HANDS ACROSS THE SEA.

Pelorus Guardian and Miners' Advocate., Volume 23, Issue 7, 26 January 1912, Page 2

HANDS ACROSS THE SEA.

A POWERFUL STUDY OP THE POSSIBILITIES OP AN ANGLOAMERICAN AGREEMENT. By Nornmn Angell, author of "The Great Illusion,” in “Everybody’s Weekly.” Editor’s Note.—During the recent debate in the House of Commons which was marked by Sir Edward Grey’s great arbitration speech, Mr. Keir Hardie remarked : “‘The seed planted by Norman Angell is beginning to bear fruit.” This remark was made in reference to the iniluence of Mr. Angcll’s book, “The Great Illusion,” concerning which M. Henri Turot, the French writer, has said : “It is destined to have on the economics) of international relationship an influence as profound as that wrought by Darwin’s ‘Origin of Species’ on our conceptions of biology.” In this article—written at my suggestion— Mr. Angell gives his view as to tbs real significance of the projected Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty.

We all seem to be agreed that the Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty will not enable us to reduce our armaments—for everybody knows that they are. not directed against America. Nor would it prevent any war : for everyone knows that, treaty or no treaty, we should never again Sgbt America. Its effect, as an example ? But it is no new thing in political history for two great powers to agree not to fight—that; indeed, is the necessary precedent to most alliances ; and if the Anglo-American agreement became an alliance —which is what so many seem to expect—the example would simply mean that other great powers would group themselves into alliances in order to meet the new one—a Russo-German aUiunce, for instance. And to judge from certain criticisms which are at the present time being - made on the GnnUnent concerning the projected agreement with America, such result is quite within the bounds of possibility. • In what, then, does the importance of the agreement reside ? Simply in the political ideas which it proves to have taken place silently in the mindsi of the two great peoples during the last few years. It is that change which alone has made it possible, and which, if the change be permanent, as we may fairly hope it will be,, will finally transform the face of the world.

What is this change ? It goes to the very root of all our notions of statecraft, and involves recasting the premisses of international politics. We know what these premisses are ; rivalry between nations is one of the great laws of life ; indeed, we are told that it is one of the forms of the struggle for life ; in this sphere of struggle, as in all others, the weakest must go,to the wall. For a nation to he strong and prosperous it must, we are assured, be militarily powerful, not only to protect itself against the aggression of others, hut to impose itself in order to have its “place in the sun” and an advantageous economic situation in the world.

War, as we have so often been told of late, is “a part of policy”—a nation must resist, fight, or go under. All the great authorities, English, American, Herman—Admiral Mahan, Clausewitz, Von der Goltz, Professor Spencer Wilkinson, Baron von Stengel, Steinmctz—■to mention only a few that spring to one’s mind—have expressed this doctrine . for us in every form and phrase. Well, it is a little over a year since chat the present writer had the temerity to challenge absolutely from beginning to end this whole philosophy. He attempted to show that in the modern world such a conception was jascd upon an imperfect realisation of ihe facts, and that our minds are tricked by an old terminology which has become obsolete. The thesis was summarised in its financial expression as folio,vs

“The militaiyr seizure or destruction of the wealth or trade of one nation by another has become a practical economic impossibility, since, owing to the delicate international credit system, the financial collapse or damage of the conquered nation would ireessarily involve the conqueror ; that even, the attempt to place a conquered people at a commercial and industrial disadvantage or to interfere injuriously with their trade is hound to react injuriously on the conqueror ; that the only feasible policy is to leave the population of a conquered territory in the undisturbed possession of their wealth and trade. This involves the economic futility of military power. The great nations have no commercial advantages not possessed by the small ; industry is as prosperous in Switzerland as in Austria, in Belgium as in Germany, in Scandinavia as in Russia. Swiss and Belgian merchants are driving English from the ’Canadian markets; Norway has relatively to population a mmh greater mercantile marine than. Great Britain. Belgium Three per Gents, stand a t DC., .and German at 82; Norwegian Three and a half at 102, and Russian a t 81. While these facts were in part revealed by the history British Colonial enterprise, it is the effect of instantaneous communication, largely the creation of the last thirty years, which has given them an overwhelming political force in Ihe modern world and renders the revision of our old axioms essential.”

