REVIEW OF THE WAR.

Rangitikei Advocate and Manawatu Argus, Volume XLV, Issue 11857, 21 June 1919, Page 6

REVIEW OF THE WAR.

SIR D,-HAIG'S DESPATCH, "REASONS FOR LONG CONFLICT DIFFICULTIES OF -THE ALLIES Some of the principal features of the war are dealt with by the British Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig, in his final despatch. In this, my final despatch, he says:-—“I think it is desirable to comment briefly upon certain general features which concern the whole series of operation carried out under my command. To direct attention to any single phase of that stupendous and incessant struggle and seek in it the explanation of our sncces, to the exclusion or neglect of other phases posibly less striking in their immediate or obvious consequences, is, in my opinion, to risk the formation of unsound doctrines regarding the character and requirements of modern war. and a-half years are regarded as a single continuous campaign there can be recognised in them the same general features and the same necessary stages which, between forces of approximately equal strength, I have marked all the conclusive bat- } ties of history. There is in the first i instance the preliminary, stage of ; the campaign, in which the op- : posing forces seek to deploy and manoeuvre for position, endeavouring, while doing so, to gain some early advantage which might be pushed home to quick decision* This phase came to an end in the present war with the creation of continuous trench lines from the Swiss frontier to the sea. PERIOD OF REAL STRUGGLE. Battle having been .-joined, there follows the period of real struggle in which the main forces of the two belligerent armies are pitted against each other in close and costly combat. Each commander seeks to wear down the power of resistance of his opponent and™ to pin him 2 to his position, while preserving or accumulating in his own hands a powerful reserve, force with which he can manoeuvre and, when signs of the enemy becoming morally and physically weakened are observed, deliver the decisive attack. In former battles this stage of the conflict has rarely lasted more than a few days, and has often been completed in a few hours. When armies of millions are engaged, with the resources of great empires behind them, it will inevitably be long. It will include’violent crises of fighting, when viewed separately and apart from the general perspective, will ap» pear individucally as great, indecisive battles. To this stage belong the great engagements of 1916 and 1917, which wore down the strength of the German armies. DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY RESERVES. Finally, whether from the superior fighting ability and .leadership of one of the belligerents, as the result of greater resources or tenacity, or by reason of higher morale, or from a combination of all these causes, the time will come when the other side will begin to weaken and the climax of the battle is readied. Then the commander of the weaker side must choose whether he will break off the engagement, it he can, while there is yet time, or take on a supreme effort what reserves remain to him. The launching and destruction of Napoleon’s last reserves at Waterloo was a matter of minutes. In this world war the great sortie of the beleaguered German armies, commenced on March 21, 1918, lasted for four months, yet it represents a corresponding stage in a single colossal battle,. THE LENGTH OP THE W AR. If the causes which determined the length of the recent contest are examined in the light of the accepted principle of war it will be seen that the duration of the struggle was governed by and boro a direct relation to certain definite factors which are enumerated below. In , the first place, we were unprepared I for war, or at any rate for a war of such magnitude. We were deficient in both trained men and military material, and, what was more important.had no machinery ready by which either men or material could be produced in anything approaching the requisite quantities. The consequences were two-fold. Firstly, the necessary machinery had to be improvised hurriedly, and improvision is never econbmical and seldom satisfactory. In this case the high-water mark of our fighting strength in infantry was only reached afer two and a-half years of conflict, by which time heavy casualties had already occurred. In consequence, the fullmanpower of |the Empire was never developed in the field at any period of the war. As regards material, it was not until midsummer, 1916, that the artillery situation became even approximately adequate to the conduct of major operations. Throughout the Somme battle the expenditure of artillery ammunition had to be watched with the greatest care. During the battles of 1917 ammunition was plentiful, but the gun situation was a source of constant anxiety. Only in 1918 was it possible to conduct artillery operations independently of any limiting consideration other than that of transport. FRANCE’S TERRIBLE BURDEN. The second consequences of our uupreparedness was that our armies were unable to intervene, either at . the outset of the war or until nearly t-wo years had elapsed, in sufficient strength adequately to assist our allies The enemy was able to gain a notable initial advantage by establishing himself in Belgium and Northern Fiance, and throughout the early stages of the war was free to concentrate an undue proportion of his effectives against France and Russia. The ecxessive burden thrown upoon the gallant army of France during this period caused the losses the effect of which has been felt all through the war and directly influenced its length. Just as at no time were we as an Empire able to put our own full strength into the field, so at no time were the Allies as a whole able completely to develop and obtain the full effect from their greatly superior manpower. What might have been the effect of British intervention bn a

larger scale in the earlier stages of the war is shown by what was actually achieved by our original expeditionary force. It is interesting to note that in previous campaigns the side which has been fully prepared for war has almost invariably gained a rapid and complete success over its less-well-prepared opponent. In 1866 and 1870 Austria and then France were overwhelmed at the outset by means of superior preparation. The intial advantages derived therefrom were followed up by such vigorous and ruthless action, regardless of loss, that there was no time to recover from the first stunning blows. The German plan of campaign in the present war was undoubtedly based on similar principles. The margin by which the German onrush in 1914 was stemmed was so narrow and the subsequent struggle so severe that the word “miraculous” is hardly oo strong a term to describe the recovery and ultimate victory of the Allies. RUSSIA AND ITALY. A further cause adversely influencing the duration of the war on the western front during its later stages, and one following indirectly from that just stated, was the situation in other theatres. The military strength of Russia broke down in 1917 at a critical period when, had she been able to carry out her military engagements, the war might have been shortened by a year. At a later date the military situation in Italy in the autumn of 1917 necessitated the transfer of five British divisions from France to Italy at a time when their presence in France might have had far-reach-ing effects. Thirdly, the Allies were handicapped imtheir task,*and the war thereby lengthened by the inherent difficulties always associated with the combined action of armies of separate nationalities, differing in ■ peech and temperament, and, not least important, in military organisation, euuipment, and supply. j|