THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

Otago Witness, Issue 3566, 18 July 1922, Page 27

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

AMERI CAN SEX'L'IMENT.

By

Frank H. Simonds.

WASHINGTON, June 2. r lhe three weeks which have passed since the Russian Note of May 11, which was the decisive gesture at Genoa, have served to mark a. striking hardening of American sentiment in the matter of Russia. It is (rue, as I indicated in an earlier despatch, that, there was before Genoa a certain weakening in the American stand. In many quarters there was a gain for the idea of recognition and the temptation held out by the promise of fat concessions had its effect, particularly as it seemed that all (lie rest of the world was rushing to share in (he prize. Genoa, however, led to a sharp revulsion. The attitude of the Soviet representatives.

their insolence, and. above all, their absolute refusal to meet the demands of tlie West, in tho matter of private properly served to destroy most of the American sentiment in favour of recognition of the present Russian Government without too rigid insistence upon certain conditions. You cannot too strongly emphasise this reaction in the United States which continues and grows. Had Genoa really resulted in anything, it, is possible that there might have been some considerable criticism of the Harding Administration for not going. In a limited degree the decision to stay away, which is a new evidence of the dominating influence of the Secretary of State. Mr Hughes, was a political gamble, but it was a. winning throw, and nothing that he has done since he took office has won such far shining approval at, home. Tho invitation to go to Tlie Hague was summarily rejected by Mr Hughes with the full knowledge that he would have the almost unanimous approval of the countrv. Mr Lloyd George’s House of Commons speech, with its references to American participation, left this country mute cold and actually hardened the official determination to have none of the Russian mess under present renditions I have often tried to emphasise the fact that there is actually more fear and detestation of the Bolshevist in the United States than anywhere else in the world. This was true in the earlier stages of the Russian Revolution, if the dislike and worse tended to die out with time. In reality it only heeame dormant, anrl the Genoa performances served to revive it in full vitality. Add io this the fact that there was there as in the country u good deal of criticism of the fashion in which British and Italian statesmanship seemed to give wav before the So viets and to make concessions which disgusted American public opinion anil seemed to it to increase Bolshevist insolence. Today the mass of Americans support their Goyei-m;nt m the insistence that a recognition of property rights shall he the “sine qua non” of all dealings with the Reds and argue that there should lie no dealings with Moscow until such a concession is made. On the. other hand, anv French idea that, tlie result of French policy at Genoa has led the American people or Government to take a different view of French policy generally is quite mistaken. \\’e think that France was light in her contention as to pi opert.v rights: vve endorse the FranooBelgian stand ; and, liad vve been in Genoa would have stood on the same principle: hut that does not in the least reconcile the majority of us to French position in 'He matter of armaments. It is a fact that the present British Government lost prestige in the United Slates by reason of its Genoa conduct. Mr Uovd George m particular has had a very bad press ever since. But it is not true that the prestige hist by Britain was acquired by bra nee. This is a mistake frequently made in Europe about Americans. We do not shift our approval from side to side; vve do not balance, and French hopes of better relations as a consequence of Genoa. Brii isfi i ,tt e f ',”"" le<l fact as extreme tVarinngtUr b “ Bed Upo » ,he event * We.shall no’, go to The Hague, and there 1 ; e p lc ‘ ss , >e,ll ""<mt for such parV I,Cre "T ** representation f V T ■ ' ou l K,t ltl(> ''““g iniite cor lecriy if you say that, whatever e/se Genoa did or did not achieve, it gave new strength to those who oppose European adventures ihe Genoa episode was used and inter’ preted as an object lesson. When it was over American sentiment had again ervtalnzed and the relusal to go to The It-. " ''ow P p ,lica A ion U rllis ° *.ow, ihe American public i s wa'elnW the intervention of the international fin am tieis in the reparations matter with a degree of interest. But one thing ought to be perfectly dear to Europe. It is con. ceivab.e that a loan to Germany may have American participation, but it will hot lie participation by the Government. Officially the T inted States is done with all financiid operations abroad, save with respect of past loans, which remain to be liquidated lne most that the Government can or will do is either to make known its opposition to the use of any private American funds m such a loan, in which case there will be an end of the affair, or else if ! tlie terms and conditions seem to it satis factory it may withhold its disapproval In other words, official action will not go beyond the exercise or non-exercise of the veto power, which of course it has But even this veto power rests on no actual authority. What the administration can do is to advise American investors that it regards such a loan as inadvisable and this advice would of course be aecepte’d Meantime in American comment you will find everywhere the explanation of ihe Genoa failure, as it is here regarded as due in part at least to the neglect of Mr Lloyd George to make any preparation in advance—such preparation as might have been indicated by a sounding of our Government. before llie Cannes decision. Such a sounding might not have resulted in tinconsent of the United States to attend, but it would have made clear what the American official view was, and would certainly prevented file publication of Mr Hughes’s letter refusing to attend, which fell as a wet blanker iipon the whole affair. s'f course, it is hard for us over here i to estimate tlie actual extent of the European desire that vve should share in international conferences. I recall that just, before Genoa, a leading Italian diplomat told tne in Paris that, for Italy, renewal of relations with Russia was so important. I that not even the American factor made if, j worth while to delay. “AA’e can’t wait i for America in this instance,” said he. | But if the American participation is of I real importance then it must be significant, :to note that Genoa, on the whole, postl ponod such _ participation, solidified Amon- \ ran opposition to foreign adventure and. i beyond all else, revived all the old and I violent American hostility and apprehension j of Russian Bolshevism. '