Poverty Bay Herald PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING. GISBORNE. FRIDAY. MARCH 2, 1917. SEA POWER.

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume XLIV, Issue 14236, 2 March 1917, Page 2

Poverty Bay Herald PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING. GISBORNE. FRIDAY. MARCH 2, 1917. SEA POWER.

Tlie fact is strongly emphasised by English naval writers, reviewing the events of the past year that the sea power of the Allies lias continued 'to do' its paramount work, with results which are daily becoming more apparent. Whatever criticism may be passed ori the lack of enterprise m the use of naval force, of which complaint is* sometimes made, this root fact must be fully recognised and credit given with all gratitude to the men who, by their steadfast tenacity, alone make the coming victory of the Allie s possible. "With the most serious submarine campaigrt with which we have yet had to contend now m full awing," writes Mr Gerard Fiennes, "and . with the undeniable embarrassment caused by lack of mercan* tile tonnage, it may seem rash to say that the Battle of Jutland confirmed our grip upon sea communications, but it is nevertheless an accurate statement of fact. "The operations' of the- U boats do not avail, to enable the enemy to -use his fleet m order to open the way of the) sea for his own use. He is m much the same < position -asi were the French irt 1759 after Quiberon /Bay, though thai battler -was actually more decisive. ..In the following- year French privateers took no fewer than three hundred Brite" ish merchantmen, and m 1761 eight hundred. But the French flag was not seen again at sea. until the peace. The recrudescence of submarine warfare against commeirce after Jutland Bank ia a direct admission that the Germans can effect nothing positive by sea. What re. mains for --the Allies to do is to recover free use of the. feeas for themselves — and to use them." A similar view is taken by another naval expert, Mr Archibald Hurd who, following the advice of Con-, fucius, "Study the past if you worild divine the future," takes it that we may judge the naval events of the coming year with great hopefulness from the events^ which have occurred since the outbreak of hostilities m August, 19J.4. When the war opened the Central Powers believed themselves fully prepared at sea. Germany possessed a navy larger than the combined forces- of France and Russia. If the British people, whose interests m the Continental qparrel was moral rather than material, had determined to stand aside, leaving, Serbia to be crushed, Belgium to be oyeriTun, and France and Russia to be defeated, the Central Powers would have obtained the assured command of the world's seas. , The German naval preparations, pursued unremittedly over a period of nearly 20 years, were .undertaken at a cost.of about d 8500.000.000 m order to frighten ithe .British people to . adopt an attitude of neutrality. At the moment when war occurred Germany possessed the second largest fleet m the worldTand she gained all the advantages) flowing from a strategical situation • which enabled her to prevent co-opera- ' tion between the British and RussiAn j fleets, while at the same time she possessed North Sea ports within three, or four hundred miles of the exposed eastern littoral of Great Britain. She ' was able to mobilise 40 capital ships— ] battlei ships and battle cruisers — besides 1 eight older ooast defence battle ships : ' she also possessed nine armoured and 43 ' other cruisers?, besides nearly 200 de- 1 stroyers and torpedo boats, and about 30 J submarines. Germany had' a great fleet, * well manned, well equippetd, and well trained. She could count on the sup- ] port of the considerable naval forces of < Austria-Hungary m southern waters, j Her ally possessed seven modern and j eight older battle ships, besides 20 . cruisers, and more than 100 torpedo ( craft. If it was a source of weakness ,\ that- the two allied fleets were so far j .apatt., it also was a source of strength ] that Germany was able to count on her j partner maintaining a naval threat; m j southern waters, and thus checking any. ( tendency on the part of the Entente ( Powers* to carry out a complete policy j of concentration by _*a. Mr Hurd then „ goes on to show the course the naval f war has taken. Though the Germai) .] fleet has madel efforts to convince the f world that it is not m a military sense £ "contained" that is the actual position ] which the Battle of Jutland failed to ] alter. The Germans assert that they j there won a victory. Time tests every ] war claim. Naval battles a«e fought ] with only one object — m order to gain ■] the right to use the seas for military and j economic purposes. Since the battle of c Jutland, German naval activity hasubeen confined to destroyer raids m the darkness. which have achieved no military . results, and to the submarine campaign , against the merchant shipping of the . Allies., and, unfortunateJy, also of neutrals. Tlie submarine campaign, Mr Hurd prediots, is doomed to failure. No . offensive weapon ' has ever yet been l .developed which has not eventually met 'by an adequate defensive. Tlie Germans are at present obtaining the benefit of , what may be described as a ne\r form of naval warfare, for the submarine as , a practical seagoing weapon has been J developed since-.hostilities opened. There , isi no reason to doubt that m the course £ of the coming year the subhiarine will be defeated. When that result has been a produced what will happen? Will the " high seas fleet again emerge.from behind f its mine fields, supported by heavy coast^ artillery? Count Reventlow and n other German writers m close touch with ', the higher command have time andi again asserted . that the German naval j forces will nevefr engage at sea unless I there is an assurance tliat they will be"., opposed by approximately equal strength. 1 _ The British fleet is stronger absolutely f and relatively than it ever was. Making d c

illmvaiic. 1 fin- its .supciioi- gnu powi-r, it.' is more Lhan twice as Ntiong m modern . battleships and battle cruisers than Ger- I many, and it is adequately supplied with ! light cruisers and desitroyers. The Germans may attemptjto trick the -British I ndmira'ls, as m the spring of last "year, ' ' but they will fail as they failed before. Unless Germany, therefore, determines m desperation to stake her all on a battle at sea, hoping, though defeat be certain, to take to the bottom of the 1 sea at least an equivalent number of ] British units, there is no reason to ] anticipate that during the year any serious effort will be made to break the iron ' dominion which the British fleet is imposing on the German Empire. Austria- ■ Hungary is also unable to use her naval forces. With every month that passes the Allies' command of the sea will be reinforced by new unitsi and by the strength which comes from sea keeping; What those factor!; m combination involve it is hardly necessary to explain. During the months ahead sea power will be translated into land power. In the early phase of the war it brought ..to ruin Germany's military policy — a short, sharp campaign against France, to be followed by the defeat of Russia. It will bring to ruin the later military saheme which has involved m- the war Bulgaria and Turkey. All those Powers which are now associated with Germany will continue to be besieged by sea, and all history attests that the sea controls the land. As the greatest writer on naval history, Admiral Mahan> remarked m reviewing the course of events after the battle of Trafalgar, m 1805: — "Amid all the pomp and circumstances of the war which for 10 years to come desolated the Continent, amid all the tramping to and fro over Europe, of the French armies and their auxiliary legions, there went on unceasingly that noiseless pressure upon the vitals of France, that compulsion, whose silence, when once noted, becomes to the observer the most striking aind' awful mark of the working of sea power." Throughout 1917 sea power will continue ,t© be arrayed against Germany and her partners, and ia due course it will bring them to defeat and ruin. .