A NEW SOCIETY

Otago Witness, Issue 3556, 9 May 1922, Page 47

A NEW SOCIETY

A meeting was held in the Students’ Building at the University of Otago on Thursday last to form a students* society for the discussion of ethical and social problems. It was decided to call the new society the Eclectic Club. Professor W. Henderson Pringle was elected president, Mr A. G. Watson vicepresident, Mr C. B. Barrowclough hon. secretary, and Messrs Combes, Souter, and Thomson members of committee. Mr R. W. Souter, 8.A., read an introductory paper entitled “Modern Eclecticism,” explaining the aims of the club and its proposed methods of study. In the second and third centuries, 8.C., the speaker said, Greek philosophy, under the influence- of the growing power of the Roman Empire, became eclectic that is, the various schools began to unite on a common basis, from which the most extreme differences had been eliminated. We to-day lived in a similar atmosphere in this respect—that there is a growing desire for unity. A club which called itself eclectic, which wanted to choose the best out of everything—an ambitious object—should have some idea of how to set about such a task. It could not be expected to reach' formal agreement among members or. controversial subjects, but confusion could be avoided. The aim of each member should be, first., to form reasoned convictions; secondly, to discern clearly the real nature of differences of opinion; and thirdly, to perceive the bearing of such convictions and such differences of opinion upon the conduct of life. The speaker went on to indicate his opinion of the best method of approach to the various subjects in the syllabus which was to be put before them, a syllabus in which it had been attempted to cover the most vital problems of the day. , Summing up, the speaker said he had endeavoured to place before them certain methodological principles. These principles were : 1. Our individual conception of the nature and value of human personality. This was fundamental. 2. The corollary from this of the nature of human responsibility, which had three provinces—the formation, the expression," and trie realisation of opinions. By bearing those principles in mind throughout subsequent discussions, he believed they would go far towards realising those aims which they had set before themselves at the outset —namely, to form reasoned convictions, to discern clearly the real nature of differences of opinion, and to perceive the bearing of such convictions and such differences of opinion upon the conduct of life.