THE THREAT IN THE WEST.

Pelorus Guardian and Miners' Advocate., Volume 30, Issue 19, 8 March 1918, Page 8

THE THREAT IN THE WEST.

PROBABLE GERMAN GAMBLE,

The Germans are declaring that they mean to try to break the Allied lino in the West. The elimination of the Russian Army has restored the waning military strength of both Germany and Austria. It has also confounded those of our experts who present war to us as a page of sums rather than a contest of brains as well as muscle (writes Lovut Eraser, in the Daily Mail.) Wo need not be prematurely alarmed by the threats of the enemy, but it is not wise to ignore them. If the Germans and the Austrians propose to engage in the most colossal gamble in history, we had better consider their prospects of success.

And first, why does the alleged intention of the enemy amount to a gamble? Because they are like a gambler who after heavy losses comes into a big legacy and risks the whole of it cn a single throw. It is a gamble because up till now the chief military lesson of the war in the West has been that on the whole, and until mew devices and methods are found, modern arms confer an advantage on the defence. Both sides have proved two things, at great cost tc themselves. The first thing is that the initial stages of an attack almost invariably succeed. The second thing is that hitherto it has been impossible to develop on a sufficient scale the advantages won in the first rush. The Germans demonstrated this at Verdun, the French in Champagne in 1915. We need not multiply examples. There is no reason to suppose that the enemy will now succeed in rebutting these conclusions , and that is why their attempt, should they now make it, will be a gamble, on an unprecedented scale. Next, it may be noted that the great amount of drum-fire in the enemy press is very unusual. The German newspapers have not as a rule announced military plans in advance. Perhaps the enemy are trying to frighten nervous people into joining the ranks of our wobblers. Perhaps they have some entirely different object in view. Perhaps they arc telling the truth for once, and calculate that they may not bo believed.

The only possible course for us is to look at the probabilities. The Germans and Austrians cannot entirely strip the Russian front, but they can leave it very thinly held. Here I may say that I can see no present prospect of ao improvement in Russian conditions. I can find nothing in history to show that the Cossacks have over exercised a determining influence upon the destinies of Russia. They arc only a drop in the ocean of Russian humanity. And may I add that I do not understand the suggestion that wo should talk benevolently to the people who have seized power in Russia? Treatybreakers look alike to me, whether they are “friends” or foes. I can see no moral difference between violating the treaty about Belgium and breaking the Pact of London. The one act has enslaved a nation, the ether has betrayed the Western Allies, who are fighting alone to-day for the cause upon which Russia's future depends. Wo cannot fight because one treaty has been broken and then condone the breaking of another. I know all the specious arguments about throwing Russia into the arms of Germany, but depend upon it, the simple rule for nations as well as individuals is to have nothing to do with traitors. That way lies the rain of our cause.

To return to our main theme, it is probable that the enemy will do tbo obvious thing, which is to concentrate in the West. They can only do so gradually, and though they have already drawn upon their eastern front for heavy drafts and many guns, it seems extremely unlikely that they will attack, so to speak, to-morrow morning. This is the biggest thing they have over undertaken, and they will not launch their blow until they are fully ready. I shall not attempt to quote from the many estimates of their strength which are being published. It is enough for us to know that by the Spring at the latest they can count upon a sufficiently formidable addition to their numbers. The bulk of their reinforcements cannot be of the first quality. We need not bo disturbed about the statement that Austrian divisions may be put into the line in France. The Austrian Army seems to be like the widow's cruse, for it never runs dry; but the Austrian troops to-day are believed to be very much below what they were in 1914. In this war they have never yet had to face British and French artillery and British and French infantry in the mass; and whatever may happen to our line, we need not worry about the sectors where Austrians attack. As for the enemy's guns, it has to be remembered that, although they will have more guns in the West than over, it is by no means clear that they possess shells in sufficient quantity. The available evidence seems to suggest that the enemy are probably rather short of material for making shells. I am not belittling the menace which may confront us, but am trying to reduce it to its Correct proportions. I believe the line in France and Flanders Should resist any attack which may how be directed against us. It is true that the Germans broke our line at

Gouzcauccurt the other day, and that they have since seized two small sections of trench near Reincourt and at Poldcrhock, as we have done times without number; but wh:;n all is said it would seem that at Gouzeaucourt the enemy did pretty badly. We talk of a surprise, but nobody seems to have been more surprised than the Germans, who failed to reap the full profit from their stroke. I suspect that some searching enquiries are in progress on the other side of No Man’s Land as well as on our own.

I should say that at the moment the real danger spot is Italy rather than France. Our turn may come, but the highly efficient Germans have an awkward habit of cleaning up jobs as they go, which is also our own practice on occasion. Having got Russia and Bouraania out of the way for the time being, it is natural that they should turn next to Italy and endeavour to overwhelm her while she is still reeling under a sore blow. The Italian Army has fought one of the most magnificent fights of the whole war, and has stemmed the tide of invasion with marvellous fortitude; but the issue still hangs in the balance, and we must not deceive ourselves. The long pause was dictated by military necessity. All those masses of Austro-German men and guns on the Sette Communi Plateau and between the Brenta and the Piave are not there for nothing. They do not mean to winter amid the hills if they can help it. Valstagna appears to be the vital point through which they hope to debouch into the plains, and if they can dispose of Italy while rehearsing Armageddon in the West it will suit them very well. The outlook on the Italian front is hopeful for the Allies, but by no means certain. The best experts assure me that there is no likelihood of a thrust at Salonika until the spring. “When the trees bud” is an old war motto in the Balkans. The surrender of Jerusalem is a great political and historical event, but from the broad military point of view our forces in Palestine cannot now materially affect the main course of the war unless they can reach Aleppo, which is more than 300 miles further north. Falkenhayn is the mystery of ;he moment. I think he is in Mesopotnm » and should be heard of soon with the bulk of the Germans and Austrians streaming westward Baghdad has become a side-issue. We have a tough time ahead, yet if we face the facts, abstain from adventures, and intern our bell-ringers, we ought to pull through. The fate of the Empire may depend upon the decisions regarding the allocation of the balance of our man-power; but this is a contest of brains as well as men, and both on land and sea we must not let ourselves jc beaten in brain-power.