Poverty Bay Herald PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, FRIDAY, JULY 10, 1937. SUPERVISION IN SPAIN

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LXIV, Issue 19378, 16 July 1937, Page 4

Poverty Bay Herald PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, FRIDAY, JULY 10, 1937. SUPERVISION IN SPAIN

The British Government's proposals lor overcoming the deadlock in regard to the maintenance of non-inter-vention in the Spanish civil war are a curious admixture, obviously designed to meet the difficulties confronting the rival foreign factors. Whether they will accomplish their object remains to be seen, but the first reactions are not unfavourable, and it rather looks as if uncertainty as to how the plan will work out will induce the nonintervention Powers to give it a trial, each hoping, of course, that the results will favour its own particular point of view. The first part of the plan provides for the discontinuance of the naval patrol system and the establishment of international observers in Spanish ports. This suggestion is not likely to evoke much opposition, since it is merely a reaffirmation of a principle already adopted and would eliminate the possibility of incidents such as those which caused Germany and Italy to withdraw from the naval control scheme. The second part of the plan, involving recognition of the possession of belligerent rights by both parties in Spain, is more likely to prove an obstacle to agreement, but this proposal has been rather ingeniously framed. Belligerent rights are to be granted only on certain conditions, and the fulfilment of these conditions is calculated to deprive a seeming concession of any material advantages. Acceptance of the plan will depend on whether or not the rival factions consider that they will be able to turn such a development to their own uses, and consideration of this aspect is likely to cause a good deal of hard thinking. The third section of the plan deals with the withdrawal of foreign troops, the fourth details the procedure, and the fifth and sixth sections are more or less machinery measures.

Everything is likely to hinge on the proposed granting of belligerent rights, to which Britain and France are technically opposed, and which Germany and Italy desire. ' Were the proposal to stand on its own it could immediately be dismissed as untenable, but it is subject to certain very important conditions. In the first place there are to be rigid lists of contraband goods which will not be permitted to enter Spain, and an adequate check of imports will be maintained by the system of supervision at Spanish ports. Among the other qualifications is a provision that any Power will be entitled to protect its shipping against the exercise of belligerent rights. On the face of it, this would permit German warships to convey supply ships, but since ■ the latter cannot carry munitions or other contraband, the point does not seem to be important, unless Germany is prepared to flout the non-intervention scheme itself. The key to the whole position, however, lies in the definite detailing of the procedure to be followed. Under this clause the first step will be to establish effective supervision at Spanish ports; the second will be the establishment of commissions to supervise the withdrawal of foreign nationals; and the third, and final, step will be the recognition of belligerent rights. The real point that emerges from this procedure is that belligerent rights will not be granted until foreign troops have been evacuated and foreign supplies cut off, and when this stage has been reached belligerent rights will have no apparent value. The provision, therefore, seems to be an innocuous concession to Fascist opinion, and if in return for this concession it is pos-

sible to secure the withdrawal ol foreign troops it will be more than justified, for once the foreign element is eliminated there will be some pros pect of bringing the civil war to an end.

The possibility of reaching an agreement on the lines suggested depends mainly on the genera! attitude of Germany towards the Spanish conflict. If Germany has had enough of mixing in other people's troubles, the plan provides an excuse for her withdrawal. If, on the other hand, she is still determined on securing a victory for the rebels then she will undoubtedly reject the scheme. Unfortunately, it is still largely a matter of prestige, but signs are not wanting that Germany is now a little less concerned with prestige than with realities. Mussolini has boasted that the Italian troops will not be withdrawn until Franco wins, but Hitler lias not been e:i uncompromising in his attitude, and if he decides that he is now given an opportunity of withdrawing without losing caste he may do so; and if he does, Mussolini, notwithstanding his prior boasts, will be compelled to follow suit. If German and Italian troops are withdrawn, there will be no occasion for further intervention on a large scale and little need even for supervision, and, what is more important, the Spanish forces, deprived of outside assistance, will be compelled to settle the issue speedily and finally. In recent months the position of the Fascist Powers has been seriously weakened, firstly, because the weight of their help proved insufficient to turn the scales in Spain itself; secondly, because Italy and Germany have found that they have little in common, and not even respect for one another; and, thirdly, because the opposition of France and Britain has been steadily increasing. It iithis latter factor which will exert the strongest influence, because enough has already been said and clone to show conclusively that far more hangs in the balance than the political future of Spain. The British proposals offer virtually the last hope of escape from an extremely dangerous situation, and it is possible that recognition of this danger will serve as sufficient incentive to effect a settlement.