Poverty Bay Herald. PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, WEDNESDAY, MAY 4, 1938. BRITAIN AND ITALY

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LXV, Issue 19622, 4 May 1938, Page 4

Poverty Bay Herald. PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, WEDNESDAY, MAY 4, 1938. BRITAIN AND ITALY

The debate in the House of Commons on the agreement with Italy proved a strange anti-climax to a situation which a few weeks ago caused the resignation of the Foreign Secretary and was expected in some quarters to be a prelude to a general election. Only 34 members of the Opposition were present when the Prime Minister opened the debate and only about two-thirds' of" the House took part in the division which gave the Government a three-to-one majority. Mr. Chamberlain's speech was devoid of anything sensational and threw little more light on a position that has proved puzzling in all parts of the world. The Prime Minister stated that the general aim of British foreign policy was to restore confidence that peace could and would be maintained. With that policy no one can disagree, because it is evident that without confidence, as Mr. Chamberlain says, there can be little progress in international affairs. It is more difficult, however, to see how the agreement with Italy fits into the general scheme. It is true that it is necessary to eliminate the danger spots of Europe, it is equally true that Italy is one of the most dangerous of those spots, but it has yet to be shown that the conclusion of this particular agreement will have the effect of removing the danger.

Most difficult of all to understand is Mr. Chamberlain's fulsome praise of Italy and Mussolini. "To-day," he said, "there is a new Italy—an Italy which, under the stimulus of the personality of Signor Mussolini, is showing a new vigour and in which there is apparent a new vision and a new efficiency. . . ." This sort of talk might be diplomatic, but its honesty is questionable. Undoubtedly Italy has been displaying a new vigour, but it has very largely been directed to the conquest of Abyssinia and the invasion oi Spain. There has been new efficiency, also, but it has been most apparent in the effectiveness with which Italian planes and bombs have been used to annihilate defenceless women and children and to wreck their homes and the cities in which they lived. There may have been a new vision, but if so it seems most likely that the stimulating personality of Mussolini has foreseen that his ventures were likely to end in disaster and that for this reason, and this reason alone, he sought the friendship of Britain. It may be expedient to make a treaty with this new Italy in order to try and divert her from her errant ways, but it seems little short of indecent to pretend that the alliance is dictated by common ideals.

There is another anti-climax in the statement of Mr. Chamberlain that "full effect cannot be given to the agreement until we can regard the Spanish situation as settled and find out selves in a * position to acknowledge the conquest of Ethiopia." Heaven only knows what is intended to be read into this remark. Italy has apparently given satisfactory assurances that she will withdraw from Spain in accordance with the proposals of the non-intervention committee —which long since seems to have gone out of business —and that she is not desirous of obtaining a permanent foothold in Spanish territory. What assurances have been given by Britain in regard to Ethiopia are not disclosed. These two questions are the crux of the dispute between Italy and Britain —had they not arisen there would have been no occasion for an agreement, and it seems rather absurd to make an agreement whose effectiveness is conditional upon their prior settlement. If they could be settled by unilateral action it might be a different matter, but there are two obstacles to this course. In the first place, Mussolini is pledged not to allow bolshevism in Spain, which means that he will continue his assistance until the rebels succeed; secondly, Great Britain is pledged not to recognise the conquest of Ethiopia without the approval of the League of Nations.

Nor do the complications of the situation end with Spain and Abyssinia. The new Italy, with its new vigour, new vision, and new efficiency, had three fields of action—Abyssinia, Austria, and the western Mediterranean. She had been effectively ousted from Austria by her former partner in intrigue, Germany, and she now professes her willingness to abandon her efforts in the western Mediterranean, thus retaining as a sphere oi future activity only the doubtful asset of Abyssinia. This retreat hardly seems consistent with the vaunted strength of the new Italy, and be-

cause of this it becomes necessary to seek some other motive for Musso-

lini's capitulation. There is something incongruous in the elaborate and costly reception that is being accorded Hitler on his visit 'to Rome; it does not seem fitting that such efforts should be made to laud the man who so blatantly tricked his partner in regard to Austria, and here again it is necessary to search for an ulterior motive. Is Mussolini anxious to keep on with his old love until he is assured of the constancy of the new, or is he, p e

haps, a little afraid that Hitler might next turn his attention to the Brenner Pass and absorb part of the Italian empire in the new GermanyV In whatever way the position is viewed it is clear that Italy is in retreat all along the line and it is this fact which makes it more puzzling to understand why Britain should be so anxious to enter into an agreement that involves the sacrifice of the principles which hitherto have governed her foreign policy.