Need it be said that the orthodox scoffed. One critic compared the prlter to the patient, 1n Hip innatir

asyium wno explained to the visiting committee that in reality it was the rest of the world that was mad and ; that he alone was sane, hut that they were in a majority, why, there he was 1 Butj one. or two did not scoff. Oounh von Metternlch, the German - Ambas- : sador in London, made this thesis the text of a diplomatic pronouncement which may he said to have marked the beginning of a new era in Anglo-German relations. Sir Edward Grey did not scoff ; he followed in the footsteps of the German Ambassador, and endorsed the thesis with this significant reservation : “True as the statement in that book may be, it does not become an operative force in the minds and conduct of nations until they are convinced of its truth and it has become a commonplace to them.” Now,, we know by what has since happened, that Sir Edward Grey has evidently come to the conclusion that as between the English and the American these truths have become a commonplace, and, consequently, anoperative factor in their relationship. In his epoch-making speech in the House of Commons, he pointed out that '“the minds of men are working upon this, and if you look hack into history you find there do come times when public opinion has risen to heights which a generation previously would have been thought impossible.

If the orthodox doctrine which I have quoted, the idea that nations are necessarily rivals, that the weak must go to the wall, etc., were true, how comes it that we have been able to make this arrangement with Amer-, ica ? For the United States Is no mean rival —a people of ninety millions in process already of absorbing Canada, already beginning to dominate Mexico, already in possession of the Panama Canal, a practical suzerain power in Culm, *to-morrow the master of the whole Antilles, stretching across the Pacific via '.Hawaii to the Philippines, and thus to the’coasts of Asia—perhaps the most expansive power in the universe today. Do we, then, abdicate ? Are we consenting to he “gobbled up” ? If so, how do we regard these projected agreements with serenity and even with such satisfaction ? We do so, because we are beginning to realise at last that the old philosophy is wrong, and that there will he no “gobbling.” We do not “own” Canada. America does not, and never will, “own” Canada. It. is owned by the people who live in it and develop it. It is impossible for one civilised community to own another. Consequently, when we talk a l 'out the “loss” of Canada to the United States, we - are using language which ih reality has no meaning. What is Canada ? It is a community of some eight million highlycivilised people, by their labour creating certain things—wheat, beef, lum--1 cr, wood-pulp, etc.—which, if we want, we have to pay for at their exact market value. If an American wants them, he has to pay for them at their market value. Not one day’s labour will one Canadian give us because Britain “owns” Canada. And not one day’s labour will a Canadian ever give an American because in the future America may “own” Canada. We might, it is true, ‘lose’ Canada as a Colony, -- hut the loss would probably not alter an essential fact in our relationship with her. Even though she became, in some form or another, a State in close alliance with America, or even a part of the American Union, our real relationship to her .would be exactly what it is now— we should trade with her, we should lend her money, we should send our children to her, we should. remain good friends with her, we should co-operate with her. According to the orthodox theory, the day that America conquered Canada, either peacefully or militarily, she would in some way possess something which she does not now possess. The whole thing is crassly misleading. Could the United States confiscate anything? But as Wall Street valued its solvency, not one cent’s worth of property would the American Government dare to touch. America would keep us out by tariffs ? But Canada as a Colony has kept us out by tariffs. The tariff question is not a national one at all. Canadian manufacturers want high tariffs, Canadian farmers want low ; and if Canada became a State in the American Union it might be the starting point of a more, resolute low tariff campaign than America has yet known, resulting for the benefit of British traders in the diminution of tariff to a market of nearly one hundred millions America might'attempt to keep British citizens out of Canada ? But there are American States to-day spending thousands of dollars trying to induce British citizens to go to them ! In any case —and this perhaps is the most important point of the whole matter—whatever Canada does in the future she will do of her own free consent. If she is to drift into closer relationship with the United States, not a single British bayonet would he raised to prevent it. We have realised that these civilised communities cannot he subject to military force. Never shall we attempt to control the destiny of Canada, or Australia or New Zealand, or any other of our great colonies by making war upon them. The most successful conquerors and colonisers in the world have learned this : The best way to own territory is to exercise none of the functions of ownership. It must go its own way. But if military force is thus futile in the ease - of colonies, so is it futile if we would only realise it, in the case of other inuenendenh communities

which we do not happen to call colonies. When the real lesson of the Anglo-American, agreement is learned, Germany will realise that if England is obliged to surrender the use of force towards a community of eight millions, it is still more hopeless for Germany to use it against a community of forty millions. It is not a lesson that perhaps can be learned in a day ; it means upsetting too many deeply-rooted prejudices and reforming too radically a misleading phraseology. Hut its general realisation is much nearer, perhaps, than some of us think. II the two most expensive and acute peoplss in the world admit its truth, the others will not he slow to follow.