ABOUT VERDUN.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 177, 26 May 1916, Page 3 (Supplement)

ABOUT VERDUN.

GLORIOUS FRENCH DIVISIONS

The official "Bulletin des Armes" publishes the following account of the first phase of the Battle of Verdun—"At a quarter past seven on the morning of February 21st the Germans opened fire and sprinkled our sector with shells of every calibre, a* well as "with tear-producing and (suffocating shells. After an hour's intense bombardment the telephonic communications were cut, and connsction had to be maintained by despatch riders. Our shelters began to give way. At the Caures Wood and town grave accidents were reported. Parties of soldiers were crushed and buried beneath the debris. Nevertheless, our artillery replied, taking as objectives enemy batteries whose po-itions had been discovered by aeroplanes, and shelling particularly the Forest of Spincourt and an adjoining wood where a formidable number of enemy guns were mounted.

The aviators who flew over the enemy positions on the 2Ut agree in saying that this region was the centre of a vert'able fireworks display. Over the small Gremilly wood to the north of La Jume'le the Hashes indicating the presence of guns were so numerous that the aerial ob-orvers had to g;ive up the task of marking on the maps the batteries they saw in action. There were batteries everywhere. Four in the afternoon marked the culminating point of the enemy fire. Sausage balloons were floating over the enemy lines. Under the avalanche of shells our first lines were levelled, but the defenders everywhere clung to the ground. The morale of the troops was of the highest order.

Th t > Germans only succeeded in penetrating our advanced lines and counter-attacks were quickly and vigorously organ'sed. When the offensive fa; ! ed tho defence was resumed methodically and stubbornly." The account goes nn to describe the various phases of the following days, which proved once again the vigour of the French commanders, the admirable discipline of the men under fire, and tho unanimous determination of all to hold their ground. It conclude:? as follows :

SAME TROOPS STILL THERE

"Tims the eame troops are stilf here which have withstood the Germans since February 2l>t. defending every posit'on. In spite of bad weather and sacrifices in men and faterial they bar the enemy's road for .still another whole night. Their mission is to hold the front on the arm between Douaumont and Hardaumont: they fulfil it until the moment when they are relieved by froih units, and the battle goes on. Our u visions, which received one of the most formidable onslaughts of the campaign, distinguished themselves in engagement after engagement by their dogged perseverance, and enabled, the reserves to hold up the encmy's'advanoo. They bore the brunt of the attacks, playing a decisive and glorious part which contributed without doubt to our holding Verdun. "Their heroic behaviour made it possible to deliver ceaseless eountor-at-tacs and inflict such checks on the enemy as deprived him of the real advantage which he expected to gain from bis enterprise. At the moment when the enemy began the offensive we could have thrown more troops into tho struggle. " Hut it would have l>een a mistake to act too hastily. The great secret of attacking is to keep the enemy in doutb until the last moment as to the real point of attack, and the forces which (.no will employ when the time comcfi. The Germans might have merely been nuiking a feint attack on Verdun, to bo followed by a massed attack on Nancy. Amiens or Calais.

'•lt was our duty to maintain tlio strict balance of forces everywhere. It' we had been too hasty in making a great show at Verdun the enemy might have been able to bring off his main coup at some totally different point. The difficulty for the High Command in such a ease is to use iron scll'-con-trol, and logically to calculate the shock to be withstood and the counterattack to be delivered. The important thing in counter-attacking is not to strike in the air, when the huge nia-ses of men which a modern battle requires have to lie manoeuvred. •'They must not be made to march for nothing. In the uncertainty of the lin-t two or three days, the attacking party always has a relative superiority. I - ' he does not make use of it or. lather, full use of it—his effort has been in vain. The defending party is then >;ue of the issue. "The flow of reinforcements wi'l enable him to readjust the balance, and the more obstinate his resistance during the first few days, the easier will this be. That is what happened at Vordun. '■" —Renter.