THE BRITISH NAVY.

Rangitikei Advocate and Manawatu Argus, Volume XXXIV, Issue 9408, 31 March 1909, Page 5

THE BRITISH NAVY.

VOTE‘OF CENSURE ON ' ' MINISTRY. LOST BY LARGE MAJORITY. United Prpas Assooiatiou-By Electric Telegraph, Copyright. London, March 80, Mr A. H. Lee moved the censure motion in moderate termß ‘ n f 8 denied that there was a public panic It was only natural that acute anxiety should-be the result of Mr Aaqiiith’.s speech on the 16th. It was absurd to talk of Germany’s treachery, Safety lay in refusing to be . influenced by a promise not to accelerate building. A diplomatic declaration might become obsolete in a week, whereas it would take two years to construct a battleship. , Sir E. Grey replied. He commended the absence of party feeling in Mr Lae’s speech, but the Opposition, he said, ought to have deferred the 1 censure motion until July, when the shipbuilding vote would be considered and more information, which would help the House to a right judgment, would be available. The House and country were perfectly right to view the new situation created by the German programme as grave. When the programme was completed Germany would have 38 Dreadnoughts —the most powerful fleet in the world. That imposed on Britain the necessity for/ rebuilding the whole fleet. (This statement caused a sensation in the House. . The element of. uncertainty was as to when this must be done. The. first necessity therefore was to take stock of the plant of the country. That the Admiralty had done. The British capacity for building hulls, propelling machinery, and the manufacture of the largest guns-was considerably in excess of the German, but a doubtful point was the comparative capacity to provide gnn mountings. The Admiralty had now arranged with the manufacturers to provide such an increase that in a few months a similar advance would be made in this branch. Dealing with diplomatic relations Sir Edward Grey insisted on the good results of King Edward’s visit. There were two things which might produce a conflict. The first was a British attempt to isolate Germany, and the second the isolation of Britain in the attempt of any Continental Power .to dominate and dictate the policy of the Continent. There was no reason to apprehend either

contingency. European Powers were spending half their revenue in preparations to kill each other! The extent of this expenditure had become a satire and a reflection upon civilisation, but Britain must be prepared to defend her national existence under the conditions imposed during our own generation. He was glad that the Colonies, such as New Zealand, recognised that their national existence was at one with purs in this matter. ,The only possible basis of an agreement to limitation was the acknowledgment of British naval superiority. “In January, ’’ he said, “I made our ‘information regarding acceleration known to Germany, adding that they must not be ‘surprised if the British estimates were increased. Germany, in a verbal, but quite definite declaration, said she would have thirteen Dreadoughts at the end of 1913, and this disposes of any extreme apprehension regarding 1910-1911. The four British hypothetical Dreadnoughts were not intended to be included in the limitation of the next programme. The national security shall have the benefit of any doubt.’' Mr Asquith added little to Sir Edward Grey’s speech, and concluded with a strong appeal to supporters for a vote of confidence. Mr Balfour, in winding up the debate, said .that the Government were relying on too small a margin of naval strength at a time When a greater strain was placed on Britain’s defensive resources ' than for the past hundred years. The motion was rejected by 353 votes to 134. The Labourites voted against it, and the .Nationalists abstained from voting. The Croydon election resulted : Hermon Hodge (Tariff Reformer), 11,989; J. B. Raphael (Liberal), 8041; Frank Smith (Socialist), 886. The election was fought on the question ot the immediate building of four more Dreadnoughts. The announcement of the figures caused a sensation in the House of Commons during Mr Balfour’s speech. [The figures at the general election were: H. O. Arnold Forster (O.), 8248; H. O. Somerset, (L.), 7241; S. Stranks, (Lab.). 4112.] 1

PREPARATIONS FOR DREADNOUGHTS.

Received March 81, 8 35 a.m. London, March 30. In the House of Commons, Mr McKenna,'in reply to Sir H. Norman, hinted that certain preparations for contingent Dreadnoughts including designs were already in hand. The "Westminster Gazette 'comments on Government adhering to tin Estimates, and emphasises the need of a sufficiently . wide margin of security to save Britain from the perpetual scrutiny of her neighbours. “ We must, ” says the Westminster “replace the present fleet by Dreadnoughts in a longer or shorter time and .v/s cannot flatter ourselves that

we have any superior resources enabling us to make up . lost time if we delay too long.” GERMANY’S ASSURANCES NOT BINDING. Received March 81, 11 a.m. Berlin, March 30. Prince Bulow, in an important speech in the Reichstag, reported Germany’s naval assurances regarding ship building, adding that they were, not of a binding character. He sympathetically referred to France’s position in Morocco. Then dealing with the nearer East he said that if Germany had not supported Austria she would have encouraged an attempt to inflict a diplomatic defeat on Austria, thereby weakening the German position in Europe.