EGYPTIAN POLICY

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LV, Issue 17143, 27 December 1929, Page 5

EGYPTIAN POLICY

DEBATE IN COMMONS THE PROPOSED TREATY CONSERVATIVE CRITICISM (Rrltish Official Wireless.) Roc. 10 a.m. RUGBY, Doc. 24. Sir Austen Chamberlain, who was Foreign Secretary in the late Government, raised in the House of Commons the question of the Government's Egyptian policy. He said that though there was no direct change in the situation in regard to the Sudan as a result of the new proposals, there was a contingent promise to allow an Egyptian battalion in certain circumstances to return to the Sudan. He regarded that as a dangerous and retrograde step. The time had not come, if ever it should come, when we could divest ourselves of any part of our responsibility for tho government of the Sudan and share again the responsibility for it with the Egyptian people. If the Egyptian battalion were sent hack to the Sudan woukl it be made perfectly clear that its continuance there depended solely upon the decision of the British Government, and that if there should be any repetition of offences which led to its withdrawal it would be the prerogative of the British Government, uncontrolled by references to any other authority whether in Geneva or at The Hague, to order and enforce its withdrawal?. Referring to claim five of the new proposals, providing that each of the contracting parties should undertake not to conclude political agreements prejudiced to the interests of the other, Sir Austen Chamberlain said it w r as ridiculous to say that the foreign policy of the British Government and the British Empire was to be governed by the interests and circumstances of the kingdom of Egypt. He hoped the Foreign Secretary would reconsider the clause, based a$ it was on ft mutality which did not exist. It was proposed that British troops should leave Cairo and Alexandria. Had they the right to go back at once if the. lives of foreigners in Cairo and Alexandria, or elsewhere, were threatened'? He viewed with profound anxiey the consent of the Government to the removal of these troops. MINISTER'S REPLY Mr. A. Henderson, the Foreign Secretary, replying, said his policy was the same as Sir Austen Chamberlain's had been when he was Foreign Secretary. His proposals contained one modification as contrasted with the proposals in the Chaniberlain-<Sarwat treaty. This concerned the location of troops for the defence of the canal. Under the Chamberlain-Sarwat proposals the British Government was not prepared to withdraw troops from the interior to the brinks of the Suez Canal for a period of 10 years. Knowing that the Egyptians did not like to have British troops in occupation of their cities, the present Government did not consider it right to continue the oecupa-

Hon for .10 years, and decided to terminate it when proper arrangements hud been made for the troops to be' located near the canal —located there for the purposes of ensuring ilio de fence of that vital artery of- British Imperial communications. This would •take from three to five years from the coming into operation of the treaty that might result from these negotiations, because the Government had determined that the Egyptian Government should satisfy our military authorities as to the accommodation and amenities necessary for the comfort of our troops, and he thought that by the time the operation became practicable the best part of 10 years would have gone. The Government believed it was impossible to keep military forces permanently in the capital of a country we desired to recognise as of independent sovereignty. It was more difficult to defend such a position it' the maintenance of. force was advocated, not as a means of protecting the canal, but of preserving internal order in the country. THE SUDAN QUESTION •With regard to the Sudan, that question had been the subject of prolonged and anxious consideration. From the Notes which accompanied the Government's proposals it would be seen that the Government was prepared to examine sympathetically a proposal for the return to the Sudan of an Egyptian battalion simultaneously with the withdrawal of troops from Cairo. Viewing the position from the viewpoint of the interests of the Sudan, the Governor-General had expressed himself strongly in favor of the conclusion of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement, and was willing to agree to the return of one Egyptian battalion to the Sudan. The Government was most unwilling to v agree to anything which might in the slightest degree create the danger, however remote, of a recurrence of the memorable events of 11)24. It felt, however, that the conclusion of a treaty would create an entirely new atmosphere and ensure that the relations between the two countries were inspired by a spirit of genuine co-operation. Mr. Henderson pointed out that paragraph li of the present proposals, as distinct from the Sarwat treaty, imposed a definite treaty obligation, on Egypt to ensure the due discharge of responsibilities for the lives and property of foreigners in Egypt. He believed that this proposal was adequate, and if the treaty was observed in the spirit in which it had been conceived he believed it would be effective. "We proceeded on the lines,"

