Poverty Bay Herald. PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, TUESDAY, MAR. 28, 1939 MUSSOLINI’S TURN

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 19898, 28 March 1939, Page 4

Poverty Bay Herald. PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, TUESDAY, MAR. 28, 1939 MUSSOLINI’S TURN

The long-deferred public speech of Signor Mussolini has done anything but create a furore throughout Europe. Indeed, the chief reaction appears to be one of bewilderment, for no one

seems to be able to interpret exactly what Mussolini means or what he wants. He is faced with the usual difficulty, of course, of having to choose his words in order to arouse the enthusiasm of his own followers

without at the same time creating consternation in other capitals. The result is a somewhat meaningless jumble from which few things emerge with clarity while many points are obscured by uncertainty and ambiguity. His praise of force, his eulogy of Italian arms, and his attacks on the democracies were necessary for home consumption, but even when speaking on these lines, Mussolini seems to have studiously avoided the use of threats. He stressed the unity of the RomeBerlin axis, but there is some ground for doubting whether he is altogether happy on this point! As regards Italian relations with other countries, it is difficult to find where Mussolini has said anything that is really new. If anything, it might be suggested that there is a new moderation in his words, that conciliation has taken the place of threats, and that he has paved the way for peace rather than for war.

The most significant passage in the speech, perhaps, was the reiteration of Hitler’s assertion that a long peace was necessary for the reconstruction of Europe. He might have added that

to no country is peace more necessary than to Italy, which, having exhausted her resources in Abyssinia and Spain, must be desperately in need of a breathing space in which to recover. Mussolini’s desire for a long peace was qualified by his somewhat cryptic remark that eternal peace would be a catastrophe for the world and his assertion that Italy would not take the initiative to protect peace before her holy rights were satisfied. In the absence of explanation, however, these remarks can be dismissed as empty mouthings, because Italy’s need for peace is apparent and the occasion for war obscure. The statement that the totalitarian States would abandon their defensive tactics and use the offensive if a democratic coalition were formed is qualified by a fuller translation which sets out that a challenge by the democracies would be accepted and that in such an event the totalitarian States would pass from defence to counter-attack. Since there is no likelihood of a democratic challenge, these words, too, can be ignored as idle boastings for home consumption.

Then comes the one concrete feature of Mussolini’s speech—-the demands made against France. Even here, however, there is more than an element of uncertainty, because if these demands have ever been definitely formulated the world has not been officially advised. Mussolini now says that he wants the world to know that the Italian problems were set out in the note to Paris on December 17. Actually what that note did was to abrogate the Franco-Italian agreement of 1935, and the importance that was attached to it may be judged from the fact that it was more than a week later before there was even a hint that the note had been despatched. At that time, however, presum-

ably in reply to the note, there were categorical French assertions that no territory would be ceded and these assertions have, never aroused any official Italian reply. Mussolini now raises the question again, but here, also, there seems to be a careful avoidance of any threats. If France refuses to discuss the problems of Tunisia, Djibuti, and the Suez Canal, then, says Mussolini, France will have itself to blame if the ditch dividing the two countries becomes so wide that it will be hard, or impossible, to bridge. Admittedly, this sentence contains warning of a rift, but it would require a wide stretch of the imagination to interpret it as a threat of war.

One more passage in the speech is deserving, of comment. Stressing the point that the Mediterranean is vital for Italy—a point, which no one would ever dispute, since nearly all Italy’s boundaries are on the Mediterranean —Mussolini adds that reference to the Mediterranean includes the Adriatic, “where permanent, but not exclusive. Italian interests are recognised by Yugoslavia." Why should he consider it necessary to link reference to the French problems with Italian interests in the Adriatic? Certainly not for the benefit of France, and the only other possible explanation is that it is intended as a hint to Germany. If is pertinent to recall that the partnership between Germany and Italy has so far yielded spoils only to Germany, and it is inconceivable that Italy can view this result without some resentment. She must have been bitterly chagrined at the German coup in Austria, and since then she has seen Germany expand further and further afield while she has herself gained nothing for her contribution to the axis. The loss of her interests in Yugoslavia would be the final blow to her pride, and since these interests could only be lost to Germany it must be at Germany that Mussolini’s remarks regarding the Adriatic are directed. Summed up, there is nothing in Mussolini’s speech that can possibly be regarded as unexpectedly antagonistic to the democracies, but there is a plain admission of the need for a long period of peace, and a hint, at least, of a possible disturbance of the alliance with Berlin.