Poverty Bay Herald. PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, MONDAY, JULY 15, 1935. BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LXII, Issue 18758, 15 July 1935, Page 6

Poverty Bay Herald. PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, MONDAY, JULY 15, 1935. BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

In li is first notable speech os Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hon if lets clearly demonstrated that he is likely to prove an able successor to the* many distinguished statesmen trim have held that important ofliee. In (lie face of some of the remarkably fine recent speeches of Mr. Baldwin Sir John Simon, and Mr. Eden, it might appear to lie an exaggeration to suggest that Sir Samuel Hoaro’s review of policy in tho House of Commons last week was the most lucid exposition of the British attitude that has been given for a long 'lime, yet it can hardly be denied that hi.s remarks gave a clearer insight into the oiHcial British mind than has hitherto been obtained. The fact is, perhaps, that the other Ministers have paved the way for the new Secretary, and that their explanations of specific questions have facilitated his more general review and made it possible for him to show :hat the Government \s reactions to various foreign issues are carefully correlated in a clearly-defined and coherent policy. Considered in eonjunction with the speeches of his predecessors and his colleagues, Sir Samuel’s remarks disclose, also, the wide measure of agreement there is in the Cabinet and the continuity of action irrespective of the particular individual in control. Revealing a real appreciation of the difficulties existing in Europe to-dav, the Foreign Secretary succeeded, without any nr tempt at eloquence or rhetoric, in showing the anxiety of Great Britain to preserve the ponce of the world to retain and extend her friendships with other countries, to continue her efforts towards disarmament, and to widen and strengthen the influence of the League of Nations. Every step that, has been taken in recent years has had one or another of these objects in view, and even though the measure of success may not hare been all that was hoped for, any .shortcomings cannot be attributed to lack of British endeavor. In some quarters in England it has- been suggested that Britain should adopt a policy of isolation —that she should cease to meddle in European affairs and concent rate her attention on her own Empire. The impossibility of such a course lias been referred to by other Ministers, and now Sir Samuel Boa re, without appearing lo labor the point-, further indicates (he extent to which the well-being of all pails of Europe, and, dadoed, the world, are bound tip with the into-ostt of the whole. The paramount consideration is peace, without which the restoration of .confidence and cron-, omie recovery are impossible. Peace cannot be ensured without security,

I and security, in turn, is impossible without disarmament. And these things, of such vital importance, can only be achieved through international agreement, and if international agreement, cannot be .secured through the. organisation of the League of Nations how else can it be obtained? This point was emphasised by Sir Samuel Hoaro when he pm id: “The more 1 look at future prosperity, the more sure T am that a. system of collective security. is essential to peace and stability, arid that the League best provides the neecssary machinery. 7 In that one sentence lies the keynote of British policy, and everything that has been done by Britain in th'c post-war years conforms to it. To those who might, disagree with it, Sir Samuel defines the alternatives. “Tf the system of collective .security that is being gradually built up with great cure mid patience were smashed,” lie said, “if the League became so feeble . and futile as to have, no real influence, then a system of alliances—that, is the reverse of collective security—-must necessarily reappear with all its ancient disquiets and intrigues.” Britain, us always, is ready to take her share of collective responsibility, and regards herself as being in duty bound to do her utmost to prevent the development- of any crisis that is likely to weaken or destroy the principles upon which the League is built. It is ror this reason- that she recently made important’concessions to Germany, hoping thereby to make'a real contribution towards the completion of pacts between, tho Governments concerned in the dangerous areas of eastern and central Europe, where tho start of a war might easily lend to -a general conflagration. Responsibility for action in this direction lias now been placed upon Germany, and Sir Samuel lloare lias challenged Germany to play her part. The conclusion of these non-aggres-sion pacts would pave the way to agreement on the no rial pact which is the principal aim of Franco, and thus a further cause of disagreement might be removed. Thus it can be shown that the German naval agreement., which, viewed br itself, might have seemed difficult to justify, tnke.s on an entirely different complexion when considered as a part of the ultimate objective. Similar reasons -actuated the concessions offered to Italy in an attempt to settle the dispute with Abyssinia, and here again it is seen that British actions cannot be judged solely by their immediate -elfocts, but that a much wider view must be taken of The position. “We stand for peace, and we will not abandon any reasonable chance that may offer itself for helping to prevent a disastrous war,” was another statement of the Foreign .See re tar v, mid in this sentence lies the' explanation of much that has bosn done, and much that has been attempted. Britain, has made sacrifices, and is prepared to continue to do so if, ns a result, she can further her ambition to reeonciJe the conflicting interests of the world, to replace enmity with friendship, distrust. with security, and the danger and fear of war with lasting peace. It may riot be a spectacular policy it may even seem to bo a futile one. but there is a quiet determination about the way in which it is being pursued that inspires hope, and, even should it finally fail, it will be another case where it is better to have tried and lost, than never to have tried at all.