FOE'S GREAT MISTAKE.

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume XLIII, Issue 14050, 21 July 1916, Page 7

FOE'S GREAT MISTAKE.

THOUGHT FRENCH UNREADY. , LONDON, July 9. The Times correspondent m Paris connectedly describes the French operitions m tp.o west. He says : — "While the Germans battered Verdun the French General Staff busily accumulated guns and men on the River Somme front, recreating General Foch's armies with the finest selection of troops, including Moroccans and the famous Colonial Corps, and new and heavy artillery. There were 27 German battalions m. opposition at. the start, and these were reinforced to 39. "The German General Staff, before the commencement of the offensive, dis.tributed a circular to the troops, saying that the imminence of the fall of Verdun had prevented tliiei start of the French northern/ offensive. This gave the element of surprise that greatly helped the French m th-e first five days ■of the move. ' v "Th« enemy's defence Tmes consisted firstly of triple trenches linked up by the heavibpfortified villages of Curlu, Frise, and Dpmpierre;, secondly, a front two miles " behind, based on Feuilleres, Herbecourt, Aasevillers, and Estrees ; and thirdly, th© Flancourt-Belloy lime. .."The new French tabtics comprised, first, a prolonged heavy • bombardment, then the 75,'s plastered with shrapnel the lateral /rear trench approaches and covering a reconnaissance m which the attackers could - ascertain the damage done, and if it proved satisfactory signalled back, summoning up the mam infantry bodies. These tactics governed the. whole of the British and French strategy m the big offensive. ADVANCE BEGINS. "Tho British and French troops at the junction of the line went forward together, but the French on the. right did not move until later. When the Colonial Corps's officers received the news that the British had captured -Mametz, they gave the word, and their nien bounded forward and immediately captured the first line. "The Germans put their trust m the impregnableness of the. network of trenches south of the River Somme,

. _ f which had been strengthened to the ut : most during the last month. . But it was . useless, and was pounded into chaos % the guns, enabling the Allied infantry , to capture the positions with lightning' rapidity and a minimum of, losses: A general who headed the assault on Dompierre said! that the French artillery, had never been more successful. "Tlie greatest factors m the British losses were' the machine-guns and t the heavy artillery, the damage caused by rifle fire, being very small. Massed ar-" t/illery and. hidden machine-guns pre,^ \ented more progress m th© northern attack. The British airmen. were extra r . ordinarily superior m observations, and were of immense value. An airmail sig.nalled nine enemy lorries which were; on th' 6 road, and invisible, except from the air. ' A heavy battery destroyed, three, and the rest bolted. Another^ aii man, flying four miles from' German - territory* saw infantry marching. He swooped : down and used his machinegun, and returned unscathed. *• , -.. GALLANTRY. OF. MEN. ,-. ...' . . the .gallantly of the new armies, and the Germans are already .realising the hug-e mistake m underestimating the British gunners. There are also full praises for tht French gunnery." "By July 5 the ( whole of the second line of defences south of the Sommo was caT.h;rcd, and daring patrols were^rev. comioitring the third line. A brief halt was necessary to bring up the AhgloI'rench lin© north of th^ river,, the infantry meanwhile repelling couijiter-at-lacks, and m brilliant joint operations at Hardecourt and m the vicinity eyened up the position, and the capture oi' Hardecourt facilitated the French advanc# north of the Somme." ..^The Present line is from the ' JJa Rols'elle f font io Contal Maison,. through Main^tz, on to the Caterpillar Woods, iorin^J\|pnt^Auban and; (the Bemafay Wopas" to junction .wlty ' t'fie French. The higher command i^^well content with, the resulji, of th^fi^st^ efforts." The correspondent simsf top the battle lessons, and says, .that tneHSermans' most favorite^ devicsv,was ajj,aousfle barrage of fire, using ; Itfgjn- expmsive^ J&d -. |M new shrapnel heavier thari;prevswarf '•a-na'? of greater, velocity, ijand^peneta&uo^^^snd sharper . detJjEafiQn >0d blat^Wim^' . » , j Apparently thje, foe -vknew^^^qaCS; 8f • tlie wgs misled ;^ii§o;|the exact. Jacea.;. . -.lite massed- .anL^norjfeoSs wetgnt of g«ns,at varioiis points, .^roflly: batfcniig tbe sectors ; 'and. the -srolilid wamk. : . ..i'.^v " ■r^-'i* : --'^ . '-VALUE O* 1 M4pHINE] t 'GtrN# ; guns. .lor the defencei : anaishe pijlim^ted ,_<yvxy artillery attack* sta^uA'but more - nearly than ever, and forecast Hhe evp-. iution ._ of future warfare. ; Rifles ; .wepro subordinated _ m the constant struggleio,. th© .machine, guns . and fa , the ■bigger pins, which both 'had the effect' of} Sim-' inating -the former great factor ydf H per-, sonal valor. Big guns do not avail, noweyeis m destroying the cunniiigest machine pun' shelters. From deep dUgruts tunnels run backwards* under a 1.11, with ascending ..tunnels cpimhig'^put en the surface, the machine' guiis " l>eing * oncealed , m the small opening. The heaviest artillery cannot break the steep s< - unniits, .tlie machine guns survive the bombardment, frontal daylight infantry attacks are hopeless.