MR GLADSTONE ON EGYPT.

Poverty Bay Independent, Volume I, Issue 80, 28 November 1885, Page 3

MR GLADSTONE ON EGYPT.

I . [ In his address to the Midlothian electors . 1 Mr Gladstone thus refers to the Egyptian II policy of the late Government: —“ The ’ policy of a foreign intervention in r Egyptian affairs, of which I have not ceased, since 1876, in Parliament and f in the Press to point out the certain 1 dangers, has produced its natural results, i 1 which the late Administration strove 1 anxiously and incessantly, yet in vain, J to avert. The chief sources of comfort ’ in reviewing a series of transactions generally painful are, that we have . respected to the utmost in our powe r international laws and arrangements, f have confined within Egyptian limits i troubles that menaced the general peace; 1 have used every administrative effort to I support our gallant forces in maintain- ! ing the honor of the British arms; have beyond all doubt introduced most valuable improvements, too sorely needed, into Egyptian law and government; and, finally, indicated provisions on a I reasonable basis for the future govern- ! ment of Egypt and the exercise of its I legal autonomy without foreign interi vention. Even preceding topics have I been touched at roughly in this address, ; still more does the complexity of the I Egyptian question defy any attempt to I unfold it fully within the limits, even 1 the extended limits, which I must ob- | serve ; but in this slight outline I shall 1 use no language which I am not able to sustain. Postponing for the moment, with a view to greater clearness what relates to the Soudan, I affirm that every step which we took in Egypt down to I the time of the operations of Arabi Pasha in 1882 was the direct consequence of the agreement with France for reciprocal support and for the maintenance of a native Government, which had been concluded in 1879, before our accession to office. The French 1 Chamber ’n the the exercise of its un-

I doubted right, rejected in 1882 the proposal of its Ministry to take part in military measures. Sorrowfully, but without doubt, though I felt less than many of my countrymen the pressure of the argument for British interests other than that of honor, I held, and I still hold, that that paramount interest compelled us, in the execution of our

pledge for the maintenance of a native Government, to re-establish the authority of the Khedive and the peace of the country, and to prosecute all practicable reforms. Our judgment was sustained by public opinion. In November, 1883, we had reached a point at which we were able to advise the evacuation of Cairo, together with the immediate reduction of the. occupying force to a brigade in Alexandria and at Port Said. We had thus, in my judgment, a hopeful prospect of an early evacuation of the entire country. It was then that the disasters of an unhappy war in the Soudan, in no wise due to us, produced a state of things so menacing to Egypt itself, that we found it our duty at once to take measures intended to prevent the extension of those disturbances beyond that region. But we insisted upon its evacuation by Egypt, and we offered our aid towards the withdrawl of the garrisons by peaceful means. Lord Hartington has lately and justly stated in general terms that he is not disposed to deny our having fallen into errors of judgment. I will go one step further and admit that we committed such errors, and serious errors too, with cost of treasure and precious lives in the Soudan. For none of these errors were we rebuked by the voice of the Opposition We were only rebuked, and that incessantly, because we did not commit them with precipitation, and because we did not commit other errors greater still. Our mistakes in the Soudan, I

cannot now state in detail. The task belongs to history. Our responsibility for them cannot be questioned. Yet its character ought not to be misapprehended. In such a task miscarriages were inevitable. They are the proper and certain consequence of undertaking that war against nature, and lie beyond the scope of human means and of rational and prudent human action, and the first authors of these undertakings are the real makers of mischief. However, as between political parties the matter at length came to a pretty clear issue. At the beginning of the last session, in one of their innumerable motions of cen-ure, the Opposition con- : demned us because we would not I engage to keep the Queen’s forces in ■ the Soudan until we had effected the estr.blishr ent of some regular government there—-we who had always deprecated the use of British force for such a purpose refused the engagement. Further and since the recent change of Ministry the new Government has declared in Parliament that though the process of evacuating the Soudan was far too advanced to he recalled or arrested, yet the measure was in itself to be regretted and condemned. Now, about the vast importance of this question there is no more doubt then about the positions of the two parties in regard to it. I know | there are persons of no mean authority who have held that the expedition to

Khartoum would have been the most arduous military effort undertaken by us since the battle of Waterloo. We thought the evacuation necessary, wise, I and just. The Tories thought it needI less and deplorable. Either the coun- ■ try has been saved by the late Governj ment from a most perilous and costly i urdertaking to which the present GoI vemment has striven to commit it, or it has been deprived by us of a noble opportunity which they would have used on its behalf. The principles of opposite policies are here pretty clearly brought out; let the country’ judge between them.”