THE VOLUNTEERS.

South Canterbury Times, Issue 7267, 21 July 1893, Page 2

THE VOLUNTEERS.

The following ara a few further extracts from Colonel Fox’s report on tho New Zealand Volunteer force :

CONDITIONS GOVERNING RECOMMEND A.TIOKS.

I have found that in the colony a certain feeling exists of doubt as to whether there is aav necessity for the maintenance of defence forces or for the upkeep of defence works. It is certain that such doubts arise from a want of appreciation of the necessity, and this is owing to the fact that bald recommendations have from time to time been made on purely technical grounds not understood by the general public, who, being altogether an intelligent public, naturally ask why such things should be done. The greater the intelligence the more reason for explanation. Without explanation, the intelligent man, not knowing the basis cn which calculations are made, is apt to deduce wrong results from false data, which ho is forced to set up owing to lack of knowledge of the real considerations.

I ha raison d ’ olre for the fortification of our chief porta ia not fully understood. The role of qur navy ia the defence of our commerce while on sea. In war time it may be accepted as a fact that our commerce will be confined to definite traie routes. On those trade routes our merchantmen will bo met and passed along by our ships of war. While on those routes they will enjoy comparatively safety. If they leave those routes they will do so at their own risk. From this it can be deduced that during wartime there will be a great difficulty in effecting insurance on vessels which, from their start until they reach their destination, deviate from the routes which will be laid down by the Admiralty, and unless their port of destination is so sufficiently fortified that they will be protected therein from the risk of being seized by an enemy’s cruiser or privateer. Therefore it is necessary to provide safe harbours for these vessels on their arrival, or else submit to have the wh.de commercial work of the colony paralysed during war time. Proceeding on these lines, it is incumbent that we should sufficiently fortify our principal ports for the protection of ocean going steamers on their arrival, and also for

the care and protection of the colony’s own merchant shipping; and last, but by no moans least, that the hips of war in these waters should have safe refuge in the face of a temporarily too powerful enemy, and ports in which they may depend on renewing their coal supply. Any attack on New Zealand must bo delivered by means of ships of war, or by naval transport, or by both combined, and will take one of the following forms : —■ (1) Attack by fleet of heavily armoured vessels on fortified centres. (2) Attack by fleet of cruisers. (3) Attack by a number of ships, composed partly of cruisers, partly of privateers. (4) A landing o men from transports. The objects of these attacks will be the destruction of fortifications, of docks, of shipping, the levying of indemnities, and the demoralisation of commerce.

They are rendered more or less possible according as to whether the British Empire is—-(A) in command of the seas, or in equal strength on the seas with her opponents j (B) whether she has lost command of the seas, or is in inferior strength. If condition (A) prevails, then form of attack (I) may ho disregarded : the heavily armoured vessels of the opposing fleet will be well taken care of.

Attack (2) will be a matter of difficulty, as an enemy’s fleet of cruisers eould not move without their locality being soon learnt, and arrangements made for their interception or reception at their destination by a strong' r naval force.

Attack (3) is more possible, as, although allowing our command of the sear, it would be difficult to have all the privateers whioh an enterprising enemy could send out shadowed by our ships of war. These privateers could be despatched from different ports, with orders to concentrate at a certain point where they would be met by one or two cruisers, and a rush might be attempted on the chief ports of this colony for the purpose of their destruction as safe harbours for our navy and commerce.

And attack (4) will only be made in combination with attacks (2) or (3), when it would only be an operation of a few hours' duration, as an enemy could not afford to land men and leave bis ships short banded with the risk of our ships turning up, while his men were ou shore. Also, attacks (2), (3), and (4), either alone or in combination, run the very greatrisk of failure before they can be delivered The enemy's ships will have to come many thousands of miles through waters well searched by our ships before they can reach their point of concentration. They will have either to bring colliers with them, have them at the point of concentration, or they will have to make a dash at one of our coaling ports, or capture our colliers, thus showing their whereabouts and giving warning of their approach. Under condition (B) —when our opponents have established their supremacy by sea— Form of attack (1) is hardly to be expected. After a battle a Ventrance, the enemy will for some considerable time have few, if any, heavily armoured vessels to send many thousands of miles from bis shores for the purpose of destroying a few forts and ships lying in colonial harbours- Besides, these heavily armoured chips have but email coal accommodation, and would find great difficulty in coming so far.

Form of attack (2) becomes at once more probable ; but the enemy’s first class cruisers will either have met eur own cruisers before this time, or will have to deal with them ; and supposing that they have done so, and are free, it will be much more their role to lie round the English coast, interceping the food supply of England, thus starving her into submission, than to be starting on a roving expedition to the other side of the world, with very little to be gained at the end of it. That will come, if necessary, in the after time. Attack (3) alone, or combined with (4), on the other hand, becomes almost a certainty. Our watchfulness will have to be redoubled, and our defences in such a state that we can ward off suoh attacks with ease. The time will have arrived when on the vitality and defensive power of the colonies will depend their ultimate iddependence and integrity, or tbeir annexation by our conquerors. Attack (3) alone, or in combination with (4), is generally admitted to be what the colonies must guard themselves against.