said Mr. Henderson, ".that no agreement would be of permanent value unless credit is given to the Egyptians for a desire to operate the agreement in the spirit in which its provisions have been conceived. Irritating restrictions calculated to arouse suspicions, and which wound national susceptibilities, have been removed." A HAPPIER CHAPTER The purpose so far as the British Government was concerned, he added, was the establishment of a firm and lasting friendship with the Egyptian people by the removal of those sources of suspicion which in the past have been the cause of so much damage to the interests of both people. The Government believed that it must regard the declaration of Egyptian independence of 1!>22 as having made a clean sweep of interference in the internal administration of Egypt. Such interference, in his judgment, could only be maintained by force. A policy of force was hardly worth a moment's discussion. It was a policy for which to-day no Government would make itself responsible, and no Parliament in this country would support., Ho believed that if the present proposals resulted in a treaty they would open a happier chapter in Anglo-

Egyptian relations. It was his first conviction that such a treaty, by obtaining for Great Britain the friendship and support of Egypt, especially in times of difficulty, would ensure the security of British Imperial communications' far more,effectively than an occupation enforced in the teeth of the opposition of the Egyptian people. He believed that through its newlyelected Government, Egypt would reciprocate the spirit of friendship and faith which had been reposed in her in recent months by representatives of this nation. Mr. Winston Churchill said the acceptance of the treaty in its present form and the withdrawal of the troops from Cairo wo.uld be far more likely to lead to bloodshed and a tense and dangerous situation in the Mediterranean, than if we went ion as we were, and would be both difficult and unsatisfactory. We must be careful, in seeking clarity, not to set up a train of events leading to a shocking and sanguinary disaster. Retirement to the canal would be pregnant witli danger. Any substantial increase in Egyptian troops in Cairo would require the -counter reinforcement of British troops on the canal. We could, at any time, while we retained the canal zone, advance upon (aire and win another Tel-el-Kobir. But did we want to do this' Laborite: Who wants to? GLOOMY PREDICTIONS

Mr. Churchill said it was a situation* hone wanted to see. The treaty should impose a limit on the size of the Egyptian forces, otherwise it would simply be equivalent to manufacturing explosives in a retort. Lord Thomson had obviously had misgivings when .it was mentioned that armored ears could reach Cairo from the canal in six hours. Was it part of the Government's plan to keep a mobile force on the canal to advance, if necessary, on Cairo? It was advisable Sto bring to the notice of the House what the Government had in mind. (Ministerial laughter). Mr. Churchill said either Ave must be prepared to concede the full Egyptian claims in relation to Sudan or face continued quarrelling with those forces in Egypt at whose behest we were, abandoning Cairo, which would resound throughout Asia, It would l)e better to leave the British troops at Cairo, conceding to Egyptian sentiment every considerate usage, and every guidance towards self-develop-ment. He urged the Government to insist on the limitation of Egypt's army and the abandonment of conscription. He believed Lord Lloyd's dismissal had been interpreted by the Arabs as an inherent British weakness. Therefore, it was a direct precursor of the Palestine massacres. Labor cries of "Shame." Mr. Churchill emphasised the force of the Egyptian election, when not a single Liberal dared to stand because they were .confronted with the bitterest foes of Britain. He predicted that long before three or live years events would occur in Cairo affording a brutal demonstration of the need of British troops. Labor cries of "Shame." Mr. Churchill hoped that tho Government would be long enough in office to reap some of the folly and the evil it had sown.

Sir Herbert Samuel pointed out that Mr. Churchill seemed to forget that independence was the dominating consideration of the 1022 declaration. Mr. Churchill thought always in terms of strategy, troops and war. That spirit retarded progress. He was prepared to take the risks that would come from goodwill. It was time the reserved points were settled. There appeared to be no margin for further concessions.