Poverty Bay Herald PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING. GISBORNE, FRIDAY, DEC. 14, 1928. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LIV, Issue 16827, 14 December 1928, Page 6

Poverty Bay Herald PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING. GISBORNE, FRIDAY, DEC. 14, 1928. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Hostilities between the United States and Britain are unthinkable in tho minds of millions of both nations, but mutual confidence between the two countries has yet to be established. It has become evident for some .time pasf that Anglo-Ameri-can relations have been drifting into a very unsatisfactory condition. During an election campaign such as that which has just passed in the United States there is, of course, always a lot of hot air, and politicians coquetting for the foreign vote make it a practice of “twisting tho lion’s tail.’’, But the indications of distrust go further than mere political’vaporings. The national policy has been shaped and consolidated to exclude that real and hearty eo-operation with Britain which to the, minds of most British people seems the natural course to be adopted by the Anglo-Saxon race. Since the "breakdown of the Geneva naval conference last year a whole series of incidents has illuminated the widening gulf and the steady growth of irritation on both sides of the Atlantic. Britain, we think it can truthfully be said, has done her best/to bring about a good understanding. From 1919 to 1927 her national policy was shaped with the evident purpose of securing co-operation, and to this end many concessions were made, most notable being, of course, the abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Even after Mr. Lloyd George’s fall, writes a contributor to the Melbourne Age, “we must not offend America’’ remained a guiding principle of successive British Governments and profoundly iniiueneed British policy, its influence can be traced in all manner of matters—-the change in Far Eastern policy, the British attitude to the security problem, the crazy "debt settlement of 1923, the disastrous return to the gold standard at a moment most disadvantageous to British industry, down to smaller things like oil concessions in the Middle East, and the extension of the. three-mile limit. The second point to grasp is that American co-operation could not be 'bought. She -took all the concessions willingly enough—and who shall blame her —-but continued to hold herself most definitely aloof from the support of British policy. And she did this simply because she believed —and was given every excuse for believing by the sustained obsequiousness of British statesmen and publicists—that she had no need of British support, while Britain had, great need of hers. The Americans, in -effect, said, “We shall continue to pursue our national policies, indifferent to foreign opinion. If you choose to make us concessions in certain matters, to accommodate your .policy to ours, we arc glad. But we will not alter our course an iota, when it conflicts with yours, to win support, which we do not need.’’ Thus, as we have seen, England got no support from America in the long controversy with France. Again, in the Far East, though England to please Washington had completely dislocated her traditional policy, the United States continued and to-day continues to play an aggressively lone hand in China, and maintains her policy of diplomatic undercutting. Finally—and this was theysupreme test —in spite of England’s Abandonment of her old doctrine of naval supremacy and her acceptance of parity, America showed no inclination to reach a broad-based compromise on naval policy, which is at the very root of successful Anglo-American cooperation, but pursued, without hint of concession, a programme which, though ostensibly aiming at parity, would inevitably give her real supremacy in battle fleets. In short, tne history of the years from the Peace Conference at Paris to the Naval Conference at Geneva made it unmistakably clear, first, that the United States did not really want British partnership at all, and, secondly, that if there was to be a partnership, ’Great Britain would be most definitely the junior partner The naval question, so vital to Britain, was tho supremo test. And the Geneva .Conference, where England stood firm on the cruiser question, risking American hostility, and, in fact, incurring it, was the turning point. From then on may be noted the reorientation of British foreign policy towards Europe, tho at least temporary abandonment of flic Anglo-Saxon co-operation ideal, and the cultivation of the friendship of France. In the marked divergence of view between France and the United States over the Kellogg Pact, Great Britain very definitely took tho French French and European side, and supported the reservations. But even more important was the Anglo-French naval compromise, in which the great point of dispute .between England .and America —the cruiser question —was decided , in England’s favor, indeed, the major significance of this agreement; must bo regarded as being diplomatic rather than, ,technical, for both parties must have known /that the formula had no' chance of acceptance by the Unitod States. In effect, the British Government was demonstrat’

ing to Washington that in any future conference she would have French support on the main issue. Since the publication of the compromise events have moved rapidly. A series of incidents, of which the failure of Mr. Kellogg to visit London and the conclusion of the ambiguous arbitration tflinty with Egypt are the most important, have expressed America's annoyance, while President Coolidge’s recent belligerent message aim the proposed revival of the monster naval eonstruetiou programme—which amounts practically 10 a threat to outbuild Europe—indicate her ictusai to be intimidated into compromise. On ilie British side, the frank criticism of American policy by two Cabinet Ministers, Lord Birkenhead and Sir William Joyiison-Hicks, have not improved the atmosphere. Thus it is clear that while tue present tension is over the matter of naval disarmament, the ultimate issue m Anglo-American relations is whether the United States is to persist in playing a lone hand m a world situation where economic eonrlicts are only too likely to arise in the future. The American foreign investment policy, which will inevitably be followed by commodity export must ultimately engender the most acute' economic rivalry, and it is this Tact which renders the United States' present attitude of sfclf-suiujjiency auu its complete lack ot understanding With Buropc so dangerous. Until the American nation realises that it is as much part of a world system as, say, France is that of Europe, there will always be danger of misunderstandings and bitterness, and real progress with the ideals of world peace and World betterment cannot be made. Happily the United States has just ejected as its . President Herbert Hoover, a niau who will bring to White House a first-hand acquaintance with Europe and : its problems, and whose aspirations are known tu bo to build goodwill by wish and sympathetic handling of foreign relations. Mr. Hoover will find British statesmen ready to meet him more than halfway m every move for the establishment of good understanding auu mutual co-operation in the interests of world peace.