ANXIETY OF THE ALLIES.

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume XLVII, Issue 15275, 24 July 1920, Page 9

ANXIETY OF THE ALLIES.

PROBLEMS DEALT WITH AT SPA CONFERENCE. BOLSHEVISTS AND POLES i (Elcc. Tel. Copyright— United Press Assn.) LONDON, July 22. Mr. Lloytft f4enrge made a statement regarding the Spa Conference. Ho paid that hp Tras very hopeful thot Turkey would sign the. treaty because- the. Turks would recognise that this was tho best means nf enabling the Porte to retain the dominions loft her and start life on a surer and sounder basis. The question of Poland had given tho Allies great anxiety. Tho Polish attack on Russia was reckless and foolish, anil the only excuse was the Bolshevists' interference m Polish affairs. Poland was legitimately afraid of Soviet Russia, and anxious to have a buffer State. An independent Poland was essential to the whole fabric of peace, continued, the Prime Minister. If the Bolshevists' overran Poland they inarched right up to the German frontier. That would re a. great temptation to Germany, and would afford a cheap way for the* Germans to escape their obligations. There were millions of trained men m Ger Tnau,y. The, effect of tho Bolshevists overrnning Poland might be to deprive the Allies of the fruits of victory, therefore the Allies concluded they must : take steps to arrest the destruction of Poland and the march of the Bolshevist armies through. Poland. The noto sent from Spa to tho Soviet Government was sent with the full consent of the Allies. It was made clear to Poland by the Allies that they would assist Poland to defend her Q\vn frontiers and her own independence. The Polish Premier undertook .to 'withdraw the Polish army to. the legitimate frontiers of Poland and to defend the frontiers and sock peace on that basis?. Air Lloyd fj-eorge described the- Soviet Government's" reply as ambiguous and largely propaganda. £0 far as he understood it -the Soviet said they wero "willing to negotiate with Poland directly. They alleged that the. Allies had ' treated Poland badly m fixing the boundary. They wanted to give more to Poland, and promised to consider the armistice m a friendly spirit. Apparently they ! were only prepared to discuss the mat- j ter with t'ho proletariat Government. The Soviet was not entitled to dictate to Poland what sort of government' shfe should have. In order to teat the , Soviet's bortfi fides' the Allies had ad- > j vised! Poland to apply tjj the Soviet tor! jan armistice with a view to J peace. In our reply to Moscow Wo were j bound to .make it clear that if, despite I the Polish application for ah armistice; ! the Russian armies still marched on we i would give Poland such assistance as Iwe could. We were bound to do everything m. our power to avert the wiping out, of Poland, which Would be fatal to •the peace of Europe, j The Premier stated that the Russian delegates coming to England would remain at' Reval pending the . Soviet's further reply. Peace was a question of time, however pressing, and France- mitt Britain had sent envoys, to Poland to investigate, tho question of assisting the people to defend the frontiers. Referring to Germany, Mr. Lloyd George thought Fehrenbach and von Simons .honorable and upright men who were doing their best to cope with gigantic difficulties, but the Allies were not confident they could carry out the treaty. Regarding' reparations he 'emphasised' the fact that the Allies reached a complete xmderstanding thereon. The scheme submitted by the Germans for liquidating reparations was most walu-a-ble, as giving clear proof that, the Germans were making a real effort to grapple vrith the problem of the indemnity. There was no attempt afc evasion.. I Dealing with the arrangements over 'tho coal question, Mr. Lloyd George said that no doubt the population of Germany was gravely auiderfed. Figures ; were submitted showing that the infnn- \ tile mortality was appalling, while investigations bore out the assertion that , the miners were unable to produce the quota of coal required because they were underfed. Therefore arrangement 1 ? were made that; more than half the 1 value of thn-coal produced should )>e j advanced to provide them with nee.esjsarv food and clothing. > I The Conference had niade- arrangements to deal effectively with the war criminals nfc an early date. Regarding disarmament, , the Premier expressed tho opinion that the naval portion should bo completed by the end of September., Considerable progress waa also being made with tihe military programmej but there were still 3,000,---000 unsurrendered rifles m Germany, , whilo although 25.000 guns were surI rendered only about halt were* destroy- , cd. Tiuy Allies wore now destroying 1 10G0 tsieekly. It is estimated that there j aro still .abftut 900.000 armed men In (GerinaiyY-&nd J there was also too much t war tnal^alil' 'spread , about the country, l Tho position was dangerous. The Allies i therefore insisted on the' issue of a I proclamation demanding the surrender .of rifles by September. I Mr. Asquith,! -while regretting that 1 the Powers had not succeeded m preventing Poland from embarking upon the foolish adventure, agreed that Poland must not be overrun by the Bolphevists. The Allies should take steps on the initiative of the League of Nations. ' , * Mr. -Lloyd George, Intervening, said that one of the most vehement portions of the Bolshevist reply was tho refusal , to have anything to dp with the League. ! Mr. Asquith, continuing 1 , expressed satisfaction that the Spa Conference saw I the desirableness of revising tho treaty • m regard to coal and disarmament.- Ho 1 hoped consideration would be further extended, as experience ■ was gained of . the Working' of the treaty. ! Mr. Lloyd George, replying ,to questions, disclaimed tho British responsibility for General Wrangel's operations. The Bolshevist reply offered an amnesty to General Wrangel. We were anxious for peace on the basis of the "independence of Poland. He- referred to the false impressions m Russia as regards the British, which -made negotiations for peace almost impossible. JTe believed the Bolshevists would be greatly mistaken if they invaded Poland, whei'e the forces were more formidable than jthey imagined. — Router.