CONTROL OF MEETINGS

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LXI, Issue 18579, 13 December 1934, Page 5

CONTROL OF MEETINGS

CITY COUNCIL’S POWERS BY-LAW NOT INVALID AN APPEAL DISMISSED (Per Press Association.) AUCKLAND, this day- ▼ ' The decision of Mr. W. R. McKean, S.M., to fine Roy Stanley £1 and costs for holding a public meeting in the Domain, without authority, was challenged on Stanley’s behalf by Mr. .T. B. Slipper before Mr. Justice Reed in the Supreme Court. The meeting took place on August 19, and the charge against Stanley, who addressed the gathering, was that as he had no written permit from the City Council he Oft-oko the by-law. The by-law, against the validity of which Mr. Slipper appealed, makes, it an offence lor any person to hold, organise, or'direct a procession, or any public meeting, 'gathering, or demonstration in a street or public place, except in compliance with the terms of a written permit. “I must congratulate you on your very able argument, Mr. Slipper,” said His Honor, “but I must point out to you that the general observation you make as to the inherent rights of the public to hold-meetings in public places has really no bearing on the present case, for common law rights can be taken away by Statute, as they have been in the present case by the granting of power of regulation to the City Council.” His Honor said it was admitted that the appellant deliberately refrained from applying for permission in order to test the validity of the by-law. Under the Municipal Corporations Act, 1933, the council was authorised to make by-laws regulating the use of any recreation ' grounds, and that, of course, included the Domain. There could be no doubt that the power to regulate its use included the power to regulate meetings. Section 13 of the By-Laws Act, 1910, gave all the powers that could be exercised under this by-law, and covered various matters which the by-law dealt > with. Applying these statutory provisions to the by-law, he was of the opinion that it was apt invalid. He was quite unable to accept the contention that the discretion left in the present case was unreasonable. It must be assumed that the City Council would act reasonably, and would give due consideration to every application for permission to hold a meeting. The appeal was dismissed.