Poverty Bay Herald PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, THURSDAY, AUGUST, 4, 1938 RUSSIA AND JAPAN

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LXV, Issue 19700, 4 August 1938, Page 6

Poverty Bay Herald PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, THURSDAY, AUGUST, 4, 1938 RUSSIA AND JAPAN

Considerable significance has been attached in the last day or two to the frontier clashes that have occurred between Russian and Japanese forces. In the face of the present international situation, it is clear that the position is pregnant with dramatic possibilities, but it would be unwise, in the meantime, to take too pessimistic a view of the outlook. Russia and Japan may be regarded as traditional enemies, each perhaps, has something that the other wants, but neither is likely to force the issue until such time as it considers that it has an undoubted advantage. There is a tendency at the moment to assume that, because Japan is involved in strife in China, she cannot afford to risk embroilment with the Soviet, but while tills is basically true there are certain factors which must have the effect of curbing Russian activity. In fact, it is a fairly safe prediction that neither country is anxious to force the issue at the present juncture. It is true, nevertheless, that only a spark is required to start a conflagration, and the question is largely one of whether it will be possible to avoid striking thq, spark. The most likely development seems to be that Russia and Japan will manage to avoid open conflict with one another, but that the Soviet will increase the measure of assistance she has been giving to China, thus embarrassing and weakening Japan without directly attacking her. In the ordinary course of events, a frontier clash between Russia and

Japan would mean little more than nothing. In the first three months of 1936 there were no fewer than a dozen such clashes but none of them developed into anything more than mutual recriminations, explanations, and apologies. For each clash there was a conflicting version from either side, and each sought to absolve itself from the blame and cast it upon the other. The difficulty was caused to some extent by the inadequate demarcation of the actual border and by unauthorised incursions by small and isolated forces. Ultimately, these incidents must have come to a head; both sides were sparring for the advantage and. in particular, Japan appeared to be testing out Russian strength and reactions. This view is endorsed by the developments of last year. There was a serious clash on the Amur River when a Russian gunboat was sunk with the loss of 37 lives, followed by the seizure of two small islands which Japan claimed and occupied. On this occasion, Tokio took an unexpectedly strong stand, and the result was that the Russians evacuated the Amur islands with little protest and nothing further was heard of the sinking of the gunboat. To theJapanese mind this meant that Russia was not prepared to force the issiie, and an almost immediate sequel was the attack on China. This piece of history has an important bearing on the position in the Far East. The Red Army had been seriously weakened by the series of purges and Moscow had demonstrated its anxiety to avoid a conflict. The inference was that Japan could take action in China without fearing Russian intervention. A fortnight after the Amur i ncident, Japan launched her unofficial war in China, believing that she would have only the Chinese to contend with and that a speedy victory was assured. The hopes of the Japanese militarists, however, failed to materialise, and the Shanghai “incident” has developed into a major war which has involved Japan in heavy monetary and economic losses, in addition to severely taxing her military strength'. As the military situation has changed, so has the attitude of Russia. With her own army no longer immobilised by internal dissension, with strong Far Eastern forces and equipment, and with the Japanese army seriously embroiled in the interior of China, the Soviet believes that the tables have been turned and the consequence is that she, in turn, is adopting a more truculent attitude. Last year, it was Russia which withdrew in order to avoid a conflict; to-day, the Japanese, even if they have not withdrawn, are showing a much less belligerent attitude towards Russia, and Tokio is clearly at pains to avoid an open breach.

The circumstances, on the face of it, might suggest that Russia would be disposed to force home her advantage, but to take that view is to consider the position only in the east. Russia, however, must look also to hei western frontiers, and here the position is undoubtedly unfavourable to her. The European situation is disturbed and Russia has definite commitments towards Czechoslovakia whose future and independence are now in the balance. More than that, Japan and Germany are in alliance, and if Japan is threatened by Russia it would be Germany’s obvious part to create a diversion in the west; and it is certain that Russia, however much she may have overcome her internal differences, has no desire to face war on two fronts. The chances are, therefore, that the Soviet will avoid war with Japan, not so much because she is frightened of Japan as because she fears repercussions in Europe. Japan, on the other hand, has no desire to engage Russia until she has liquidated the situation in China, and this appears to be a long way off. In the meantime, Russia may have satisfied herself that Japan is anxious to avoid a conflict and this may encourage her to strike back at Japan indirectly by increasing her assistance to China. This, at least, is the theoretical position and it leads to a belief that war between Russia and Japan is not likely. Theories, however, do not always work out in practice and it cannot be overlooked that the situation is so delicate that anything might result and that a spark set to the tinder in the East might even lead to an explosion in the west.