrograd that the Cadets are steadily regaining power in the Duma and consolidating the forces of order and authority. The increasing strength of the Cadets is of good augury. The Cadets, or Konstitutional Democrats, include in their ranks the better educated and more thoughtful classes in Russia, sometimes called the Intelligentsia. These classes, and they are powerful alike in numbers and in influence, will rally to any Government which promises to restore economic, political and military stability. With the Duma recovering its morale, and M. Kerensky with extended powers at the head of a strong Government, (here is better hope for Russia to-day than there has been for some weeks past. While political conditions are improving Russia is having extraordinary trouble with some of her best known generals. One of the most famous, and in some respects the most successful, General Brusiloff, was dismissed because he failed to take adequate measures for repairing the breach made in the southwestern armies by the mutiny of disloyal regiments. His dismissal is said to be irrevocable. Alexieff was removed some time before because he was “not considered to possess the energy, enthusiasm and confidence necessary.” Before that Kuropatkin, who had been in command of the northern group of armies, was deprived of his command and sent off to Teshkent as Governor-General. Now Gourko is under restraint on a charge of treacherously corresponding with the cx-Czar with a view to the restoration of the old regime. Russia has indeed a peck of troubles in connection with her high military commands, and it will not be easy to replace these experienced and able generals. It is, indeed, difficult to believe that when the army is reorganised and is again able to fight as an efficient force employment will not be found for some of these tried officers.

One aspect of the Russian retreat and of the complete breakdown of the morale of the Russian armies causes the utmost chagrin to the Allies. The retreat was not an orderly retirement. At many points rearguard actions were not fought at all. The troops refused to fight, threw down their arms in some cases, and evacuted strong positions without firing a shot, allowing the Austro-Germans to enter into possession without unslinging their rifles. It was not the retreat of an army, but the flight of an armed rabble. This failure to cover the retirement entailed the abandonment of enormous quantities of stores and material, and worst of all of large numbers of guns. Under any circumstances the arfillery losses would have been serious, for Russia has never had enough guns for her requirements, but the losses were especially disastrous because they included invaluable heavy guns with which Britain and Japan had succeeded in supplying Russia by dint of immense exertions. These losses are recorded by the correspondent of the Times. “An unfortunate feature of the retreat,” he says, “is the large proportion of heavy guns captured by ’ the enemy and the loss of the re-equipments which had been laboriously provided by Great Britain, France, and Japan.” The heavy reverses which the Russian armies have suffered have been due in large measure to the fact that they were unable to reply to the enemy’s enormous artillery concentrations. Russia’s Allies have strained their resources to make good this deficiency, a deficiency which makes permanent success unattainable in modern warfare. Now the collapse of the Russian armies has undone the work of many months, and the restoration of the Russian army to efficiency entails not only complete reorganisation and the reinstatement of the principles of discipline and authority, but also the re-equipment of many of the armies with heavy artillery. The military correspondent of a Russian newspaper wrote that “the catastrophe at Tarnopol was not the result of fighting, but of pusillanimity, cowardice, ignorance and criminality.” Whatever the contributing causes may be Russia has suffered disasters from which it will take her a long time to recover even under most favourable conditions, and for the task which confronts him Kerensky needs a giant’s strength.