A CONTRAST OF PLANS.

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume XLI, Issue 13475, 2 September 1914, Page 4

A CONTRAST OF PLANS.

'QERM AN AND FRENCH. "Initiative aaid Power of MahhfciiVre," was tlie subject of a lecture by Briga-dier-General H. H. Wfilsbn," * 0.8., D.5.0., Director- of Military Operations, 'War. Office, to- an assembly of officers, nearly four years ago. ." The well-known'; expert in] tactic^ a*isciissed the German "and "French-plan's of war— the plans, which liave been used' -iii the present epochal test. "We all know,"" said General Wilson, "that there are two schools -ftf: thought •as regards the exercise of inftiativb/* There is the. German school, which preaches and practices, the initiative of attack.; To attack alway-,' to attack at all times, to attack everywhere," and to attack everybody..' There .is ft creed. There is something 'grand m tlie' .simplicity, of this doctrine, a. simplicity which goes a lbiig way, towards ehsnring success. . .'.'" "' '" Then there, is the. French school,' which preaches the attack just fis vdhemkntly, wliich is just as scathing on all 'forms of defence, unless they are/ merely -ill period of incubation for 'a proximate attack ; biit. which also preaches that ' to attack always, to a£tack at all times, to attack everywhere, and to, attack everybody may lead to a great waste of power, and possibly to disaster. ..'..''' '' 'The German plan seems to work 'out roughly as follows :— Possibly the area of the* enemy's concentration can be fixed, m which,, case the initial forward movement; is made against an area, and not against troops.. Possibly the position of* the hostile troops can be approximately determined, m . which case the forward movement is made .against them. . But, whether , agaipst . an area, or against troops, the course pursued is always- the same.; . It.- is a, f ull. extension and afi convergent advance, the whole' force te bring ite' weight to. .bear at once, and always and ever by an overlapping, of the\ flanks^ and '"-by" 'an* irresistibly, initiative to deprive /the \enemy of all nower of offence,/ and throw him from the outset on the defensive' /. ."' Such, an open deployment means ' 'no general- reserve; and no power te alter plans and no power of manoeuvre." The 'event, fi have show; n that the Ger> man attack wag against an area". Tfi'e leaders hoped: ¥ to Sfreep through, T3eljrhun^ and to strike France' before mob-; ilisaiioh Was 'complete on n very ;im ; porta hit' concentration area, fi.fi fifififi'^'fi'""''' After a ! refei"ence^o"the advantages of.j ibe." German scheVne— "a bold fi advance. t " an 'enveloping moveri.eht <j^ " attack and .'full', "initiative"—General''Wi|soh mentioned 'three disad v^ntlgei^ '■:—^l) The j' whole movement fnhy ' miscarry o wi n £ te ' Vi s. aulif-v* , copulation of the area or of the position ojf the enemy's troops to" be enveloped. (2) There is/small .ch^<sov/o.f_ changing the plan, when once commit-'' ted iffi it. (3) The Cfommander-in-Ohr.-f '. ha§ little power, oyer the fortith-H pfihis army. „.'•' .!The check suffered bV'.the^Gisr.inansVin '.tjief vicinity oi* Lieee is impressive evidence j that they 'did miscalculate the defensive strength of that .area. The plan presumed /a, rapid passages, .by a fierce hhse£,/ but this necessary tager Tf«M? hot^ined.; Suhseqh„nt -fifixe?points mentioned thai much cpn.nsioi).. resulted ( frpm t.^.\s unexpected spt'baplf.. ; , the 'lecturer gave forije $ry humor on the "cult of /the , in]i"tiative,'' aatn t abj.Or. lui,e Jetish among, ..the' Germans. If. the.' hiimblest 'jiriyate :has not' a. marshal's, baton m his knapsack, lie at least has scope jfor initiative, y' All .are, full, of intelligence," the/ 'Geper'air , remarked playfully. * ' C AU "' are full , of ,ihdividuaV;ty . All a£e .full: qf initiative^ "all, indeed, ■except the .liaplesjf Commander-in-Chief. :He alone, *tli6ugli /it is ' conceivable he may }iave;|inteliigehce£jiid pc^sihiy i. n ;di-. yiduali.ty,j'cah r obvipusly have ho.initia- ■ litre: : " 'Kg .alone is ah p. looker. -The whole picture reminds me of. number pf, men' m 'icaleco\is'.',di;a;wn upyori fhe.edg'e of a liatqjiig pond, .when on. of the junior /members (t^lyrig the -initiative), j-ushes: clown.. the , spring. bpa,r,d' ahd pluhge_i m. He is followed by ali the othefs^ . until .-finally, the only ..num left, on; the/, bank^is u ttie, senior (member of' the fi-pdt ty,. In -a fit of desperation lie/ too,; races 'down, the plank, and goes headlong into! tho pond.", Is this," an. ox-, a^geration,?'- . /Perhaps it' .s. But look bacH.at.lß64, 1866,' and 1879, and a;'l th&. German teaching, 'sjheei. and tell ihe, if it is. vei-yv far, from the' truth." .', . Other writers have . asserted a lack of initiative, ,', and, / have alleig^d that ' the' G^i_han soldier is a clockwork unlit, moving by force of a bidden, spring, of y?hich ne "is igriorahl. ■ "fi- .....,,,,■ ,-t'As I understand tho Frene}i theorY, itVrs tlii&". continued, 'the .General. "They are iric-inecl iff., favor ; manoeuvre i':n. the' early?' phases.. of an 'n'ctipn m pre. ference to - deployment';. .'.they" therefore favor, largo reserves^ they j_el\eve. iii: the actioii/being fougfy lay ' the t Com-m_hder-in-Chief, and n«t'.'by some..subordinate leader. They therefore restrict initiative t(f .purely, local , and .tacwc.au o}»Tations, a^nd have htfther _.ibe \desjre nor the intei^tioh of, {illo\yihy?., ah j action to bc\ lirought.on by. junior ' person fi This s'cheine alsp .is perfectly logical. ' They i.nte.irt.4.'''te ; , pause a V moment':, until .they see wh-^t. their enemy./.s -doing, and' then bring .the.buifc of.tlieir troobs'to .some weak point. In" or<ler -to do 'ibis two things; are necessary: . (1) ','Tliey inUfet obtain early, information. of^the'ehchiy's line of advance' ari'ct'-|d^pilV>ym-.rit.' (2) -They -.must, keeb: thoc'bufk of tlveir "force ih.a.formation • which/: .ends jitsplf to rapid '.move, ment m 'ajiy direction, so "ilia t-J on i'ihc infoi-matioh * being , received fi lh.ev. ;can move to, and fall upon,'' the' enemy's wealpoint. Tliev intend •to cai ry bi*-/the first by t\ &\rpn^ jjiixed 'force' in front. Sonic people sometimes call i,3Vii. a r strhte. gic advanced guard. To carry but the ■second they propose to keep n large force, possi'ijlv W.f, or even the bulk, of t-hefr force as pfi wailing 'I6rce;' a striking force, remember,, but a waiting force/which somo"'peoiUe sometiihos' call a reserve."