Mr Churchill's Errors as Admiralty Critic.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 177, 26 May 1916, Page 2 (Supplement)

Mr Churchill's Errors as Admiralty Critic.

, Strategy. WHY THi: GRAND FLEET DOES NOT TEMPT DISASTKK IX ADVENTUROUS ACTION. GERMAN' FLEET'S OUTING AND ITS OBJECT.

"Amid loud and prolonged O '■i cheers th-e right lion, gentleman resumed his seat. Mem- i>hers poured out into tho lob- «; hies, where there was, as noted )i liv the Lobby correspondents, I'? some difference of opinion, -jjjC Some Members wore inclined jc to believe that the late First °]J* l.ord was actuated by a desire to come back into public life at jc & all costs; others that some- ;Z § thing WAS wiong with the w ;•>; Navy, and that the Fleet was * in paralysed inactivity ; others, 3S 5 again, ihat the present Fir.-t Lord was not a man of action, \l ■Z and that nobody had evei 3t heard of the First Sea Lord " ;Z Out somewhere in the North ■.} Sea Lieut-Commander Horatio )t Nelson. R.X., who had spent :;5 the night on the bridge of his }Z destroyer, tottered down to his ■s diminutive cabin when dawn [s 'f- broke. His eyes were weak ;Z with th.' stinging hail and all ■'.} )i their straining to pieive the j; ;;i darkness; his lace was all the !;;] J!-' colours of the rainbow, but !!: mostly blue; his hands could scarcely .lift his cup of cocoa, -}Z and his camel-hair storm-coat # S. was caked with ice. As he thawed he picked up the Poldhu w ireless —his only =::= source of information as to jC the atta.irs of the Empire till he should reach his base —and lie ■.} ■.f. read the proceedings of the v '■Z House of Commons. Then he i'Z £ soundly cursed all politicians, & ;f lay down on his bunk, and fell V '■Z asle.'ii. *":

The whole of last week's debates on the Navy have been nothing more than a repetition of the campaign to get Lord F'ishor back to the Admiralty, fortified with the powerful but wayward support of Mr. Churchill, calculated to confuse honest but ill-informed people, infuriate the officers and men of the Grand Fleet, and encourage the enemy jn a certain scheme which they have in hand. That is the whole truth about it. Lord Fisher, who in times past nas shone as a public speaker, lias modestly kept in the background. Mr. Churchill has done ije talking, assisted by Mr. Balfour, who very rashly allowed himself to be goaded into some candid remarks about monitors, for which it is difficult to see any use. Presumably, as indicated above, the Grand Fleet may be trusted to provide what necessary strong language is required to express the opinion of loyal and reasonable people on this very disgraceful business. THE CHURCHILL CHARGES. Mr. Churchill's charges were three. He said:— First, that he fears there has been serious delay in the programme of capital ships; secondly, that the flotillas laid down by himself and Lord Fisher were not being completed fastenough ; and, thirdly, that if HE had been at the Admiralty he would not have maintained "strategic passivity" in 1916.

The tir.-t of these three contentions have been already answered by Mr. Balfour. The third is worth looking into more closely, because it is the main part of the pro-Fisher agitation, and because unintentionally, but none the less powerfully, IT PLAYS INTO THE HANDS OF THE NEW COMMAND-ER-IN-CHIEF OF THE GERMAN FLEET.

Personally considered, of course, ii is a reflection on Sir John Jellicoe —all the more serious because the Fisherite Press is fond of alleging (see tli e sundwichmen in Whitehall) that one of the best arguments foi bringing Lord l'isher back is that lie would give a lreer hand to Sir .John Jellicoe. Nothing could be more unfortunate—if it be not too strong a word more poisonous than this suggestion. JELLICOE'S FREE HAND. The Admiralty cannot- deny it, be-

cause their denial would bo considered prejudiced. The Commander-in-Chief cannot deny it, because he does riot communicate with newspapers. Well, 1 am going to deny it for him. Sir John Jeliicoe has a perfectly free hand, it is by the exercise of this freo hand that this "strategic passivity" has preserved for us tiie most, absolute command of the sea of ancient or modern times. Naval policy in lio.ue waters is absolutely his policy, and it ought to be perfectly well understood that if an attack has be on made on our naval " passivity"—which lins been the most brilliant peace of sea strategy of any time, and has secuivd us in thesis islandsd such absolute immunity from the immediate excitements of war that we don't need even to have martial law and shut up Parliament—it is an attack on Sir John Jeliicoe. In the plan which he lias adopted he has the confidence and co-operation of Sir lienry .Jackson, of Sir Arthur Wilson. the most brilliant seamen of the last generation, and a man who remodelled steam tactics —and 01 Sir Henry Oliver. Both Sir John Jeliicoe and Sir Arthur Wilson, have continually exercised great tleets in the North Sea and also the Atlantic. Among the many varied and exciting episodes in nis •• ir • a- never oncv fallen to Lord Fisher to command a ileet in manoeuvres.

What does "strategic passivity" of this kind consist in? It consists in occupying staions, carefully thought out by Sir Arthur Wilson and Sir John Jellicoe in time of peace, which entirely checkmate the enemy. As the Fleet is at present disposed, the enemy darenot raid our coasts (except for ten minims or so in thick fog and at enormous risk), cannot get into the Atlantic, cannot interfere with our transports or our food supplies, dare not move tor more than a cerain defined distance from his own bases. From these stations, as is common knowledge, the Fleet roams constantly in search of the enemy in well-defined strategical areas —areas outside of which no decisive battle can be fought, which are OUR, chosen battle-grounds, and as long as tlie enemy avoid which, no decisive result can be otbamed--cither for us or bim. THE GERMAN" FLEET'S OUTING. T said above that all this nonsense about "strategic passivity" assisted th? enemy (though unconsciously, in a plan which he appeared to have in hand. The German Fleet the other day came out for a short sail -off tne northern coasts of Hollandd, and we may expect similar sails in the future. THEY ARE MADE WITH THE DESIRE OF CALLING PUBLIC ATTENTION TO THEM IN THIS COUNTRY. They want us to ask the question (Mr. Churchill is the sort of person who might ask it) : " Why is the German Fleet allowed to sail out like this without being brought into action?" They want us to have a public agitation "to BRING THE GRAND FLEET SOUTH.

The raids on Yarmouth and Scarborough were made eighteen months ago for the same purpose, and they failed. Now they are trying again. What would happen if they succeeded? In the first place, if the Grind Fleet came south, a German raiding squadron would certainly make a dash for the Atlantic, hold up our sea traffic with America, and probably do untold damage before Sir David Beat'y caught them up and sank them.

Tn the second place, our big squadrons would be enticed into waters where the shallows would impede our newest ships, and the minefields make manoeuvring on a large scale difficult. We should be fighting in the favourite waters of the mine and the submarine, without sea room, and with our flank uncovered. How much the Germans would like us to do it! At every mention of "strategic passivity" how happy they must be. THE NELSON WAY. One more thing for the Fishcrites. Lord Nelson waited TWO YEARS outside Toulon before the French would come out to battle. When they came they were sent by a land staff; they fought in an open tit id on the high seas. And they lost Trafalgar.