Poverty Bay Herald PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, FRIDAY, DEC. 23, 1938. DISCUSSIONS IN ROME

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LXV, Issue 19820, 23 December 1938, Page 4

Poverty Bay Herald PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, FRIDAY, DEC. 23, 1938. DISCUSSIONS IN ROME

The focal point of international interest for the next fortnight will be Rome, where discussions of an undefined, but by no means unimportant, nature will be carried out between the heads of the British and the Italian Governments. The atmosphere preceding the conference is strange, if not strained. Britain and Italy have only recently concluded an agreement which, although of a somewhat nebulous nature, was supposed to deline the relationships between the two countries. More long-stand-ing than this agreement, however, more precise, and infinitely more important is the agreement between Britain and France whereby the two

nations are committed to assist one another in the event of unprovoked aggression. France and Italy have

no agreement that could be regarded as binding; on the contrary, they appear to have innumerable points of disagreement. The question then arises as to whether Italy proposes to attempt to manoeuvre Britain into a position in which she will be called upon to decide between two loyalties —a position in which she may be asked to forgo some of her commitments to France in order to maintain friendship with Italy and possibly avert still another threat of a European war. In other words, Italy may cherish hopes of making Rome a second Munich and securing peace—and plunder—by blackmail.

It is not likely that any such policy would succeed; and for a variety of reasons. In the first place, Signor Mussolini has not developed Herr Hitler’s technique. Hitler announced bluntly and plainly exactly what he wanted and what he proposed to do if he did not get it. By contrast, Mussolini’s method in temerity itself. It is assumed that he wants territorial changes in a number of places, notably Tunis and Corsica, and a share in the control of the Suez Canal, although just why he should want them possibly even Mussolini himself does not know. In order to direct attention to Italy’s claims an obviously officially-inspired demonstration was staged in the Italian Chamber. If Italy was angling for a bite, she certainly got one, for the reaction in France was immediate and unequivocal; she would go to war rather than yield an inch of territory. This display of firmness was effective, for the Italian Government promptly disclaimed responsibility for the demonstration and, so far as has been disclosed, has prudently refrained from making any official demands, notwithstanding the fact that it has been reported that Hitler has given the projected enterprise his blessing and a promise of at least moral support. Whether the claims will die a natural death will largely depend on the attitude of Britain.

There are two points which immediately obtrude themselves in any consideration of this question. The first is that after the conquest of Abyssinia Mussolini proclaimed that Italy had satisfied her territorial aspirations. It might be argued, of course, that a chance remark of that nature is not necessarily binding, but it would be interesting to know, nevertheless, what has occurred in the short interval to cause him to change his mind. Is it, perhaps, that the strained economic conditions of his country require that he should discover some new diversion for his people? The second point is that only in April last Italy entered into an agreement with Britain to preserve the. existing status in the Mediterranean. Every one of the demands said to be now contemplated by Italy would involve a breach of this undertaking, and in regard to some, at least, Britain has stated officially that she would take this view. It is clear, therefore, that if Italy persists she will not only involve herself in a clash with France, but will also be guilty of a definite breach of faith with Britain. In the light of all the circumstances, it is fairly safe to predict that Italy will not persist in her demands in the face of determined

opposition. Of the validity of the Italian claims little requires to be said. After Abyssinia she became “a satisfied Power" and in April last she was content with the status quo in the Mediterranean. These facts alone invalidate any new demands, but in addition' there is the obvious absurdity of seeking new territory when she has not yet been able to control, let alone settle, her existing colonial possessions. So far as the control of the Suez Canal is concerned, Italy has not even attempted to make out a case for her inclusion in the administration. It is true that she is the second largest user of the canal, but if that were an adequate basis for her claim Britain, in turn, would have good grounds for demanding a share in the control of the Panama Canal; or, for that matter, foreign countries whose ships trade to Britain might insist on a share in the control of British ports. In any case, the April agreement specifically bound Italy to respect the convention under which the canal is administered. The only possible conclusion from all the facts is that Italy is looking for trouble. The primary motive, perhaps, is a desire to distract attention from internal difficulties, but, apart from that aspect, there is the fact that Mussolini is ambitious. He may have been spurred on to greater efforts by his success in Abyssinia or, more likely, by the success of Germany’s blackmail, but whatever the motive for his demands there is not the slightest apparent excuse for conceding them, while, on the other hand, there is every reason why the other Powers should make a decisive and determined stand against the coercion of the dictators.